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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is the critical analysis of the evolution of the criminal 
justice systems throughout the past decade, with special attention to the fight against 
transnational terrorism. 
It is evident – for any observer - that such threats and the associated risk that terrorism 
entails, has changed significantly throughout the past decade. This perception has 
generated answers – many times radical ones – by States, as they have committed 
themselves to warrant the safety of their populations and to ease a growing sentiment of 
social panic. 
This thesis seeks to analyse the characteristics of this new threat and the responses that 
States have developed in the fight against terrorism since 9/11, which have questioned 
some of the essential principles and values in place in their own legal systems. In such 
sense, freedom and security are placed into perspective throughout the analysis of the 
specific antiterrorist legal reforms of five different States: Israel, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
On the other hand, in light of those antiterrorist eforms, it will be questioned if it is 
possible to speak of the emergence of a new system of criminal justice (and of a process 
of a convergence between common law and civil law systems), built upon a control and 
preventive security framework, significantly different from traditional models. 
Finally, this research project has the fundamental objective to contribute to a better 
understanding on the economic, social and civilizaton costs of those legal reforms 
regarding human rights, the rule of law and democracy in modern States 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND “THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK” 
 
 
“ The natural sciences talk about their results. The social sciences talk about their methods”1 
Henry Poincare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Poincare, Henry, Science and Method, Courier Dover Publications (2011), p. 65 
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1) Introduction  
 
This work aims to study a very specific topic: the d velopment of criminal 
procedure law in the post-September 11 period, in the areas covered by the various 
important counter-terrorism and counter-organised crime measures taken not only by 
national governments, but also by international organisations such as the UN or NATO. 
More specifically, this work will seek to analyse the criminal investigation and coercive 
measures adopted in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, as well as the 
structural changes in the nature of the criminal justice system of democratic 
constitutional states. 
 Another important aspect on which we will focus in this work is related to the 
nature of these legal changes and their dissemination in other areas of law as regards the 
curtailment of rights and restriction of guarantees2. 
 Finally, this study will address the impact and costs of these legislative changes3 
in the nature and structure of the democratic rule of law. As has been recognised not 
only by the legal community, but also by experts in economics and sociology, the 
impact of these ongoing changes in the criminal justice system was observed not only in 
the restricted area of law, but also in several key ar as of contemporary society. 
 In this respect, we will attempt to answer the following three fundamental 
questions: 
1) To know whether ongoing legislative changes have divided contemporary 
criminal proceedings into two stages: the pre-trial st ge and the trial stage, with 
fundamentally different values and principles. 
                                                
2 Edwards, Jack E., Bank Secrecy Act: Suspicious Activity Report Use Is Increasing, But FinCEN Needs 
to Further Develop and Document Its Form Revision Process, DIANE Publishing (2009), pp. 42 - 64 
3Gupta , Kulwant  , International terrorism: Conventions, resolutions, legislations, terrorist organisations 
and terrorists, Atlantic Publishers & Dist, (2002), p. 138 
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2) To ascertain whether the distinction between inquisitor al and adversarial 
procedure (i.e. the usual distinction between contine tal and Anglo-Saxon legal 
and criminal justice systems) remains current and scientifically sustainable. 
3) To objectively analyse and quantify the costs and implications of these measures 
for the liberal democratic nature of the state.  
 
2) Methodological Approach 
 
Given that this is an analysis of the legal systems – or of some legal systems – 
within the contemporary context of the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the 
comparative method would, by nature, be the ideal working method. The comparison of 
legislation and case law4 between the jurisdictions chosen for analysis is therefore the 
primary and overarching objective of this research work. In fact, it would be impossible 
to identify any global trend of change or paradigm shift without addressing, for 
comparison purposes, the legislative building blocks corresponding to the various 
matters between the different legal systems.  
However, in this context, if the comparative methodol gy itself plays an 
inevitably decisive role, the choice of “objects” to be compared, i.e. the legal systems 
chosen to be thoroughly analysed and compared, is equally important.  
The comparative methodology consists of a specific research strategy based on 
the comparison of analytical objects related to each other by certain common features.5 
Undoubtedly, comparative law is a powerful method of the comparative research of 
legal systems. However, is it relevant to attribute the results of comparative 
                                                
4 Cruz, P., “Comparative Law in a Changing World”, Cambridge University press, London (1999), p. 5 
5 Gutteridge, H., Comparative law: an introduction to the comparative method of legal study and 
research, Cambridge University Press (1949), P. 76 
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investigations to comparative law? Is it possible that they constitute its integral 
component or should they be considered something independent, a separate domain of 
legal scholarship? 
The comparative method is applied in comparative law as the basic specialized 
method of the research of legal phenomena. Besides, th  emergence of comparative law 
as a science resulted from analysing and resolving new problems in general 
jurisprudence. As Saidov asserts in this connection that when defining the designation 
of comparative law it is necessary to speak not so much about the institutional 
recognition of a new discipline, but rather about the acknowledgment of a number of 
new problems that have appeared in legal science.6 
As Kiekbaev states:  
“ It appears hardly possible to determine the characte  of the comparison process. 
The comparatists only refer to the necessity of comparison of similar legal systems. 
He fails to mention the significance of comparison f r the establishment of 
differences in those legal phenomena which were initially believed to be identical 
or similar. In this connection, the well-known German comparatists K. Zweigert 
and H. Kotz recognize that the process of comparison represents the most 
complicated aspect of comparative law and that is deemed rather problematic to 
establish any rigid rules regulating this process. David holds that comparative law 
is nothing but a method of study of legal systems. This theory was dominant in 
USSR as well as in the rest of East and Central Europe in second half of the 20th 
century. Acknowledging the given work, Hungarian comparatist Szabo developed 
it further, asserting that ‘comparative law’ is a much broader concept in 
comparison with simply a method of jurisprudence; it is characterized as a ‘whole 
movement’ ”.7 
 
 In the particular case of our study, the comparative methodology consists 
mainly of the comparative analysis of legal systems (previously selected) according to 
relevant material topics in terms of the subject of this research study: legislation relating 
to the criminal justice system in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. 
                                                
6 Saidov, A.H., Sravnitelnogo Pravovedeniye. Obshaya Chast, Izdatelstvo Zertsalo, Moscow (2001), pp. 
77 
7 Kiekbaev, Djalil I., “Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline?”, in European 
Journal of Comparative Law, V. 7, September (2003) 
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Similarly, it is important to note the strong doctrinal research component 
(doctrinal research method) that this work involves. Doctrinal research asks what the 
law is on a particular issue8. It is concerned with analysis of the legal doctrine and how 
it has been developed and applied.9 This type of research is also known as pure 
theoretical research. It consists of either a simple research directed at finding a specific 
statement of the law or a more complex and in depth analysis of legal reasoning.  
Indeed, a large part of the data presented herein was obtained from a 
comparative analysis, according to methodological and legal canons, of legislation and 
cases examined by courts of different jurisdictions. I  this context, the extent of the 
doctrinal analysis cannot, in methodological terms, be ignored or neglected: on the 
contrary, it will be a useful tool, complementary to the comparative approach that 
prevails in this work.  
Doctrinal research is, indeed, gaining an increasing importance within legal 
methodology. According to Van Gestel and Micklitz: 
“ Where some have argued in the past that interdisciplinarians often produce such 
abstract knowledge that has little relevance for legal practice, those who criticize 
doctrinal research normally do not claim that this re earch has no value for legal 
practice or legal understanding. In fact, much of the criticism towards doctrinal 
legal research appears to be either outdated or lacking a clear focus (…). There also 
appears to be an emerging debate in Europe about the ‘ rue nature’ of law as a 
science and about the consequences for legal scholars ip. Until today, however, 
doctrinal legal research has managed to keep its dominant position both at the 
national and the European level”.10 
 
Therefore, official sources and the prevailing doctrine are two key elements to 
be taken into account when analysing each of the jurisdictions. This research tool 
(doctrinal research method) allows us to clearly understand the major reform trends 
                                                
8 Steven, M. Barkan, “Desconstructing legal research: a Lw Librarian’s Commentary on Critical Legal 
Studies”, Law Librarian Journal, nº 617 (1987), p.  
9 Daryl, L., “Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the 
Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works” in Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, 17 
(2007), pp. 481-558  
10 Rob Van Gestel and Hans W. Micklitz, “Revitalizing Doctrinal Research in Europe: What about 
Methodology?”, European University Institute Working Papers, 2011/05, pp. 5 - 6 
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observed in each of the jurisdictions, as well as the main issues pointed out by observers 
and authorised sources regarding the fight against terrorism and organised crime.  
What are the reasons for the choice of these jurisdict ons – United Kingdom, 
United States, Spain, Israel and Portugal - from a leg l and sociological perspective? 
The choice of the English, Spanish and Israeli legal systems is clearly based on 
sociological and political grounds of considerable importance: these States – 
traditionally integrated into the ‘Western bloc” – are highly familiar with the problem 
and the consequences of terrorism. Moreover, their legal systems, in addition to dealing, 
historically, with the presence of various types of terrorism and organised crime, have 
had to adapt – we shall see through which mechanisms – to a new type of emerging 
global terrorism based on new forms of communication and dissemination. 
Two topics should be considered here, from a methodological point of view: the 
nature of the legal systems concerned11 (traditionally, from the point of view of 
international policy categorisation) and the legal means used in the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime. The trends and changes that have occurred – some of 
                                                
11 The reference to the nature of the legal systems con idered in this analysis is based on the decisive 
hermeneutic criterion of the traditional distinction between the continental (inquisitorial) and Anglo-
Saxon (typically adversarial) legal systems. Adversarialism has long been subject to criticism. It hasbeen 
described as being too confrontational because cases re presented to courts as disputes and trials are 
regarded as contests of opposing interests.  
The process is regarded as antagonistic and confrontati al, with primacy being accorded to negating or 
destroying the opposition's case rather than to settling the dispute. Paradoxically, conflict is used to 
resolve conflict. Its focus on proof rather than truth, and party control of proceedings has been criticized 
as elevating the interests of the parties over the need or desire to find the truth or to secure justice more 
broadly.  
Other pressures for change have been more practical than ideological. In a number of the criminal justice 
systems in Europe and the common law world, imprisonment rates have risen steadily over the past three
decades, often unrelated to increases in the crime rate and have put pressure on limited and inadequat 
prison systems and state budgets. In 2008, in the United States, the imprisonment rate was around 756 per 
100,000 of the population; in the United Kingdom, around 153 per 100,000 and in Australia, 129 per 
100,000. Though imprisonment rates have been rising, European imprisonment rates are generally lower 
than Anglo-American rates: Spain has a relatively high imprisonment rate of 160 per 100,000, but west 
and middle-Europe (France 96; Germany 89; the Netherlands 100; Switzerland 76; Belgium 93; Austria 
95) and the Scandinavian countries are considerably lower.  One of the factors driving higher 
imprisonment rates has been the growth of populist punitiveness, or penal populism, which has been 
described as the process by which politicians tap into, and use for their own purposes, what they believ  
to be the public‟s generally punitive stance. See Freiberg, Arie, Post – Adversarial and Post – Inuisitorial 
Justice: transcending traditional Penological Paradigms available at 
www.aija.org.au/NAJ%202010/Papers/Freiberg%20A.pdf  
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them ongoing – reflect a global scenario of changes that clearly define the emerging 
criminal justice systems, or at least a global trend of changes that inevitably affect the 
new criminal justice systems12 in what Marks call “the post-September 11world”.13 The 
expression “post-September 11 world” refers to the significant changes brought about in 
the criminal justice systems by the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and 
Washington. Indeed, it is inevitable to conclude that these events have caused a real 
revolution in such significant areas of the criminal justice system as police investigative 
powers, the prerogatives of intelligence and information systems in crime prevention, 
citizens’ fundamental rights, prison systems, etc. In a sense, the case law and legislative 
changes examined throughout this work can only be understood in the light of this legal, 
political and sociological concept. 
These are the changes – particularly from the point of view of criminal law and 
criminal procedure – that define the main subject of this work. 
What are the main features of the changes underway in the legal systems under 
review, in their response to the phenomenon of terrorism and organised crime? To what 
extent were these changes caused directly or indirectly by the events of September 11, 
2001, March 11, 2004 (Madrid) or July 7, 2005 (Lond)? In what way has there been a 
bifurcation of criminal justice systems into two distinct stages: a pre-trial stage and a 
                                                
12 Indeed, some of the most significant changes relate precisely to one of the key issues selected for 
analysis in this research project: the ‘bifurcation f criminal justice systems’. In fact, some of the 
legislative reforms undertaken in countries such as England and Spain, as well as a number of 
administrative and police instruments that have been cr ated reinforce the idea of a progressive distancing 
or separation between the pre-trial stage and the trial s age in terms of fundamental rules and principles. 
Therefore, what we call “emerging legislative changes” should be addressed within the framework of this
increasing bifurcation of criminal justice systems. Cfr. Masferrer, Aniceto, Post 9/11 and the State of 
Permanent Legal Emergency:  Security and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism, Springer (2012), pp. 
34 – 65. 
13 Marks, Ronald. A., Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World: domestic threat and the need for change, 
Greenwood Edition, California (2010), P. 65 
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trial stage? What are the implications and costs of hese changes in the basic structure of 
the democratic rule of law? 14
These questions will be answered through a careful collection and detailed 
analysis of empirical and legislative data. Once again, the need for a strong 
methodological component is crucial: the type of data to be collected and analysed (in a 
universe of so much documentary information and legis ative output) and the analytical 
comparison methods to be used are decisive elements in the structuring of this work. 
In this particular work those empirical and field research elements are referred to 
some interviews, surveys and ethnographic observation developed in Israel and Spain. 
But what is exactly the utility of these empirical research methods?  
Empirical research allows us to understand essentially he difference between 
what is usually called “law in the books” and “law in action”. Basically, it is a reality 
interpretation tool underlying the existing regulatory system. Empirical research allows 
us to interpret the legal phenomenon far beyond the legislative and case-law framework, 
mainly through the study and analysis of social groups, of their behaviours and 
reactions. 
At the same time, this empirical research will ease th  understanding of the 
impact of the legal system on the social, economic and civilisational spheres15, which 
will be essential, in the specific case of this thesis, to understand the costs of counter-
terrorism measures in the structure and values of the democratic rule of law. 
Finally, empirical research is unquestionably an essential tool when seeking to 
understand the sources and reasons of ongoing legislative changes, as is the case in this 
work. Indeed, only by understanding the real human and social context inherent in a 
                                                
14 See Cheryl Saunders, Katherine Le Roy, The Rule of Law, Federation Press, (2003), p.65 
 
15 Moser-Mercer, Barbara and Lambert, Sylvie, Bridging the Gap: Empirical Research in Simultaneous 
Interpretation, John Benjamins Publishing, (1994), pp. 105 - 120 
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given historical moment can one understand the reasons behind the changes that have 
taken place and – if in any way possible – anticipate changes in the more or less near 
future. 
Scholars recognize the value of empirical analysis in understanding the legal 
system and its role in society. Due to the information technology, data sources on the 
legal system are improving in quality and accessibility. Compared with just a few years 
ago, researchers today can easily access original dat  sets. However, empirical studies 
cover a range of techniques which are usually not sharply defined. Empirical research 
methods can be characterized by the collection of data and data-analyses on which a 
theory, hypotheses or conclusion is based. Indeed, s veral simple empirical tests are 
available to confront the best available data with theory.16 Basically, the “empirical 
legal research is valuable in revealing and explaining the practices and procedures of 
legal, regulatory, redress and dispute resolution systems and the impact of legal 
phenomena on a range of social institutions, on busines  and on citizens”.17 
In fact, it remains out of doubt that the comparative method will be the main 
methodological pillar of this work: the previously chosen legal systems will be 
compared to identify changing trends, the emergence of new paradigms of criminal 
justice, the (legal, social and economic) costs of these new changes in terms of civil 
liberties and civilisational development. 
To what extent are the comparative and empirical research methods useful and 
scientifically sound in a work of this kind? 
It is undoubtedly that the application of the comparative method has many 
advantages in the context of this research work. 
                                                
16 Caminada, Koen, “Empirical research methods in law”, Universiteit Leiden Phd Course Orientation 
(2009), pp. 43 - 54 
17 D. H. Genn, M. Partington, S. Wheeler, Law in the real world: inquiring and understanding how law 
works, Final Report and Recommendations (London: The Nuffield Foundation, 2006), p. 1 
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1) On the one hand, it enables us to identify, in each legal system, common points 
and aspects of legislation (adopted and awaiting approval) to prevent and 
combat the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime. In this respect, 
comparing functionally similar legal institutes allows us to understand the social, 
economic and legal contexts that serve as the historical basis for ongoing 
changes at the global level. 
2) On the other hand, the comparative methodology also llows us to define, in a 
way, common points of legislative developments in homogeneous or similar 
areas. For example, the comparative analysis of counter-terrorism measures 
proposed and adopted in the United Kingdom and in Spain (in the aftermath of 
the 7/7/2005 and 11/3/2004 attacks) shows, as we shall ee in the following 
chapters, important similarities that make it possible to establish a stable pattern 
of analysis of legislative developments. 
3) The comparative method is generally agreed to be an important interpretive tool. 
At this point, the comparison of legislation and case law is a very useful tool for 
the interpretation of domestic and international rules relating to the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime. 
4) Finally, the comparative methodology is both an interpretative tool and a source 
of development and legislative impetus, insofar as v rious countries (especially 
small and medium-sized ones) tend to adopt legal solutions similar to those 
already tested in other states that play a major role in international politics. As 
Baldwin and Davis have noted:  
“ It is principally through empirical study of the practice of law…and in studying 
the way legal processes and decisions impact upon the citizen, that the disciplines 
of sociology and, to a lesser degree, philosophy, ps chology, and economics have 
entered into and enriched the study of law. This multidisciplinary research has, in 
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turn, influenced many aspects of legal practice…Even th  rules and procedures of 
the law, which can seem arcane and specialist, reflect this influence.”18 
 
One last note on the methodological framework: much of the comparative 
research work will be carried out through the joint a alysis of draft laws or legislative 
proposals brought before the National Parliaments of the countries concerned. This 
choice is based on two clear and substantial reasons: on the one hand, these legislative 
proposals (many of them arising in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such as March 11 
in Madrid or July 7 in London) reflect, better than ything else, the spirit of change 
inherent in the legislator in view of the emergence of new and potential criminal 
outbreaks; on the other hand, these elements allow us to identify changes on a global 
scale, or at least beyond the borders of each State.  
For the purposes of this analysis, it should be clear that we are in a timeframe of 
just over a decade, which covers the period after th  attacks of September 11, 2001 up 
to the present day. This dimension represents an important methodological topic, insofar 
as it restricts the underlying materiality to the analysis and even the historical and 
sociological context of the phenomena under study. We should therefore highlight this 
particular historical and temporal context on which the comparative analysis focuses: 
the post-9/11 period and the changes made to the legal system in response to the 
outbreak of global terrorism, which has since been at the forefront of the world political 
agenda. According to Scheppele, 9/11 starts a new era in terms of criminal justice 
paradigm because: 
“At the time, the United States was shocked and the world was shocked along with 
it. The audacity of the attack prompted an extraordinary outpouring of sympathy 
for the United States. It also prompted an unprecednted series of legal actions. 
NATO triggered art.5 of its founding Treaty to bring all Member States to the aid 
of the United States.' The United Nations Security Council both recognised ‘the 
                                                
18 John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’, Chapter 39 in Peter Cane and Mark 
Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, 2003, at 881. 
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inherent right of individual and collective self-defense’ in conjunction with the 
attacks and also passed a series of resolutions to coordinate global action in the 
fight against terrorism. Regional bodies all over the world-the European Union, the 
African Union, the Arab League, the Association of S uth East Asian Nations, the 
Organisation of American States and more-condemned th  attack, and then joined 
in the antiterror campaign with resolutions, directives, treaties and action plans. For 
a brief time after 9/11 it appeared that much of the world had come together to 
fight terrorism”.19 
 
This timeframe is justified because “this is the period everything has changed, 
both in terms of crime and in terms of criminal system”20. After 9/11 the Western 
countries often sneered at law. Despite the extraordina y secrecy that tried to hide the 
details - the wars, the black sites, the renditions, the torture – countries like United 
States, United Kingdom, Spain and Israel made it quite publicly clear that international 
law was to be no barrier to action if their self-interest were at stake.  Western conduct in 
the "global war on terror" threw out a generation's worth of progress in bringing 
humanitarianism to international conflict. The Geneva Conventions regime had 
established that international humanitarian law covered all persons in spaces of armed 
conflict who are not fighting or who have stopped fighting - and yet detainees were 
labelled "enemy combatants" and lifted out of the Gneva system altogether . The 
Convention against Torture and many other internatio l instruments had laid down 
strict rules not only against torture itself, but also against cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment of detainees – and yet "enhanced interrogation" brought back beatings, stress 
positions, sensory assault, sleep deprivation and the water board, defended as legal 
under the new paradigm of “war on terror”. Formal extradition treaties had generally 
governed the movement of detained persons from country to country; extra-legal 
transfers of persons (renditions) were used only occasionally when a suspect was moved 
                                                
19 Scheppele, Kim, Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 9/11, Thomson 
Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors (2011), p. 353 
20 Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, (eds) Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (2009); Armin von Bogdandy, "Constitutionalism in International Law: 
Comments on a Proposal trom Germany" (2006) 47 Harv. J. Int. L. 223. 
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to stand trial in a country that abided by international norms. And yet, after 9/11, 
extraordinary rendition transported terrorism suspects from places where they were 
protected by law to places where they were not. On the eve of 9/11, there was already 
budding international agreement that major internatio l conflicts were to be resolved 
through the UN Security Council. And yet the UN Security Council was bypassed as 
soon as it became evident that the Security Council would not agree to what the United 
States, Britain and Spain wanted to do on Iraq.21 
Finally, we must bear in mind, as has been repeatedly noted by contemporary 
criminology and criminal sciences, that extreme caution should be exercised when 
identifying paradigm shifts within criminal justice systems22. Although there are strong, 
solid and persistent lines of change, the generalisation of results, extrapolation and 
definitive conclusions can be a serious flaw from the methodological and scientific 
point of view. Therefore, this work will focus particularly on identifying the main lines 
of change within the criminal justice systems, deriv d from the fight against these new 
forms of crime, avoiding definitive and sweeping con lusions without sufficient 
evidential and scientific basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Scheppele, Kim, supra note 18 at 356  
22 Samuel G., “Comparative Law and jurisprudence” in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 47 (1998) p. 817 
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a) Global Terrorism and the Changing Criminal Justice System – a 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Familiarity with global terrorism is increasing. The West is the primary target of 
ongoing aggression. It receives successive blows that undermine its confidence in the 
institutions it set up to maintain world order, civil societies’ confidence in their own 
governments, confidence in the capacity of the defence and security forces, and loyalty 
to the values underlying their culture. 
In the 20th century, the ending of Western imperial rule in the world of peoples 
they considered barbarians and savages, left a residual confidence in the model of 
international order mentioned in the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which were submitted to the various organisations that were created to 
act in the areas of economy, security, culture and development. 
When NATO, the defence organisation that survived the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1999, in Washington, the capital of the 
remaining superpower, it became aware of the change d, thus, adopted a new strategic 
concept in which it identified international terrorism and transnational organised crime 
as the greatest threat to the Member States. 
As has so often occurred in the wars of the past, previous experience does not 
help to face the novelty of aggressions, and the September 11 attack, which brought 
down the Twin Towers, showed that the identification of the threat was not followed by 
the definition of an appropriate new strategy, neither by NATO nor by the Member 
States. 
The United States, offended and humiliated by Al Qaeda, tried to review its 
security and criminal justice policy by signing the n w National Security Strategy on 
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September 17, 200223. This was complemented a year later by a national str tegy for 
combating terrorism. We saw  France deciding to review its Vigipirate Plan of 1978 in 
order to deal with the new threat, defining the Army’s intervention in preventive 
actions. Furthermore,  at the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO drew up the Military Concept 
MC 472 for the same purpose. While, in February 2003, Spain, which would later be 
severely stricken, approved the Strategic Defence Review, which also addressed 
“foreign terrorism against the West” and urging theArmed Forces to counter this threat 
within NATO and the European Union, in peace and humanitarian aid operations and 
supporting the state security forces.  
The March 11 attack in Madrid showed that the relationship between the threat 
of global terrorism and the security response had not found a suitable model. US 
unilateralism, evidenced in Iraq, seems to have establi hed a global danger for all 
Western states, without having been able to contribute to a security doctrine for world 
peace.  
The interpretation of the additional side effects of the intervention in Iraq in 
response to the aggression suffered, included those such as an instability that has 
plagued the Security Council, NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, a discredit 
that has fallen upon the governments of the contingent coalition who acted without any 
land occupation plan and thereby, creating the void of Iraqi representation, alienating 
the confidence of the population, enabling the gradual, but difficult identification of the 
profiles of the aggressor and the aggression, of the causes and reasons and of the 
innovative counter-terrorism strategies. 
One of the main novelties of this new world order is that the principle, signed in 
Westphalia, that the State is not only the sole legitimate holder of violence, but also the 
                                                
23 Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy : U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life:  
U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life, Oxford University Press (2006), p. 132 
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only entity capable of making war, is definitely in crisis. The end of bipolarity in 198924 
did not confirm the hope for peace dividends, because conflicts have multiplied, albeit 
with new and disturbing features: the capacity of vi lence by non-State actors who are 
nonetheless entitled to challenge the Member States nd undermine their sovereign 
foundations. 
They do not face opponents supported by a civil society of which they are the 
instrument, using conventional armies, on the orders of a government corresponding to 
international rules: terrorism, rather than confronting armies, brutally attacks innocent 
populations to break the pillar of trust that connects them to legitimate power, using the 
opponent’s media to enhance the perverse effects of the attacks, also aiming at the times 
that allow broadcasting the events live, as was the cas  in the March 11 and September 
11 attacks. 
The new international terrorism moves and takes advantage of the international 
legal framework, allowing itself to protectively use the barriers of geographical state 
borders, abuse the free movement of persons to establish dormant internal colonies 
within civil societies that are prospective targets, learn how to manipulate financial and 
computer networks that serve transnationalism, incite subversion on account of local 
dissatisfaction, manipulate the theories of justification by incorporating religious values 
in the proclaimed strategic concept, decentralise initiatives, not make objectives clear 
and maintain the climate of victory for the simple fact of persisting.  
Contemporary criminal justice systems – and democratically structured States – 
have to face an unpredictably agile and stealthy enemy by making contingency 
arrangements to organise preventive measures against gents for whom dying is 
confirmedly not a risk or problem.  
                                                
24 Bogdan, Denitch, The End of the Cold War: European Unity, Socialism, and the Shift in Global Power, 
University of Minnesota Press, (1990), p. 45 
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It is therefore necessary to reformulate international cooperation, starting with 
information services and by recognising that there is a difference between an 
international danger or threat and a transnational danger or threat, the latter requiring 
some sacrifice of the traditional reservations of sovereignty. 
It will also be important to reformulate the concepts that delimit the 
interventions of the security forces and armed forces, because the new threat of 
terrorism and transnational organised crime has nothi g to do with old geographical 
boundaries or with traditional established powers.  
Indeed, the weakness of the international community in the fight against 
terrorism has no better expression than the inability of the UN to find a globally 
acceptable definition of terrorism. Since the times when the League of Nations was 
unable to find, before the outbreak of World War II, a concept of terrorism in its 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937), the international 
community has persistently failed to reach a consensus on the broad definition of 
terrorism.  
Only very recently, from a legal point of view, and as a consequence of the 
global impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on US soil, significant 
progress has been made in achieving a consensual and rel tively stable definition of the 
concept of “terrorism”, although it has not yet been definitively formalised by 
international resolutions. It is necessary to mention, in this field, the United Nations 
Resolution nº 59/195, (22 March 2005), UN resolution nº 39/159 (17 December 1984), 
UN resolution nº 54/109 (25 February 2000), UN resoluti n nº 59/46 (16 December 
2004) and the United Nation Security Council resoluti n nº 1456 (2003).25 
                                                
25 See all these matters, deeply analysed, at Omer Elagab and Jeeheaan Elagab, International Law 
Documents Related to Terrorism, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, (1997 ), p. 980 
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This research work is based on a relatively balanced and consensual definition of 
terrorism that has been defined and defended on various international platforms, such 
as: 
- United Nations Organisation: despite the creation f the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), the General Assembly has not yet reached a formal definition. 
However, there are several resolutions on this topic: UN Security Council Resolution 
1269/1999, 1368/2001 and 1373/2001. 
- United States of America: this country has produced plenty of material from which the 
following can be noted: Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d); Point III. 
“Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against 
Us and Our Friends” in “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America”. 
- NATO: AAP-6 Glossary – “Terms and Definitions” provides the following definition: 
“the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives.”26 
This definition has attempted to be somehow consensual, particularly in view of 
the violent conceptual disputes that have arisen at the United Nations General Assembly 
and Security Council over the term “terrorism”. However, this definition ignores - or at 
least underestimates - the cases of state terrorism, the inclusion of which could lead to 
serious legal consequences in terms of international conflict resolution. In this respect, 
this study will address terrorism as a global threat, whose potential for understanding 
                                                
26 Thomas M. Pick, Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch, Home-Grown Terrorism:  
Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation Among Groups With an Immigrant 
Heritage in Europe, IOS Press BV (2009), p. 93 ; See also Thomas-Durell Young, Command in NATO 
After the Cold War, Diane Publishing (1999), pp. 56 - 76 
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covers not only terrorism by religious or ideological groups, but also political and state 
terrorism. 
 
b) The Research Questions  
 
Having said that, it is important to clarify the main research questions addressed in 
this study and which somehow determine and delimit the research and data collection 
activities carried out. 
 
1) As a first consideration we will observe and analyse the phenomenon that we 
could call “bifurcation of criminal justice systems”, based on an increasingly 
relevant and evident distinction between the pre-trial stage and the trial stage itself. 
Indeed, the growing concern of criminal justice systems about the prevention and 
suppression of terrorism and organised crime seems to have produced substantial 
differences of values and principles between these two procedural stages. The first 
stage seems to be particularly marked by broad judicial and police investigative 
powers and prerogatives, while the second stage seems committed to the defence 
and protection of the fundamental rights of suspects and the traditional values of the 
rule of law. This bifurcation of the criminal justice system, its prevalence and 
impact will be analysed in its full depth and extent. 
 
2) In a second stage, the goal is to understand if the classical difference between the 
adversarial and inquisitorial models of criminal procedure remains intact, relevant 
and current in the new international legal and geopolitical context. Indeed, it is 
necessary to understand if this bifurcation of criminal justice systems (referred to 
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above) and the new features of these systems (especially in the context of criminal 
procedure) are still compatible with the traditional distinction between the 
inquisitorial and adversarial procedure models. 
 
3) Finally, we will analyse the implications of the antiterrorist reforms in the 
structure and functioning of the democratic rule of law. The sacrifices imposed in 
terms of civil rights and democratic freedoms – with the proliferation of extensive 
security legislation in criminal proceedings – has been one of the most creative 
debates conducted on counter-terrorism legislation n Western countries27. 
Nevertheless, any serious scientific study on this matter cannot ignore the enormous 
financial and civilizational costs that resulted from a whole new set of laws aimed at 
strengthening the powers of criminal investigation, the State’s prevention and 
control capacity28, reducing judicial control mechanisms in proceedings and 
allowing for special schemes such as controversial exceptions to commonly 
established constitutional principles 
 
3) The “New Threat” and the challenges of Criminal 
Justice Systems. 
 
The 1990s, with the victory of the market economy, the collapse of the USSR 
and the foundering of economic borders boosted by the unstoppable advance of 
technology, created a qualitatively new situation in the world, with a single hyperpower, 
                                                
27 Freeman, Michael, Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency 
Powers to Fight Terror, Greenwood Publishing Group (2003), p. 132 
28 Conte, Alex,  Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism:  
Commonwealth Approaches: The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Springer 
Edition, (2010), p. 111 
 
 
21 
the United States, and with the proliferation of unemployed Russian scientists (and 
other) experts in nuclear weapons. 
While there was this astonishing (unprecedented) power f the United States, the 
world went on to live in a network, so much so that it is now possible to create 
organisations of citizens from different countries to achieve a common objective. 
Furthermore, in the theoretical terms of international relations, some ideas were put 
forward (and, although debatable, took root), such as the definitive political and 
economic system having been reached through liberal economic schemes, according to 
Fukuyama, or the vertigo brought about by the clash of civilisations, according to 
Huntington, or citizen sovereignty against State sovereignty, according to Kofi Annan. 
In the case of the United States, the currently dominant doctrine is the fundamentalism 
of the Realist school of thought, which sees the world as a set of Nations in a chaotic 
system, where this power can only be dominated by military force. 
All this tells us that we are experiencing a major qualitative change in our 
international life and in the theory of international relations. In fact, it is extremely 
important to remember that, in 2001, political, economic and financial power was 
concentrated in the United States29 (32.6 % of global GDP), UE (26.5 %) and Japan 
(13.4 %), accounting for 72.5 % in this set of the Northern Hemisphere, where China 
would gain an increasing share during the 21st century, not forgetting Russia’s recovery. 
All this economic power depends on the control of production and the consequent 
trading of oil, which in itself helps shape some of the foreign policies adopted by these 
international actors. Everything that has been said, plus the oil, becomes an explosive 
mixture that the North American Realist school of thought tends to aggravate. 
                                                
29 Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State System and the World 
Economy, Penn State Press (1991), pp. 54 - 68
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The sense of (historical, religious, ethnic, economic) humiliation of some of the 
world’s great civilisations in the face of the power represented by the Northern 
Hemisphere, concentrated in the United States, in addition to the shame they feel about 
their own governments, creates a feeling of rebellion and defiance that currently has the 
means to act. 
The behaviour of the major oil companies in the producing countries, 
particularly in the Middle East, which due to their multinational nature do not forget 
their country of origin, helps such movements of rebellion and defiance materialise. 
The case of Palestine allows for a concentration of eff rt and attention. 
If the civilisational divide is recognised by Western thinkers themselves as 
dangerous and capable of giving rise to a future major conflict, everything should be 
done to avoid it. In this new framework, however, trorism has the ways and means to 
definitely jump from the local and regional scale to the global scale. Exactly the same 
reasoning applies to transnational organised crime. 
All this means that terrorism, being morally unjustifiable and unacceptably 
violent for acting mainly against innocent people around the world, is today a tool of 
International Politics, gaining a visibility and importance that it had never achieved 
when the objectives were local or regional. Indeed, we must accept that international 
terrorism can be simultaneously a political tool and a tool of organised crime, in both 
the domestic and foreign policy spheres, and this very relationship will be examined 
thoroughly in this research work. 
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a) The New Phenomena of Terrorism and Transnational Organised 
Crime as a Key Challenge for Criminal Justice Systems 
 
From 1993, when the first attack on the World Trade Center was carried out by 
Ramzi Yousef, to 2003, with the black weeks of April and May (166 casualties in 
attacks in Chechnya, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Morocco), terrorist violence 
acquired a new dimension, transforming reality and changing the world. Similarly, the 
globalisation of violence imposed by Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, on par with 
major economic groups engaged in tax evasion and money laundering activities, caused 
a significant change in the modus operandi of modern crime. The same decade also saw 
the carnages of Oklahoma, Nairobi, Mombasa and Bali. All these disasters have a 
common denominator: to inflict the maximum number of civilian casualties. They were 
all united in the rejection of the so-called “American model” and the “unipolar world”, 
Western lifestyle and the liberal democratic culture p evailing there. 
In this context, a number of international criminal etworks (such as the famous 
Italian Cosa Nostra) and some “traditional” terrorist groups (such as the Hezbollah or 
Islamic Jihad)30 were gradually left behind, both in terms of the international 
importance and immediate impact of their attacks and in terms of the perception of a 
global action plan. The new players, who exhausted all the efforts made by political 
actors and the media, were, on the one hand, the new M xican and Colombian drug 
lords (with unprecedented mass murder and terror stategies) and, on the other hand, Al 
Qaeda, whose proclaimed leader declared a full-fledged war against the United States 
and Israel since 1998. 
                                                
30 Marianne Vardalos, Engaging Terror: A Critical and Interdisciplinary Approach, Universal-Publishers 
(2009) p. 54 
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We must therefore conclude that the contemporary criminal landscape is 
changing at an exponential speed, which has caused the profound changes that criminal 
justice systems have undergone in recent years. In this respect, it is important to 
distinguish two key phenomena: 
 
b) The New International Organised Crime 
 
The 1990s and the early 21st century saw profound changes in the fabric of 
organised crime worldwide. These changes were brought about by two factors from the 
outset: the use and dissemination of new technologies and, on the other hand, the use of 
financial circuits of capital transfer and investment. Criminal organisations have 
become global, also internationalising the very crimes that sustain them: trafficking in 
drugs, weapons and women, money laundering, institutional corruption, etc. 
On the one hand, current criminal networks, taking advantage of the regional 
free-movement areas (such as the European Union), disseminate and diversify the type 
of activities, making their control and police surveillance difficult; on the other hand, 
the effects of the criminal acts also multiply and human or arms trafficking networks, 
for example, have several relocated bases and can therefore diversify the action, 
management and coordination (as well as financial capital investment) sites. 
This scenario – which is growing exponentially due to the use of the internet and 
new information technologies – has forced states to adopt specific legislative measures 
that, for the sake of efficiency, have resulted in a significant reduction in citizens’ 
fundamental rights. 
In this context, countries such as the United States nd the United Kingdom have 
considerably strengthened police powers in citizen identification, raids, searches and 
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wiretapping, to the detriment of the guarantees constitutionally granted to citizens in the 
liberal system created in the second half of the 20th century. However, the need to 
control illegal trafficking and the freedom of movem nt and capital has caused, in 
recent years, substantial setbacks in the freedom of ovement, in both the European 
Union (where several States have increased border controls and required additional 
measures for customs supervision) and the United States.  
At the same time, the alliance between traditional criminal groups and terrorist 
groups has become noticeable, as they join forces to maximise common benefits. 
Indeed, in most cases, terrorism has been linked to crimes such as the falsification of 
documents, money laundering and illegal trafficking, which are mostly carried out by 
criminal organisations driven by purely economic and fi ancial interests. 
Consequently, the research carried out unconditionally demonstrates that 
Western countries have produced an incredible amount of ew legislation regarding the 
fight against tax evasion and avoidance, money launderi g and corruption. A 
paradigmatic case is Portugal – a Southern European country with deep-rooted 
corruption practices – which, in the past six years, has made a true paradigmatic 
revolution in bank supervision and in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance. 
In any case, the ongoing changes seem to be persistent and enduring: the face of 
organised crime is definitely changing, acquiring a tr nsnational scope based on 
powerful technological and military means. It is alo inevitable to conclude that this 
change has produced, among other phenomena, a perverse and unpredictable 
consequence: a new form of international terrorism. 
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c) The New International Terrorism 
 
We speak of a quantitative change due to the number of casualties in a single 
act, and of a qualitative change in that the border of terrorist action has moved to 
unexpected regions, creating a different form of war, where the apparent absence of a 
declared strategy is offset by marked signs of a palpable, material strategy expressed in 
acts, guidelines, messages, physical coordinators and military commanders. Where the 
targets and objectives are global, as long as they have a serious and tremendous impact 
on Western interests in the world and are thus capable of generating panic, fear and 
turmoil.  
Therefore, we should perhaps speak of a global “catastrophic terrorism” seeking 
easy profits. A new international terrorism, that distances and distinguishes itself from 
other modern and pre-modern forms of political or ideological violence. Some of the 
features of this New International Terrorism have alr ady been the subject of scientific 
research and are scattered across security reports, journal articles, independent analysts, 
ongoing legal proceedings and important theoretical and practical studies. 
The main features, which we will examine in detail in later chapters, are: 
 - Its transnational or internationalised nature, due to the association and complicity of 
formerly isolated groups and the choice of increasingly large areas of action, taking on a 
global dimension. The signs of cooperation between th  IRA and Colombian groups, or 
the complicity of Iraqi-based groups (such as Ansar al Islam) with Al Qaeda, make it 
necessary to review and reformulate the typical form f terrorist action. On the other 
hand, the penetration of Al Qaeda in more than 40 countries around the world, with 
renewed cells in many of them, as well as the “outsourcing” of other small, but fast-
acting groups, leads us to face the new internationl terrorism not as the product of a 
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faction of fanatics – as in the 1970s and 1980s31 – but as a federation, or a 
confederation, united more by the final outcome, by their common enmity and 
immediate objectives than by ideological, tribal, national or ethnic ties.  
This obviously does not mean that the phenomenon of criminal association and 
international connections to terrorist groups weren’t already a reality in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The IRA, for example, already had a solid operational network of contacts 
and financing at international level, very similar to today’s major Islamist and South 
American groups32. The point, here, is that these new groups of terrorists or criminal 
organizations seem to have developed a very specific and unique connection  - at the 
different stages of the operational activity – based only on common objectives and 
financial reasons.  
- The loss of territorial bases in sympathising, supporting and tolerant states and 
consequent demand for new clandestine bases in democratic or liberal states, or in 
failed, disorganised or incapable states. With the fall of Taliban power in Afghanistan in 
2001-2002 and the end of cooperation between France d Sudan, as well as the 
strengthening of international control over remote ar as in North Africa or South-East 
Asia, terrorist groups have gradually lost their fixed and stable bases and chosen mobile 
and clandestine bases, often integrated within Europe or North America. 
- The use of increasingly powerful means of destruction, including the threat of using 
weapons of mass destruction, making fewer terrorist incidents correspond to a far 
greater number of casualties. This has become easier with the use of state-of-the-art 
explosive mixtures, portable anti-aircraft missiles and, in the case of the attack on the 
Tokyo Subway, with biological and chemical weapons. 
                                                
31 Beleza, Teresa, Direito Penal – Volume I, Universidade de Lisboa Editora, Lisboa (1989), pp. 43 - 45 
32 Bew, Paul and Gillespie, Gordon. Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968-1999. 
Lanham, MD, Scarecrow Press, (1999) p. 302; Dillon, Martin. God and the Gun: The Church and Irish 
Terrorism. New York, Routledge, (1998) p. 204 
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- The association of politically- and ideologically-driven groups with organised crime 
groups, with technical division of work and tasks, areas of influence, allocation of funds 
to specialised areas of action (communications, data collection, influence on 
bureaucratic structures, etc.). Although the relationship between terrorism and ordinary 
crime is a long-standing issue of criminology and criminal law, the rise of phenomena 
such as “narco-terrorism” has become an inescapable rea ity, a symbol of the alliance 
between terrorism and the new international organised crime. 
 
4) Towards a New Model of Criminal Justice System 
 
a) The new characteristics of Criminal Justice Systems  
 
While the features and operation of terrorism and organised crime are being 
thoroughly studied, the examination and analysis of the effects and costs of counter-
terrorism (and counter-organised crime) measures in the legislative, social and even 
civilisational context are becoming increasingly important. 
These costs are today evident at all levels. Besides th  pervasive feeling of 
reduction or sacrifice of some of their fundamental freedoms, citizens are actually 
seeing some of their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights restricted33. We will 
examine a number of paradigmatic cases of counter-terrorism legislation in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
                                                
33 Eckes, Christina, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Individual 
Sanctions, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009), p. 185 
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These costs, as Donohue calls them34, are mainly of a legal nature, but also of an 
economic, social and, ultimately, civilisational nature. 
It is notorious that all the States chosen for analysis in this work have made 
significant changes in the powers and prerogatives of police and judicial authorities in 
the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Those powers, as will be seen on a case-
by-case basis, were so extended that they often suppress fundamental rights peacefully 
rooted in communities. In other cases, moreover, thy placed significant restrictions on 
the exercise of those fundamental rights: this is the case, for example, of the right to 
mobility, to free movement between States, to access of information and its 
dissemination, religious freedom, etc. 
The significant increase of police powers in matters of criminal investigation and 
the corresponding adjustment of judicial and administrative control mechanisms have 
led to significant criticism of legislative developments in the Western world since 9/11. 
The increasing lack of control in house searches, wiretapping, computer control or 
banking supervision clearly reflects a very specific obsession with terrorism and 
organised crime. Indeed, the United States, Spain, England and even countries like 
Portugal or Ireland have known increasingly harsh and inflexible legislative proposals 
relating to fundamental rights and freedoms. Some were approved. The Patriot Act in 
the United States, or the review of the codes of criminal procedure in Portugal and 
Spain, or even the extraordinary extension of pre-trial detention periods prevailing in 
the United Kingdom for terrorist suspects are consolidated symbols of this new 
paradigm of criminal justice. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, wiretapping and surveillance 
mechanisms have been made available and widely used in all these legal systems, 
                                                
34 Donohue, Laura K., The Cost of Counterterrorism – Power, Politics and Liberty, Cambridge University 
Press (2008), pp. 3 - 7 
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without exception. In the prevailing post-9/11 paradigm, a predominantly exceptional 
mechanism becomes a routine, common and effective means of combating terrorism 
and transnational organised crime. 
State control over electronic data transmission system  has also increased 
exponentially – in both quantitative and qualitative terms – causing a pervasive feeling 
of lack of freedom and intimacy among citizens and users. Therefore, the concept of 
“moral panics” seems to serve as a justification for all kinds of restrictions, since they 
are all carried out as a way to effectively combat terrorism and organised crime, always 
subject to the possibility of fatal attacks and unimaginable consequences. 
Also within the context of economic activity and of financial intervention and 
mobilisation capacities, the costs of counter-terrorism laws have been significant. 
As Donohue states: 
 “Although financial counterterrorist laws may be causing an incremental erosion 
of areas already subject to substantial government co trol or regulation, they have 
infringed on a broad range of rights – free speech, religion, privacy and property – 
all important to the overall health of a democracy. They have caused other political 
and humanitarian damage as well”.35 
 
Indeed, counter-terrorism laws have also affected th  free movement of capital 
and banking regulation significantly, imposing strong restrictions on the application of 
bank secrecy and the free movement of capital, especially when sourced from countries 
considered as an “enemy zone” or “suspected zone”. 
These restrictions, in addition to the obvious costs from the point of view of 
immediate financial and economic activities, have given way to a new international 
regulation model which in turn has led to a substantial loss of confidence and stability 
of primary and secondary financial markets worldwide36. 
                                                
35 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at 25 
36 Oana M. Nedelescu, R. B. Johnston, The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets, I sues 2005-2060, 
International Monetary Fund, (2005) 
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There have also been significant changes in the field of freedom of expression. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, freedom of religious and ideological expression 
has been significantly restricted, and the “propaganda of Islamic fundamentalism” has 
become a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment. 
Without drawing any final conclusions at this stage, it is important to emphasise 
that this set of changes has gradually distorted, at various levels, the criminal justice 
model prevailing in most Western countries. This ditortion has gained particular 
relevance in the rights of suspects and in the verystructure of the criminal procedure 
system inherited from 19th century classical liberalism. Throughout this work, we will 
see exactly what this new configuration of the criminal justice system is in its various 
aspects. 
At this stage, it is essential to this work to analyse whether this set of changes 
implied the progressive implementation of a criminal procedure law characterised by 
two very distinct stages: the first stage – of inquiry and prosecution – dominated by the 
secrecy of the inquiry and extended police powers – either for obtaining information 
from suspects or restricting their fundamental rights – and by a reduced participation of 
suspects and virtually no judicial control. On the other hand, a second stage (or the trial 
stage), characterised by the guarantee of the fundamental values of the classical liberal 
system, in particular the right to a fair trial, the right to defence and the right of victims 
to participate in the proceedings and to appeal to higher courts, among others. 
Although we cannot yet speak of a paradigm shift, all documentary and 
empirical data collected indicate that there is a strong trend of change37, visible and 
noticeable in all areas of law, from banking regulation to criminal procedure law. 
                                                
37 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Terrorism and Law: The Rule Of Law And The War On Terror, Lawyers & Judges 
Publishing Company (2004), p. 247 
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The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and, later, the 
attacks of March 11, 2003 in Madrid and of July 7 (and July 26, 2005) in London, 
forged with blood and fire, visions of death and destruction, (re)create a global 
environment of terror and fear, in which governments and populations are living under 
the constant threat of terrorism. This fact has implicated a clear tendency to expand 
executive power and this, as Donohue states, has seriou  implications: 
 “The state may use the information it acquires not just for counterterrorism, but to 
prevent popular dissent, to manipulate the other branches of government, or to 
exert social control. The tendency of the executive branch to acquire power was not 
lost on the American founders, who used the separation of powers doctrine to 
check executive strength. The problem is that in the face of terrorism the 
legislature’s and the judiciary’s ability to offset the executive is severely 
diminished”. 38 
 
Terrorism has become the main concern of governments in the 21st century and, 
in spite of not being a phenomenon of this century, of having very distant roots, and 
having intensified in the 1970s, throughout Europe and in the United States, it became 
particularly visible, ostensible and, above all, ubiq itous after September 11, 2001. 
Terrorism used to occur within borders, but it is now global, does not recognise 
national borders to act, and is organised in mindless, almost invisible and intangible 
networks. 
Consequently, counter-terrorism policies are also global. Therefore, one of the 
key aspects of this globalisation of terror is, admittedly, the creation of numerous 
counter-terrorism laws that underlie the value of security, that are inscribed and result in 
a fervent legislative impetus, and that, in the name of security, restrict fundamental 
rights and, in particular, the various aspects of “civil liberties”. 
The events of 9/11 gave way to a period marked by a trend of erosion and 
oppression of civil liberties and rights, constitutionally protected freedoms and 
                                                
38 Donohue, Laura K., supra note 33 at 11 
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guarantees, owing to the coercive enforcement of highly aggressive security measures 
imposed by the executive arm of Government, in particular by the governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The imbalance between freedom and security 
reflect the “imbalance of powers” created by the inffectiveness of the US system of 
“checks and balances” based on the main idea of the separation of powers. In other 
words, the flaws of this system are a result of the implementation of a new standard in 
which the abuse of executive law-enforcement power usurps the power of the Courts 
and Parliaments, suppressing the guarantees inherent in the normal functioning of the 
constitutional system. 
As a result, the imposition of restrictions on the rights, liberties and guarantees 
has shrunk and compressed the sphere of civil liberties, and, indeed, the American 
democratic political system has not been able to redraw an “adaptive zone” to face the 
pressure of the wicked enemy. 
However, this axis between good and evil has shifted to another plane, 
projecting itself into a dual, or rather, dialogical and exponential dimension of conflict, 
where a new paradigm emerges: security vs. freedom, in the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Portugal (which constitute the scope of the territorial jurisdiction, the “spatial/territorial 
dimension” examined in our study) and in all countries, from both a regional (i.e. 
throughout the European Union) and international perspective. 
It was to protect citizens’ safety that the Bush administration led the Congress to 
approve the Patriot Act, in which security standards abound, containing new powers to 
make arrests sine die, to perform administrative surveillance and search operations, 
without prior judicial authorisation, summary trials, with total absence of evidence, and 
as regards the right to privacy, the increase of powers to intercept telephone and internet 
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communications, the withdrawal of restrictions on the use of special powers of 
counterintelligence operations in ordinary criminal proceedings. 
The application of human rights legislation to moderat  the reaction of 
governments to what they call “terrorism” is one of the toughest tests for the concept of 
human rights. The way terrorists are seen by the political system, all this gregarious 
movement around the deviltry of terrorists justifies the lack of respect for the Rule of 
Law and democracy and, consequently, justifies the contempt and rejection of human 
rights standards by terrorists, who ruthlessly and mercilessly claim that many innocent 
people must die. 
It is understood that this conflict justifies some restrictions on the exercise of 
civil liberties or even their temporary suspension, because the purpose of human rights 
legislation is basically to keep counter-terrorism measures and activities under control. 
In this context, the human rights benchmark is an important limit to serve as a 
buffer and to compel Governments to justify the anti-democratic measures they use in 
the open hunt for terrorists. However, we must not forget that it is the responsibility of 
Member States, of their whole array of political/administrative and judicial institutions 
to secure these limits39. 
Ultimately, the question is: What if Member States are unable to shoulder this 
responsibility? Well, this is an algorithm with the following two overlapping 
hypotheses: 
- What if the State itself cannot live with this internal and external (self-organised) 
ambiguity caused by this turbulent phenomenon, the em rgence of these disorders and 
“moral panics”, this scenario of chaos created by terrorism? In other words: 
 
                                                
39 Richard Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the War on Terror, Cambridge University Press, (2005), p. 33 
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1 - What if the State cannot survive the external ambiguity caused by the manipulation 
of “these enemies”, i.e. the new mindless and global terrorists? 
 
2 - What if the State cannot survive itself, its inter al ambiguity (fear increases security 
measures, withdraws freedoms, rights and guarantees that are fundamental, essential), 
its survival, succumbing to what we may call self-strangulation? 
 
The direct effect of the terror that materialises and reaches its maximum impact 
through terrorist attacks is the destruction, restriction and even suppression of freedoms, 
rights and guarantees, of “civil liberties”. 
We will examine how the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks (specified below) have 
conditioned and changed the internal security system  and plans of the countries under 
study (the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Spain and Portugal). 
This implies explaining the role of internal security (understood both in its 
organisational/supervisory dimension and in its “security policy”40 dimension) in 
addressing the shock of terror – we will therefore utline how these countries have 
reacted to terrorism. 
Our study covers a 10-year period and we chose September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) as 
the starting point. This choice is based on two different reasons: one of a legal nature 
and another of a political and philosophical nature. On the one hand, as we will explain 
throughout this work, the main criminal policy and legislative changes occurred after 
the September 11 attacks. In this context, virtually  Western (and Asian) countries 
have taken important measures in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and organised crime. On the other hand, it seems clear, from a 
                                                
40 Andrew D. James, Science and Technology Policies for the Antiterrorism Era, IOS Press (2006). In 
relation to the specific security policy in Portugal see José M. Magone, The Developing Place of Portugal 
in the European Union, Transaction Publishers, (2004), pp. 67 - 89 
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geopolitical point of view, that the September 11 attacks substantially changed the 
conduct of international relations between states, including the legal instruments of 
police and judicial cooperation. 
However, some other “target dates” are important to gather the main legislative 
reactions, so, in addition to of 11 September, we recorded March 11, 2004 and July 7, 
2005, because we believe that these major disasters represent ruptures and, 
consequently, they have led to mandatory reflections  the State’s security system, 
particularly on how it deals with the discourse and the sources of terrorism. 
This implies pointing out terrorist attacks that, given their ability to inflict terror 
with exponential and uncontrollable effects, are th pretext for the compulsive impetus 
in security legislation production. It also implies, naturally, measuring the reactions to 
terror and recording the myriad of counter-terrorism rules and standards that have arisen 
after the attacks, regardless of ethically evaluating he issue of “terrorist threats”. 
The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, March 11, 2004, and July 7, 2005 
clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that contemporary terrorism has become 
characterised by a high degree of complexity41, organisation and transnational action 
and that, by selecting apparently scattered targets, it is capable of reaching the deepest 
organisational pillars of democratic societies. 
Indeed, only after we realise that terrorism is a complex social, political and 
legal phenomenon established within the chaos of terror itself can we control its effects 
and subvert its logic of application and operation. 
Again, and still regarding the initial question, if the legal and regulatory 
mechanisms serve to increase security, legally restrict terrorist activities and threats, 
then why do they have the completely opposite effect?: they are factors of increased 
                                                
41 Jorgen S. Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibasic, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, BRILL, (2009), 
pp 329 – 345. 
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insecurity and violence... after all, two aspects of the same reality: they enhance the 
factors of uncontrollable fear. 
In this system, we must consider that we are dealing with a tetralogical ring in 
which clashes, unrest, turmoil and movements are precisely that: the 
order/disorder/interaction in which there are multiple international actors, levels of 
power and in which the notion of sovereignty of theclassic post-Westphalian model 
collapsed, all this in the name of terrorism. 
We could say that the new international order resulting from the juxtaposition of 
characters/actors also has the harmonising power to create a new balance in which the 
European criminal area could play a key role, either for the harmonisation of sanctions, 
or for the reduction, if not eradication of criminal havens. 
However, and this would be a suggestion for further research, based on this 
comparative analysis of security vs. freedom, an attempt could be made to assess the 
new security model in the light of the “binding pattern”. 
The pattern that separates security from freedom, or rather, that places security 
and freedom at opposite ends should be abandoned, ad research should continue in 
order to find the binding one, which exerts on security and freedom a centrifugal and 
centripetal pressure of concentrated authority and not of totalitarian authoritarianism, 
lest we lose the references to fundamental rights. 
We therefore believe that we can give a completely innovative answer to the 
problem of terrorism as being a phenomenon of colletiv  schizophrenia, of legal 
schizophrenia, and that it is possible to find the binding pattern, the human or 
humanised model to serve as a stabilising and balancing force in the new risk society.42 
 
                                                
42 Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society: towards a new modernity, Sage Publications, London (1992), p. 78 
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b) Conclusion  
 
Having systematically presented the broad lines of research and scientific issues 
that define the subject of this work, as well as its methodological structure, it is 
important to provide a brief summary of the chapter organisation and theoretical 
structure of the work. 
The new context emerging from the September 11 attacks in the United States 
will be presented and examined in detail in the second chapter. This topic, which is 
closely linked to the above-mentioned timeframe, will focus primarily on the analysis 
and specification of three distinct topics: the new political discourse and social response 
in the “era of global terrorism”; the new legal framework of emergency management 
and the response of criminal justice systems; the new criminology and criminal policy 
guidelines on the fight against terrorism, clearly reinforcing the so-called Criminal Law 
of the Enemy (Feindstrafrecht)43. 
After this analysis, each of the subsequent chapters will deal with the chosen 
jurisdictions (United Kingdom, United States, Israel, Portugal and Spain) separately, 
detailing the ongoing legislative reform processes and the new positions of the majority 
doctrine in the fight against terrorism and transnatio l organised crime. This separate 
analysis will reveal common signs of change, sound legislative reform processes and 
their sociological and political contexts, which can comprehensively characterise what 
we described as the ‘bifurcation of criminal justice systems’. 
Finally, the last part of this work will seek to combine the main topics studied in 
each of the jurisdictions and establish a paradigmatic overview of the ongoing changes 
in the framework of contemporary criminal justice systems, in the post-September 11 
                                                
43 Jakobs, Gunter, 'Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht', in 5(3) Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 
Strafrecht 88 (2004), p. 76 
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period. Indeed, the data collected from the exhaustive research carried out should be 
structured within a global theoretical framework that allows us to understand whether or 
not we are dealing with a new model of criminal justice and what are the prevailing 
features of the criminal justice system in the prevention and prosecution of the new 
threat.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE NEW THREAT OF GLOBAL 
TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
“Le supplice ne rétablissait pas la justice; il réactivait le pouvoir”  44 
Michel Foucault 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Resende, Harolodo,  Michel Foucault: Transversais entre educação, fil sofia e história, LTDA Ed. 
(2011), p. 56 
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1. Global Terrorism: The “New Threat” 
 
Before beginning the analysis of this new terrorist threat to contemporary western 
societies it is important to explain how this chapter fits in this investigation study. What 
is the connection between the study of modern interna ional threats and the research 
questions presented in chapter I? 
In chapter I’ve identified the three main research questions which are the backbone of 
this study. On the on hand, to understand the changes that have occurred in the structure 
of the systems of criminal justice as a result of the antiterrorist reforms undertaken in 
the past decade. On the other, to analyse the convergence that seems to be occurring 
between legal systems traditionally belonging to different families, as an answer to a 
comman and global problem. Finally, to identify the results and the costs of these 
antiterrorist measures, from the point of view of the evolution of the systems of criminal 
justice, and the point of view of the structure of the rule of law in democratic states. 
Therefore this chapter will look at the implications of the configuration of international 
terrorism for the analysis of the research question herein. At the same time, a detailed 
analysis of the main criminal justice models will be carried out, with attention to recent 
developments. Through this analysis, it will be better understood the theoretical basis 
under which the antiterrorist measures - that will be specifically scrutinized in chapters 
III and IV - were adopted by the States. 
As a starting point it is fundamental to understand the nature of the phenomenon we 
designated in the first chapter as “global terrorism”45 and to fully comprehend its diverse 
                                                
45 Weinberg, Leonard, Global terrorism, The Rosen Publishing Group (2009), p. 11 
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forms and manifestations throughout this past decad. In this regard we must recognize 
that contemporary terrorism is not just, as Ventura observes, terrorism with weapons 
and explosives, but a “multidimensional phenomenon with a variety of expressions that 
includes a wide range of realities such as cyber ter orism, food terrorism and 
transnational organised crime”.46  
This chapter will provide an understanding on the way terrorism has developed in recent 
years. Such an understanding, will allow for a better comprehension of the reason 
behind those legal reforms and their impact in both accusatorial and inquisitorial 
systems cannot be fully comprehended.  
The facts and ideas which will be developed in thisc apter II will allow us to look into 
States’ reaction to the phenomenon of terrorism, as they seek to suppress and prevent 
terrorist acts and the spread of panic and fear. 
In this way, it is essential to understand exactly what we are talking about when we use 
the term “global terrorism” and the multiple definit ons it can comprise. Martin notes 
that only by analyzing the essence of the concept of terrorism can we grasp the 
legislative response of States during the past decade47. This is what we will attempt to 
do in this chapter, paving the way for the topics we will scrutinize in chapter III and IV, 
where different reactions by States in the context of the war against terrorism will be 
compared. 
It is crucial to underline that the development of errorism as we have come to know it 
has caused significant changes to States’ response t  such a complex reality as we will 
see in this chapter. This is due not only to the int rnational character of the new terrorist 
threat but also to some specific features related to religious terrorism and specifically to 
                                                
46 Ventura, Antony, “Il problema del origini de Terrorismo di Sinistra” in Terrorismi in Itália, Il mulino 
ed. (2004), pp. 75 – 149; Rienner, Lynne, Transnatio l Organized Crime and International Security, M. 
& Serrano (eds) (2002), pp. 56 and following; Dishman, C., ‘Terrorism crime and transformation’ in 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Global University ed. (2001) p. 24. 
47 Martin, Gus, Understanding terrorism, challenges, perspectives and issues, SAGE ed. (2010) p. 103 
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extremist muslim terrorism, and to important ties with organised international criminal 
groups. These new characteristics, as Orezen observes, are at the basis of the main 
changes to criminal justice models that have taken place in the past decade48. We will 
therefore try to systematize in this chapter: 
a) the global dimension of the new terrorist threat; 
b) religious fundamentalism and the genesis of extremist uslim terrorism; 
c) the connection between terrorism and organised crime. 
As Dias observes, the main reasons for the structural changes we have witnessed in 
regard to criminal procedure laws - extension of pre-trial detention periods, increased 
communications control, new paradigm in police powers and the reform of migration 
regulations - are closely linked to the emergence of new forms of terrorism and to the 
global and transnational dimension of this new threat.  
According to Megoli, this situation clearly shows the state of panic that exists in 
European and non-Europeans countries alike with regard to the phenomenon of 
terrorism49. The concepts of “permanent disruption” and “social st te of exception” 
have been widely used in Portugal, Spain and Germany50 to describe this phenomenon, 
which ultimately aims to express the state of permanent fear, or dread, of a terrorist 
attack or threat. Thus, this chapter will look at the following relevant aspects: 
1) analysis of the concept of terrorism and its historcal evolution; 
2) timeline of most relevant events in modern and contemporary terrorism; 
3) emergence of new forms of terrorism 
4) new threat of extremist muslim terrorismand the motivations behind it; 
                                                
48 Orezen, Suleyman, and Bal, Ihsan, Multi-Faceted Approach to Radicalization in Terrorist 
Organizations, Ios PressInc, (2011), pp. 44 - 78 
49 Megoli, Robert (org.), Exploring Criminal Justice: The Essentials, Jones & Bartlett Publishers (2012), 
p. 392 - 399 
50 Guedes Valente, Manuel Monteiro, “Terrorismo – fundamento de restrição de direitos” in Terrorismo 
(org. Adriano Moreira), Almedina Ed., 2004, pp. 422 - 457 
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5) relationship between terrorism and organised crime - structural and circumstantial 
connections; 
6) characteristics of global terrorism and the necessity of new responses by the criminal 
justice systems. 
In what measure are these aspects important in relation to the research questions posed 
in chapter I? 
Only by comprehending this significant historical modification is it possible to fully 
understand the fundamental change in the characteristics that surround the terrorist 
phenomenon and the real dimension and extent of the main antiterrorist reforms that 
have taken place in this past decade. 
To grasp not only the cause but also the significance of the legal reforms of the last 
decade, a global understanding of the essential chara teristics of this new threat, as well 
as its historical evolution, is necessary.  
This historical analysis will provide insight into he chain of events that preceded the 
9/11 attacks and the other main terrorist attacks of the past decade (Madrid, London, 
Bali, among others). Furthermore, knowledge of the motivations and the nature of 
claims behind modern terrorist groups is also fundamental to understand the responses 
adopted by States throughout the past decade. As Valente refers “if [modern terrorism] had 
no claims to global dominance and no characteristics of mass terrorism, certainly the response 
by states would have been very different in the past years”.51 
 Before the historical analysis, however, it is fundamental to understand the theoretical, 
philosophical and doctrinal tradition underlying the evolution of the terrorist phenomenon, as 
well as the own evolution of criminal justice systems in the wake of such phenomenon. As 
Moreira refers "to understand the evolution and impact of terrorism among modern justice 
                                                
51 Guedes Valente, Manuel, Direito penal do inimigo e o terrorismo: o progresso ao retrocesso, 
Almedina (2010), pp. 67 – 68.  
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systems it is absolutely necessary to understand the genesis and the evolution of the theoretical 
models on which such systems are based upon".52 This is the theoretical framework which will 
be studied hereafter.  
 
2. The Global Threat of Terrorism and the ‘Bifurcation ’ of 
Criminal Justice Systems – a Theoretical Approach 
 
Looking back to the 1970s, punitive sentiment began to gain momentum in the 
criminal system, after a exceptionally long period f relative stability and penal 
welfarism dating from the 1980s that had utilised a common sense approach by 
generations of academics, policy makers and criminal justice practitioners. Effectively, 
a system of decency and humanity has morphed into oe of insecurity, anger and 
resentment. David Garland contends that in Britain, for example, a significant shift 
toward a punitive approach to criminal justice policy has taken place and a whole new 
´justice system´ started to be dominant.53 
The justice system will always depend on the model that prevails in the light of a 
given historical period and as a result of very different conditions. What kind of model? 
A model that might be imposed by governments, by social bodies or simply by the 
cultural and legal tradition of a people. The key to interpreting a given justice system is, 
exactly, in the dominant model (the model that has d more influence on the justice 
system) and in its main normative guidelines.  
                                                
52 Moreira, Adriano, “A ambivalência terrorista” in Terrorismo, Almedina Ed., Coimbra (2004), p. 11 
53 Garland, David, “The Limits of Sovereign Power, Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society” in Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford (2001), p. 447 
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Specifically considering the case of criminal justice, the dominant model has a 
decisive importance in the definition of its rules and of its most important principles. As 
was stated in the models’ analysis as presented by Herbert Packer, depending on the 
prevalence of the ‘crime control model’ or of the ‘due process model’, the essential 
judicial rules will vary: the admission or not of certain evidences, the allowance or not 
of pre-trial detention, the presumption of innocence or the presumption of guilt, etc. In 
the same manner, the conclusions are proved beyond d ubt in Packer’s analysis, 
regarding the fact that the objectives of the justice system are also mutable and 
dependant on the predominant model: in truth, according to the crime control model, the 
justice system’s objective would be to suppress and repress crime, whereas in the due 
process model, the objective is to ensure that the accused or suspect (facing the State 
prosecution’s charge) has the means to fully exercis  h s right of defence.   
Therefore, one comes to the conclusion that the justice ystem depends on the 
model or models that present themselves as dominant i   given historical period. In this 
sense, it is essential to analyse the works of Richard Vogler and the main points of his 
book “World View of Criminal Procedure”.  
His position is that both models presented by Packer ar  not, after all, opposing 
and antinomic models, as they are frequently present d i  the legal literature54. For that 
reason it is not possible, to understand the justice system based on the tension between 
these two alleged opposing models because:  
“(…) Put simply, crime control is patently an objective whereas due process is a 
method. In no sense can they be considered as polar opposites or ‘antinomies’ and 
to do so is to give unwarranted priority to the model which promises results over 
the model which merely describes a procedure. So far from being value-neutral, the 
terms of the argument are loaded from the outset.”55 
 
                                                
54Tarr, Alan , Judicial Process and Judicial Policymaking,  6th ed., Cengage Learning (2012), p. 91 
55 Vogler, Richard, World view of criminal justice, Ashgate Publishing (2005), p. 7 
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In truth, by dissecting the two models presented by Packer, it seems noteworthy 
that they focus on different things. While the crime control model seems to be focused 
on the objective of the justice system, the due process model tends to place that focus on 
the procedures inherent to the system’s functioning.56 
However, the conclusion achieved by Vogler regarding the definition of dynamics 
and trends that conform the justice system will be ev n more important. According to 
him, three ‘broad methodological guidelines’ coexist and shape the justice systems 
characterisation. These are as follows: 
- The inquisitorial model; 
- The accusatorial/adversarial model; 
- mediated popular justice; 
According to Vogler, these three ‘methodological guidelines’57 coincidently 
interfere with the justice system and, depending on the dominium or on the prevalence 
of each one, the justice system will be completely different. The prevalence of one of 
these ‘methodological guidelines’ (as Vogler calls them) determines the criminal justice 
model in force. As Roberts highlights:  
“More serious criticisms of “A World View of Criminal Justice” begin with its 
title. On closer examination, it is apparent that the book is not directly concerned 
with criminal justice, but rather with criminal procedure, criminal process or 
criminal justice systems. This is not merely a pedantic terminological quibble. Most 
of the text is given over to historical or comparative description, but in a short 
conclusion and somewhat longer introduction Vogler advances explicitly normative 
legal and moral claims. His principal contention is that every legitimate system of 
criminal procedure must reconcile aspects of the inquisitorial, adversarial and 
popular justice traditions (‘the three great trial methodologies’) with its own 
distinctive legal, cultural and political heritage. 
Vogler grounds his argument in historical experience, whilst simultaneously 
insisting that his analysis substantiates an idealized conception of criminal 
procedure—a blend of the descriptive and the normative in some ways reminiscent 
of Ronald Dworkin's influential theory of adjudication.”58  
                                                
56 Packer, Herbert,“Two Models of the Criminal Process” in  University of Pennsylvania Law Review 113 
(1964), pp. 1- 68 
57 Vogler, Richard, supra note 439 at 98 
58 Roberts, Paul, “Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,  28(2), 
pp. 369-391 (2008), p. 374 
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Sharing Vogler’s perspective, a detailed and persistent analysis of some historical 
justice systems leads us to the proof of the permanent i teraction between these three 
methodologies. Their presence and influence is undobtedly in every justice system in 
history. It is not acceptable that the criticism made by some authors to Packer may be 
applied to Vogler’s work, since these “methodological guidelines” referred by Vogler 
are not merely procedural or related to proceedings. When a reference is made (in 
Vogler’s work) to the inquisitorial or accusatorial system (or even to mediated popular 
justice traditions), it bears in mind not only the essential rules of procedure 
characterising each one of these systems, but also their objectives, which are 
considerably different in each of these models. For example, in regard to the level of 
truth to be achieved in the criminal process: while th  inquisitorial system searches, at 
all costs, for a pure truth and for a real reconstruction of the facts – regardless of 
financial costs or the means of achieving it -, the accusatorial system is committed to 
achieving a procedural truth, aware of its limitations and of the nature of the justice 
system. In addition to the above, some systems of traditional justice aim at the 
application of communitarian justice, in name of the “ istorical community”. 
It is based on this conclusion that one must understand the justice system, its nature and 
its functions. It is from this perspective that one should build the theoretical model 
which will sustain this investigation and the theoretical framework of our analysis. This 
is because, as Vogler states, only through this ‘triple dimension perspective’ will one be 
able to understand, with enough realism, the dynamics and the balance at stake in the 
criminal process: 
“Every system, at different historical epochs, has experienced the gravitational pull 
of each of the three trial modes and has responded accordingly. Every system, in its 
current structure and practice, crystallizes their r lative influence to a greater or 
lesser extent. The central argument of this book is that whatever mode of procedure 
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is operated, it should not seek to exclude, significantly limit or disable the 
participation of any of these three legitimate interests in criminal justice.”59 
  
Understanding these three broad methodological guidelines, these three “models 
of justice” and their permanent interaction is the key to understand the justice system 
and its transformations.  
In reality, a system with mainly inquisitorial tendencies will establish long periods 
of pre-trial detention, in order to ensure the necessary evidence is obtained and 
preserved60, as well as the protection of witnesses (particularly in cases of violent or 
highly organised crime), whereas a system with mainly accusatorial tendencies will 
privilege the development of the judicial proceedings and the adversarial principle as a 
way of restoring truth and “social consensus”, thus opting for considerably short periods 
of pre-trial detention.61  
The main idea to be maintained is as follows: the justice system, in particular the 
criminal procedure, is developed according not only to the defendant’s essential rights 
and guarantees of defence and impartiality, but also ccording to the State’s interest in 
repressing and controlling criminality and, furthermore, to the interest expressed by the 
community, which imagines new ways to apply justice a cording to its aspirations. All 
these vectors and interests (the methodological guidelines) are, as Vogler states, 
legitimate, meaning that all must find their own area of influence within the justice 
system. None of these vectors may be eliminated nor can their legitimacy be questioned, 
                                                
59 Vogler, Richard, supra note 439 at 16 
60 Costa Pinto, Frederico, Direito Processual Penal, Universidade de Lisboa (2008), p. 56 
61 One must explain the classical opposition between inquisitorial process v. accusatorial process. In 
Vogler’s book, the reader is taken to a conceptual world that identifies the inquisitorial model as being 
responsible for the serious attacks made to the fundamental rights still persisting in some political regimes 
(such as the Chinese or the Russian) and the accusatorial model as a symbol of freedoms and procedural 
guarantees achieved during a long path of historical maturation. It obviously is an excessively Anglo-
Saxon vision of procedural  law. In truth, the most recent comparative studies on the matter, some by 
Anglo-Saxon authors, have recognized that the differences between both regimes don’t have today the 
importance and the meaning classically attributed to them, while one can also see that both come 
progressively together regarding such important issue  such as pre-trial detention time limits, detentions’ 
regime and rules on obtaining and preserving evidence.    
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purely because the system’s characterisation will be the result of their interference and 
interaction.62  
Nevertheless, these considerations give birth to anther equally important 
question: which factors or conditions influence and determine the prevalence, at a given 
historical moment, of one of these three models? Which factors impose a mainly 
inquisitorial tendency on criminal procedure, in detriment of the adversarial or 
accusatorial line of thought? Or which factors produce a dominant influence over 
popular justice methods, in detriment of normative and institutional justice?  
During his research, Vogler states very clearly that no justice system can ever dare 
to exclude any of these poles or exert its legitimate influence (and thus shape the 
characterisation of criminal procedure), but he does not produce a framework capable of 
answering, in a clear manner, which factors determine the predominance of one of the 
“presented methodological guidelines”. On the other and, he apparently attributes that 
result to a certain “historical randomness”.63 
Close attention must be paid to this point, because it was one of the most 
important elements for the criticism received by Vogler’s works. In truth, if in the 
World View of Criminal Justice a criticism to any mathematical or geometrical 
perspective of criminal procedure is made (that is, he idea that the system’s dominant 
values may be scientifically determined), a perfect answer is still lacking. Which factors 
determine the combination and interaction of the methodological guidelines? 
In fact, this seems to be the theoretical structural flaw of the research carried out 
by Vogler, as stated by Roberts:  
“Finally, the values which each procedural tradition s supposed to represent, and 
in practice to incubate and propagate, are not delineated with sufficient care or 
focused application. It is truistic that legitimate criminal process for a modern 
                                                
62 Voger, Richard, supra note 439 at 98 
63 Vogler refers to a “historical necessity”. See Vogler, Richard, supra note 439 at 13 
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democracy must balance the competing interests of individual participants, state 
and society. The real question is: how?” 
The central thesis of A World View of Criminal Justice, that criminal procedure 
reform must always combine elements of ‘the three great trial methodologies’, in 
itself provides no tangible answers.64 
 
From this perspective comes the most important question to be answered in 
relation to Vogler’s work: how do these three great tri l methodologies interact within 
the justice system and define its main aspects? 
The only point of reference left behind by Vogler’s work regarding this question 
is extremely controversial and poorly sustained from a scientific perspecitve. It is 
related to the idea that the inquisitorial model is closely linked to authoritarian political 
regimes or centralised and bureaucratic systems. In this sense, according to Vogler the 
inquisitorial model would tend to be predominant in the emergence of this type of 
political regimes, thus explaining the use the Nazi, the Soviet, or the Communist 
Chinese regimens have made of this model of criminal procedure.    
This approach appears to lack accuracy because it is based on a historical 
perspective of the inquisitorial system (that is, juridical traditions and organised 
practices) in Continental Europe. Basically, it is based on an old fashioned view of the 
inquisitorial system. 
As Summers refers, the distinction between inquisitorial system and accusatorial 
system lost its scientific utility with the development verified during the last century on 
both models, contributing indeed to often confuse the scientific discussion and hide the 
similarities between both models, as well as darkening the unquestionable existence of 
an European tradition of sharing the essential values in criminal procedure.65     
                                                
64 Roberts, Paul, supra note 442 at 391 
65 Summers, Sarah, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of 
Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford (2007), p. 10 
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In fact, the inquisitorial system’s vision is, in Vogler’s work, a theoretical and 
abstract vision, disconnected from the reality of European continental practice66. For 
that reason, it is rejected or strongly criticised by French, Spanish or Dutch scholars. 
Any comparative perspective would tend to systematically find converging points 
between both juridical traditions, thus producing a systematic global understanding of 
the European criminal procedure, very different from the theoretical description of 
inquisitorial or accusatorial models.  
This is, in fact, an inevitable consequence of political, economical and social 
conditions which mark contemporary Europe. It would be impossible, as the 
comparativist Patrick Glenn emphasises, to completely s parate the European juridical 
traditions. On the contrary, a gradual cohesion and the sharing of values and attitudes in 
the essential questions would be inevitable, which is even more evident within the 
context of a communitarian Europe. 67 68  
The strong influence of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)69 
must be emphasized, as it established a minimum standard of protection of fundamental 
rights which led to a greater convergence among the S ates of the European Community 
in regard to the development and protection of human rights. As Palmer observes, the 
development of a common measure in the protection of human rights has reinforced 
European law as a legal family built upon common pri ciples and rules.70 
Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the European Court f Justice, when referring 
to the ECHR and to the constitutional protection given to fundamental rights, helped 
                                                
66 Delmas Marty, Mireille, European criminal procedures, Cambridge University Press (2002) p. 20 
67 Glenn, Patrick, “Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions” in M Reimann and R 
Zimmerman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, OUP, Oxford (2008) , p. 432 
68 Field, S., and West, A.,  “Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-
Trial Criminal Process”,  Criminal Law Forum 14 (2003), pp. 261–316 
69 Adopted by the Council of Europe on July 4, 1950. 
70 Palmer, Vernon, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family, Cambridge University Press, 
(2001) p. 233 
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cement this commn path towards a mutual degree human rights protection. The 
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (in 2000 as a 
declaration and later in 2007 as an effective bill of rights) represented a fundamental 
step in asserting a common  protection of human rights in all the dimensions of the 
European Union. 
Therefore, despite this orientation of Vogler, one question remains essential 
towards the understanding of modern criminal procedur : if the system’s 
characterisation is built with the geometrical scope of the three broad methodological 
guidelines, which factors contribute towards a preval nce of one over the others?  
We will now analyse each of the factors that decide how and for what reason these 
‘methodological guidelines’ interact. 
 
1) The fundamental law or the constitutional tradition of a given State; 
 
The issue appears to be extraordinarily important within the scope of this work. The 
identification of the determining factors of the existent type of criminal procedure may 
renew the entire scientific perspective on criminal procedural law.   
Here, it is important to remember the theoretical proposition formulated in the 
beginning and which support this judgment: all justice systems tend to reflect a certain 
political-social program, inherent in the constitutional text (in countries that have a 
written constitution) or found in the juridical and popular justice tradition of a country. 
Effectively, the programmatic spirit and social, political and moral rules emanating 
from the constitutional text have a strong imprint on the country’s justice system, 
shaping it in its principles and characteristics. For instance, European liberal 
constitutions inevitably impose some decisive characteristics into their respective 
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criminal procedure models,71 such as: respect for the adversarial preceding; demand for 
strong defence guarantees; and imposition of limits regarding freedom-depriving 
sentences. On the other hand, the fundamental laws of Islamic States tend to reproduce 
ancestral procedural rules, based on a determined form of ritualistic or religious justice 
and, although they also consecrate some rules which are close to western models, they 
draw a process model very different from liberal systems.         
 
2) Ideological context and the narrative underlying the political and institutional speech, 
as well as the social perception associated to it. 
 
 The country’s fundamental law or constitutional trdition is as relevant as the 
ideological background and the context of values, ideas and “emotional state” in which 
a given society lives in. 
The political and institutional speech, the transmission of values and the social 
perception emanating from the media and power nuclei play a decisive role in the 
legislative production, as well as in the pragmatic or entation of all levels of governance 
(federal, regional, local).     
As Kostakopoulou affirms, on the abstract of her article “How to do Things with 
Security Post 9/11”: 
“Discourses and the ideas, perceptions and templates upon which they are based 
exert a powerful influence on law-making, push policy – making in a precise 
direction and determine operational action and outcomes. British counter-terrorist 
law and policy post 9/11 is heavily mediated through a conceptual filter that evokes 
a siege mode of democracy, which deliberately displaces the traditional rights-
based model, and a security narrative based on a double asymmetry. 
(…) Both features of the Government’s security discourse are critical in explaining 
not only British counter-terrorist legislation and policy evolution in the 21st 
                                                
71 Roberson, Cliff, Constitutional Law and Criminal Justice, CRC Press (2009), pp. 28 and following.  
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Century, but also their official depiction as necessary, and singular, responses to 
some structured necessity and the associated logic of ‘no alternative.” 72 
 
3) The jurisprudential tradition and the institutional structure of the criminal 
investigation bodies 
 
Another factor with a vital importance in the justice system’s characterization, in 
particular in the area of criminal procedure is its jurisprudential tradition.73  In fact, even 
in civil law systems, without the rule of binding precedent, strong lines of 
jurisprudential trends have formed, consolidated by Superior Courts’ decisions. Even 
without being “binding” in a normative sense, they form a solid and preponderant 
current of juridical references, to which juridical agents normally obey and which lower 
courts normally follow.      
In this sense, it seems wise to summarise the three ess ntial points discussed 
within the previously posed question: which factors contribute towards the definition 
and characterisation of the criminal justice system, within the scientific framework 
defined by Voger? 
 
These are the factors we have identified and separately explained above:  
• The fundamental law or the constitutional tradition of a State 
• The ideological context and the narrative underlying the political and 
institutional speech, as well as the associated social perception 
 
                                                
72 Kostakopoulou, Dora, “How to do Things with Security post 9/11” in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 28, n. 2 (2008), p. 317 (abstract) 
73 Maldonado, Daniel, Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South 
Africa, and Colombia, Cambridge University Press (2013), p. 273 
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• The jurisprudential tradition and the institutional organization of criminal 
investigation bodies 
 
After the investigation of the fundamental elements that contribute to the framing 
and characterisation of the justice system, analysed according to the scientific 
framework delimited by Vogler, it is now important to reflect upon the model of justice 
system more adequate to deal with the 21st century crime reality, as well as with social 
aspirations concerned with the application of justice.74 
What type of justice system should prevail in the face of a new criminality, with 
new resources and objectives? What objectives should be assumed by the justice system 
as fundamental in this new era, which still maintais the challenges of the past (the 
suspect’s fundamental rights during the investigation stage, for instance) and face others 
equally relevant (for example, the victim’s role during the criminal procedure)? 
It was discussed how Packer distinguishes the two criminal justice models, focusing 
on the different objectives they assume: while the crime control model defines 
repression and the fight against criminality as its biggest objective, due control model 
concerns are related to the suspects fundamental rights within the criminal process. At 
the same time, contemporary authors such as Douglas E. Beloof shed some light on 
some structural flaws in Packer’s models75, particularly the little attention paid to the 
victim and his/her role within the criminal process. It was also analysed how Vogler 
criticises the existence of these two models as being opposed or antinomic.       
Nevertheless, assuming from the start the need to complement this framework with 
a new reference to the victim’s part in the criminal process (today, it is a consensual 
idea not only by criminology, but also by juridical sociology and by the positive law of 
                                                
74 Levine, James, International Criminal Justice: Critical Perspectives and New Challenges, Springer ed. 
(2010) p. 125 
75 Beloof, Douglas, Victim’s Rights, Abc Clio Edition, London (2012), p. 5 
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the majority of liberal-democrat systems), it seems rather evident that both models 
emphasise two great axiological poles of criminal process. The fight against crime and 
the concern with ensuring the effectiveness of the suspect’s fundamental rights are, in 
truth, two of the most important values, if not the most important, of the criminal 
process.76  
Even with obvious practical and scientific flaws, Packer’s model has the advantage 
of bringing us face to face with the biggest concers of the justice system and the 
criminal process. The advantage of understanding its internal dynamics, the 
transformations suffered throughout history and even th  guidelines which were passed 
on to them by different political regimes.  
Trying to construct an analytical framework based on Packer’s two great models and 
after the important contribution received from his most fierce critiques, the question to 
be asked is: which justice model is more appropriate for the challenges of new 
criminality and the new structural issues of criminal process? 77 
Through Vogler’s analysis, a study was made of the guidelines of each and every 
modern justice system, as well as of the variables and conditioning factors (the ‘three 
methodological guidelines’) determining their influence and predominance. Once again, 
the question is: how is the contemporary juridical-riminal system characterized or how 
should it be characterised? Which characteristics should prevail in the justice system’s 
direction, in the face of the new data that design today’s reality? Which is the 
predictable evolution of the system in the near future?  
It is undeniable that today’s criminality has characteristics of sophistication and 
development never seen before in history. At the same time, the terrorist phenomenon, 
                                                
76 Letschert , Rianne Monique, The New Faces of Victimhood: Globalization, Transnational Crimes and 
Victim Rights, Springer ed. (2011), p. 45 
77 Beinart, Peter, The Good Fight: Why Liberals, and Only Liberals, Can Win the War on Terror, 
Melbourne Univ. Publishing, (2007), pp. 31 and following. 
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whilst not new has assumed proportions that have not been seen in other historical 
moments, both due to the inevitable impact terrorists acts have on a globalised media 
world and equally due to growing sophistication and technological advancements by 
terrorists groups. Terrorism stands out so profoundly within modern criminality that 
some authors, such as Bruce Ackerman or Richard Leone, are not shy in mentioning 
“the age of terror” or “the age of terrorism”.78   
What repercussions might occur along the development and globalisation of this 
type of criminality in the evolution of justice system, especially in an age where citizens 
are authentically concerned with the limitations imposed on their freedoms and with the 
assaults to their fundamental rights?    
First of all, it seems wise to state that, even after the dissemination of large scale 
terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe (New York, Madrid, London) and large 
scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a general consensus regarding 
the need to maintain democratic institutions and the constitutional-liberal framework 
firm and in full force. This holds true, at least in the most important legal texts and in 
the dominant political speech.79  Such consensus obviously stems from the citizens and 
other social agents’ legitimate concerns in ensuring the rights, freedoms and guarantees 
achieved in the aftermath of World War II, but at the same time, from the concerns in 
maintaining a “moral and ethical superiority” in the fight against terrorism and against 
all types of organised criminality. As Kostakopoulou states: 
“It seems to me that liberal democratic countries have a legal and moral responsibility 
to maintain the integrity of their political culture in countering political extremism. For 
liberal democratic principles are not an optional extra.” 80 
 
                                                
78 Ackerman, Bruce, “Before the Next Attack. Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism” 
(Yale University Press, New Haven and London, (2006); Leone, Richard, The war on our freedoms: civil 
liberties in an age of terrorism, Ed. BBS Public Affairs (2003). 
79 See articles 3 – 26 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights; the preamble of the recent Lisbon 
Treaty and even the United Nations Global Counter-Trrorism Strategy. 
80 Kostakopoulou, Dora, supra note 456 at 340 
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In this sense, there seems to be the need for a new criminal procedure model, 
capable of understanding the evolution and the reforms that recently emerged in 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Israel. A model capable of preserving the 
essential framework of the liberal criminal system while at the same time, 
comprehending the recent reforms taking place in different jurisdictions.  A new reality 
of crime and a new reality of justice. 
Effectively, both models presented by Packer – as opposing models – don’t seem to 
have the potential to frame the reality of today’s criminal process. On the other hand, as 
Vogler identified, both seem to consider different issues (crime control model on the 
justice system’s objective and due process model on its functioning method) and, 
therefore, an important part of the criminal process reality fails to be understood. On the 
other hand, because – and this is apparently the biggest flaw in Packer’s models – they 
analyse the criminal process as a ‘uniform whole-model’, ignoring its different stages 
and autonomies, by way of different structures and objectives. 
The idea of bifurcation of criminal justice system wants to designate a model that 
distinguishes and differentiates the criminal process into two distinct stages – 1) 
investigation and prevention; 2) trial and crime punishment – with distinct guiding 
principles and main objectives. In truth, this model s es these two stages as 
considerably autonomous and separable from each other, structurally different and, 
therefore, the subject of different normative standards.  
By accepting this difference, the evolution of the rules applicable to each phase is 
differentiated.  The two phases must be allowed to have an autonomous evolution, both 
from a scientific and a legal point of view. 
Beyond that, the idea of bifurcation of criminal justice system has yet another 
fundamental characteristic as a scientific model: it is gifted of an enormous explaining 
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potential, in response to the complex evolution recently registered in different juridical 
jurisdictions, in particular the countries we have nalysed in this work.  
What is the point of asking whether the English criminal process is orientated 
towards the repression and punishment of criminality (Crime Control model) or towards 
the assurance of the suspect’s fundamental rights (due process model)? Or rather if its 
biggest objective is to ensure a satisfactory compensation of the victim and the 
protection of his/her procedural role (victim satisfaction model)? These questions, as 
Soares da Veiga noted, have lost their fundamental value and interest.81  
Most certainly, during the early stages of the investigation of a crime, the 
responsible agents and bodies would not be primarily concerned with fulfilling the 
victim’s objectives and needs82 (in a stage when it’s not even clear what type of crime 
was perpetrated, how it was perpetrated and under what circumstances). Nevertheless, 
this may already occur during the trial stage, where the court tries to access the need to 
punish or not a given (criminal) conduct and to restore, as far as possible, the social 
tissue affected by that crime (restorative justice). At the same time, it would not make 
sense (in most legal systems) to characterize the criminal process as being accusatorial 
in its early stages, because the investigation bodies have not even gathered the necessary 
information to confront the possible suspect. Even so, no one is honestly able to raise 
any doubts about the accusatorial process predominating, for example, in the United 
Kingdom.83  
This reasoning emphasises, from the start, the frailty of a criminal process 
‘traditional’ models, whether of Packer’s terms or by characterising it, in absolute 
terms, as inquisitorial or accusatorial or even as a traditional system. A criminal justice 
system might have eminently inquisitorial characteris ics during the process’ early 
                                                
81 Soares da Veiga, Raul, supra note 208 at 67 
82 Costa Pinto, Frederico, supra note 272 at  43 
83 Gibson, Bryan, The Criminal Justice System: An Introduction, Waterside Press (2008), p. 28 
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stages (by protecting information and imposing freedom-limiting measures to the 
suspects) and become an extremely enthusiastic defender of the adversarial proceeding 
during the trial and sentence enforcement stages.  
In this sense, it becomes fundamental, from early on, t  commence from a new model 
that distinguishes two autonomous stages during the criminal process: 
 
• Phase I: Prevention and Investigation [of criminal conduct] 
• Phase II: Trial and Punishment [of criminal conduct] 
 
The first stage includes all investigation acts developed by the bodies in charge 
of the criminal investigation, starting from the moent the crime is reported until the 
moment it is taken to court. The entire scope of prevention measures84 related to a 
specific crime (in general, put into practice by legal authorities) or to crime in general 
(in general, put into practice by political-administrative bodies), such as police raids in 
high incident areas, protection to risk groups, prevention measures imposed as public 
safety measures, special strategies of surveillance of p ople and goods, etc., is also part 
of this universe. 
The advantage granted by this model is that it focuses on each one of these stages in 
an autonomous fashion, thus enabling a greater comprehension of the legal system 
under analysis. The bifurcation of criminal justice system is increasingly more 
important, which is proved by the fact that nowadays criminology and juridical 
sociology studies are forced to make a two-phased analyses of the aspects involved in 
the criminal process or even in criminal politics in general. As Stewart Field states, 
regarding the 19th century French criminal process:  
                                                
84 Regarding crime prevention strategies see Ashworth, Andrew, Sentencing and criminal justice,, 4th ed., 
Cambridge University Press (2005), pp. 69 - 78 
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“These changes are associated with the “Code d’instruction criminelle 1808” which 
strongly influenced reforms in various German terrio ies (and indeed throughout 
Europe) and especially the first German Federal Code of Criminal Procedure in 1877. 
This introduced that system that French jurists from Helie onwards have seen as a 
‘mixed system’: an inquisitorial private state investigation during the pre-trial phase 
and a public accusatorial trial phase.”  85 
 
Basically, this model will separately look at the pre-trial phase and the trial phase, 
with one particularity: it includes realities that somehow go beyond the criminal 
process, as the administrative crime prevention measur s previously mentioned. In 
truth, police measures of prevention and public control, among others, cannot be 
included within the scope of the criminal process, rather making it a part of what is 
generally designated as ‘criminal politics’.    
Going back to the two phases distinguished earlier, it is important to issue some 
consideration on their differentiation. Understanding the differences between them 
might help one understand the grounds of this idea of bifurcation of criminal justice 
systems. 
From the start, it is quite evident that the first phase has a much greater proximity to 
the alleged crime, which has several implications. During the course of an early 
investigation, the extent and scope of the crime committed is not always clear, which 
demands very careful information sharing, a concern that, in general, is no longer 
present during the second (judicial) phase, where the classical principle of publicity and 
the right to defense fully apply. Beyond that, the opportunities given to the suspect 
during the investigation’s preliminary phases of contradicting testimonials and collected 
evidence are obviously fewer86 than during the trial phase. In fact, it does not make any 
sense to present to the suspect the collected evidence, which at that stage may be still 
very much embryonic and poorly articulated. Besides that, if this information was 
                                                
85 Field, Stewart, “Fair Trials and Procedure Tradition in Europe” in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
March (2009), p. 13 
86 Costa Pinto, Frederico, supra note 272 at 67 
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communicated, it would allow the suspect the power and capacity to destroy other and 
possible more important evidence or to intimidate relevant witnesses for the process’ 
development.  
The analysis of British and American legal systems – that will be undertaken in 
Chapter IV – will facilitate the understanding of the substantial difference in results that 
the researcher could obtain if he focused his attention on the study of some recently 
approved laws in relation to the investigation phase (for example: twenty six days pre-
trial detention for suspects of terrorism, house searches without judicial warrant for 
highly organised crime or terrorism) or, on the contrary, on the study of the rules and 
principles of the trial phase. As will be demonstrated, such conclusions can also be 
drawn in relation to the Portuguese and Spanish legal systems.  
In fact, any lawyer exclusively focusing on the aspects previously analysed of the 
Portuguese penal procedural law wouldn’t have any doubts in, according to Herbert 
Packer’s theoretical framework, classifying the portuguese model in force as “crime 
control model”. In fact, the majority of the previously analysed restrictions that are 
imposed to the fundamental rights are in order to facilitate investigation and draw 
reliable evidence that may lead to the suspect’s convi tion. A scheme of this type would 
be categorised, according to Packer, as a crime control model, without any shadow of 
doubt.  
“The crime control model is based on the proposition that the repression of 
criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the 
criminal process (...). The model, in order to operat  successfully, must produce 
high rate of apprehension and conviction and must do so in a context where the 
magnitudes being dealt with are very large, and the resources for dealing with them 
are very limited.” 87 
 
At the same time, according to Vogler’s scientific grid, the Portuguese system 
would be undoubtedly classified as mainly inquisitorial. In truth, the restrictions 
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regarding the information granted to the suspects for his/her defence or even to the 
general public (a consequence of the investigational secrecy regime), as well as a 
tendency for a broad implementation of the pre-trial detention measure would always be 
seen as symptoms of a strongly inquisitorial system. 
In fact, according to Vogler’s conception, the inquisitorial process is indeed 
characterised by “four essential features, the third of which is the use of different forms 
of intolerable pressure against defendants in order to achieve co-operation”. 88 
Nevertheless, a deep analysis of the Portuguese proc dural law, focused on the trial and 
appeals phases would lead to completely different rsults, as will be seen now. 
First of all, Portuguese law established a totally ccusatorial trial system, being that the 
adversarial proceeding is in full force. In truth, it is so stated in the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic: 
“ The criminal process has an accusatorial structure, being that the trial audience 
and the actions of taking of evidences determined by law are subordinated to the 
adversarial proceeding”. 89 
 
In the same manner, the Criminal Process Code directly appeals to the functioning 
of the adversarial proceeding during the production of evidence, with the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence from the prosecution’s ca e at trial.  
Apart from these important aspects, Portuguese procedural law presents a 
complex and intense web of legal appeals, very similar to common law systems.90 In the 
Portuguese legal system, beyond the prevalence of the possibility of appealing legal 
decisions (art 399 CPP), the entire system is assembled to allow an appeal route, not 
only for sentences or final judgments, but also the majority of the decisions made by a 
judge during a trial. In the light of the aforesaid, t is also important to say that the 
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majority of decisions allow a double appeal, not forgetting about the permanent 
possibility of appealing to the Constitutional Court in matters of constitutionality. In 
truth, many criticism have been made in relation to this “excess in the guarantee of the 
trial” in the Portuguese legal system, which was identified as one of the main causes of 
the justice’s delay. In 2003, during an interview to a Portuguese newspaper, the 
President of the Assembly of the Republic referred to this “excess of rights and 
guarantees” which, according to him, is transformed or can be transformed into an 
“absence of justice and guarantees”. 91  Rothwax calls it the “overextensions of 
protections”.92   
The recent legislative alterations introduced in some legal systems concerning the 
fight against terrorism and highly organised crime have come to create some instability 
in the traditional characterization given to systems, such as inquisitorial, accusatorial or 
popular justice system. Indeed, it seems that the notio  of ‘inquisitorial’ legal procedure 
today exists “only in the unreflected projections of c mmon lawyers”, as suggested by 
Nijboer.93 
It seems evident that the legislative evolution will have to bear in mind the 
characteristics attributed to this new emerging criminality in the globalised world94 by 
most studies. It will also have to pay a stronger attention to the forecasts and specific 
alerts made by the government agencies in charge of fighting crime all over the world. 
For example, the Australian Crime Comission, in an analysis carried out for the year 
2009, suggests that: 
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92 Rothwax, Harold, Guilty – The collapse of Criminal Justice, Random House, New York (1996) 
93 Nijboer, J.F., “Common Law Tradition in Evidence observed from a Continental Perspective”, in 
Comparative Law, IOL ed., (2008) pp. 299 – 338.  
94 Held, D. and others, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (1999), p. 56 
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“New technology has enabled organised crime groups to operate across national 
borders and execute illegal activity at a geographical distance from their victims. 
Using new and available technology, international and Australian crime groups 
commit complex frauds, access equipment to produce drugs and share child 
pornography. Technology increases the ease with which money can be transferred 
offshore, enabling organised crime groups to undertak  cross border money 
laundering.” 95          
 
But, apart from the technological aspect96, the report produces some important 
conclusions related to new IT crimes and money launderi g, in a scale never before 
witnessed by any country. Some conclusions drawn by the report will now be stated, for 
their key importance within the continuance of this re earch project:  
“Organised crime is involved in a diverse and increasing range of industries. In 
general, it is becoming more involved in sectors or industries where there are fewer 
risks, less law enforcement attention and greater opportunities to generate large profits. 
New technology has also made it easier to move goods over large distances and 
between countries (…). 
There are parallels between the types of activities carried out by criminals and 
terrorists. Both use transport, communications and fi ancial services to plan and 
support their activities. Both target the vulnerability of their victims and engage experts 
to assist their activity. 
Criminals and terrorists protect themselves and their assets, hide information and use 
similar methods of operation including violence, corruption and money laundering.” 97 
 
It seems quite evident that the legislation to be produced in this area, according to 
current circumstances, will have to produce a very sensitive balance between the fight 
against this new type of criminality and the genuine social concerns of citizens’ 
fundamental rights and basic freedoms. The underlying political speech and ideological 
narrative seem to point at this direction, which, as was seen in the analysis made of 
Vogler, will unavoidably affect the legislative reforms in course.  
                                                
95 Australian Crime Commission, The Organised Crime in Australia – 2009 available at 
http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2008/2008_oca_key_issues_trends.pdf  
96 As Steve Uglow refers, the impact of new technologies doesn’t only have a negative effect in terms of 
organised crime; their influence on the investigation and police work should also be highlighted. See 
Uglow, Steve, Criminal Justice, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. (2002). pp. 68 - 72 
97 Australian Crime Commission, The Organised Crime in Australia – 2009 available at 
http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2008/2008_oca_key_issues_trends.pdf  
(accessed on August, 2013) 
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The concern over safety in face of the fear of new terrorist attacks (United Kingdom 
and Spain) or by the increasing and obvious organised urban criminality (France and 
Greece) or even by the unpredictable effects of colossal financial frauds (USA) will lead 
– or, in some cases, have already lead – to legislative measures that harden the fight 
against this type of crimes,98 facilitating criminal investigations and allowing for 
harsher and more restrictive measures of coercion on the suspects. On the other hand, 
the growing social and public concern related to freedoms and fundamental rights will 
force governments and parliaments to significantly modify the law, as well as to create 
counter-weights that maintain the constitutional scheme of checks-and-balances in 
functioning. In truth, this checks-and-balances ystem represents one of the most 
important legacies from the classical liberalism and was kept as an essential pillar 
within the European Union’s structure. 99  
In truth, no investigator can honestly believe that measures will be undertaken to 
contain and restrict criminal investigation activities, within this context of ‘war on 
terror’.100 On the contrary, the tendency witnessed (even in cou tries such as the United 
Kingdom and Spain) goes in the direction of a growing flexibility of these activities. At 
the same time, there is a broadening of the situations n which the bodies of criminal 
police may intervene (restricting the citizens’ fundamental rights) without the need of 
judicial intervention101, which, in the past, was only allowed for in utterly exceptional 
situations. In the same fashion, the pre-charge detntion time limits will tend to be 
extended, particularly in situations involving terrorism or highly organised criminality.  
                                                
98 Cuerda, Antonio, Nuevos Desafíos Del Derecho Penal Internacional: Terrorismo, Crímenes 
Internacionales y Derechos Fundamentales, Tecnos ed. (2009), p. 45 
99 Fisher, Elizabeth, “The European Union in the age of Accountability” in Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 24, n. 3 (2004), p. 506 
100 Klosek, Jacqueline, War on Privacy, Greenwood Publishing (2007)  pp. 77 - 90 
101 ( United Kingdom) Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part IV s 23 (1); (Portugal) Art. 174, 
no. 4 of Portuguese Code of Criminal Process.  
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At the same time, within the operation of crime prevention, one witnesses – and will 
still continue to witness in a near future – a growing number of police-based 
“preventive operations”, particularly in problematic areas, in order to prevent terrorist 
crimes, arms trafficking, money laundering and other activities of criminal group.102 
This reasoning serves to conclude that a progressiv prevalence of the crime control 
model within the scope of Phase I (or, in Vogler’s terms, of inquisitorial line) will take 
place, in which the objectives of the criminal policy will dominate the process’ path, 
with increasing breaches on the citizens’ fundamental rights. 
On the other hand, as a way to manage to necessary balance within the criminal 
process, to answer the growing social concerns or simply to maintain the foundations of 
the liberal legal tradition, governments will tend to create more effective mechanisms of 
control and assessment of evidences and the means used to obtain them, legal ways to 
enable a more effective participation of the suspect during trial (considering that this 
intervention was extremely limited during the investigation phase) and public scrutiny 
of the charge and trial of these suspects.  
All of this can be translated into a reinforcement of he defense mechanisms at the 
suspect’s disposal, with more room for adversarial debate and, especially, more 
mechanisms of legal appeal. Basically, this means a progressive prevalence of the due 
process model within Phase II (or accusatorial line), in which the suspect’s guarantees 
and his/her fundamental rights are the process’ main concern. We have here, in a very 
clear way, the idea of bifurcation of criminal justice system.  
Basically, systems traditionally considered as accusatorial, according to academic 
standards, will know a slow but steady inquisitorial tendency within the scope of crime 
                                                
102 FATF – GAFI, Building Effective Systems to Fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,  
(June, 2007) available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/18/11/38944355.pdf  (accessed on August, 
2013) 
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prevention and investigation mechanisms. This is precisely what is happening in the 
United Kingdom and also in the United States. On the other hand, some continental 
systems will tend to harden their prevention and investigation system (Phase I) and to 
accentuate the respective inquisitorial tendency, especially when certain types of crimes 
are on the line (example: the Portuguese Gun Law 2006). This tendency will probably 
also result in an increase (shy or considerable, depending on the governments) of pre-
trial detention rates in a near future, as referred by Frederico Isasca. 103 
This tendency will be the systems’ answer to the boom in organised and highly 
violent crime that has been witnessed over the last decade, as well as the growing 
terrorist threat. Increasingly intrusive investigaton measures and more permanent crime 
prevention actions – programmes such as Zero Toleranc  Policing104 - are combined 
with the social demand for harsh and exemplary punishments on the suspects, even if 
“against the results obtained by the majority of investigations and studies in this area”, 
as referred by Andrew Ashworth. 105  
A very important example of this punitive or securitizing tendency is the 
abandonment of some very central procedural safeguards that serve to protect people 
from abuse in the legal environment, such as the rights of the suspects and prisoners in 
sexual crimes. Thomas contends that in the United Kingdom a sex offender register has 
been created based not on substantive evaluation or research but popular opinion 
expressed through the media, including the publication of sex offenders details, which 
has led to mass demonstration, denunciation and vigilantism. The so-called return of the 
                                                
103 Isasca, Frederico, “Prisão preventiva e restantes medidas de coacção” in Jornadas…, cit., pp. 65 - 79 
104 Uglow, Steve, Criminal Justice, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell Ed., London (2002), p. 59 
105 Ashworth, Andrew, supra note 467 at 389 
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victim and victim status has also become apparent in this prevailing punitive 
environment.106 
However, at the same time, the liberal tradition and the system’s credibility will 
force the use of open and transparent schemes of legal activity during the trial stage, in a 
clear sign respect for the liberal principles such as fair trial and rule of law.107 Even if 
merely symbolic, Western democracies can not abandon their most significant and 
historical values and juridical principles.  
 It is this theoretical framework that will underpin the analysis of the data in 
chapters III and IV, entailing us to observe the phnomenon of bifurcation of criminal 
justice system, how the antiterrorist responses have brought common law and civil law 
systems closer together, and the significant costs that have resulted in regard to legal 
and constitutional values. However, prior to the detailed study of such legal responses, 
it will be useful to engage in a deeper understanding of the specific characteristics of 
this new threat, as well the historical path and the most significant issues that were 
raised towards criminal justice systems, namely the surge of new types of terrorism in 
the world stage. 
 
3. Historical Evolution of Terrorism 
 
Although terrorism has been, in its broadest sense, the penicle for changes in 
many societies108, the current phenomenon finds its roots in the French Revolution. It 
                                                
106 Thomas, Terry, “When Public Protection becomes Punishment? The UK Use of Civil Measures to 
Contain the Sex Offender” (2004) in European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, nº2 , p. 339 
107 Weissbrodt, David, The Right to a Fair Trial  - articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2001) 
108Hübschle, for example, analyses the way in which diverse forms of Islamic related terrorism have 
changed the political panorama of societies in the Arab World, many times prompting true movements of 
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was during this period that terrorism gained a new life and that the term terror started to 
enter the vocabulary of many politicians, "even identifying the decisive stage of the 
revolution, after the "law of suspects", passed in September 1793, condemning 
thousands of citizens to the guillotine." In 1798, the dictionary of the French Academy 
began to include the word terrorism as a "political figure in which Power kills to 
maintain or enhance itself."109  
"Revolutionary Catechism" was the first known organis tion in the fight against 
despotism. However, at the time of its creation, no rules were layed out concerning the 
function of the organisation. 
Thus in 1879, "a group of youths outraged with the regime of the time, gathered 
ideas and adopted the principles that were intended to guide "Catechism", in order to 
tackle the organised and systematic violence by the czarist power." 110 This is how 
'Narodnaya Volya' was created, which literally means People's Will. It was the first 
active terrorist organisation known up to that time. The death of Czar Alexander, 
following the attack of March 1, 1881, has been attribu ed to this group.”111 
The principles of Narodnaya Volya are consubstantiated on the following: 
“Terrorist action consists in the suppression of the government´s most harmful 
men, in defending the party against espionage and in the punishment of the most 
evident violence and arbitrariness committed by theGovernment and the 
Administration. The purpose is to undermine the prestig  of governmental force, to 
constantly prove the possibility to fight against the government, thus fortifying the 
revolutionary spirit of the people, and, finally, to form active members prepared to 
fight.” 112 
 
                                                                                                                                    
national liberation, as the OLP (Palestine), Lebanon and Iran (with the Islamic Revolution).  Cfr. 
Hübschle, Islamic revolution and terrorism, Leya ed. (2005), pp. 11 - 16 
109 V. Authors, Enciclopédia Luso-Brasileira de Cultura, Lisbon, Editorial Verbo Ed., p. 1429. 
110 Franco, Pinheiro Joaquim, “A Rússia dos Czares” in Revista Nação e Defesa, nº 34 (2008), p. 27. 
111 Ibid. at., p. 31 
112 Chaliand, Gérard, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, University of California 
Press (2007), pp. 147 and following 
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 From here onward, a kind of faceless terrorism or systematic terrorism began to slowly 
develop, nevertheless without defined goals or specific enemies to knock down.  It is 
with this concept on systematic and global terrorism, as put forward by Marshall113 that 
we will work on this study. It is a formulation that has been gaining ground among 
those who investigate terrorism as a concept. Sousa Santos states that: 
“The emerging phenomenon of contemporary terrorism post 9/11 has to be seen 
from a double perspective: a global dimension (in so far as its objectives are the 
global and complete destruction of the international legal and political system) and 
a systematic dimension (as global terrorist networks rganize and coordinate many 
autonomous groups for a common purpose).” 114 
 
However, it already brought about the idea that the population as well as 
members of the organisation itself could be targets of terrorism, if necessary. On the 
other hand, it also mentioned that people should be influenced for the purpose of a 
revolution. Attacks have since multiplied, several methods have been used to perform 
such attacks and many thousands have been victims of terr rist acts. 
The most important demonstration of this sort of terrorism occurred after World 
War II, more specifically in the late sixties. Most analysts point to 1968 as the milestone 
of modern terrorism, when systematic terrorist operations by the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) began.115 Authors like Hoffman and Laqueur consider that "the 
decisive milestone of this change refers to the hijack ng of an airplane of the Israeli 
airlines by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one of 
the six factions of the Palestine Liberation Organis tion (PLO)."116 
                                                
113 Marshall, Monty G., Global “Terrorism: an overview and analysis”, Integrated Network for Societal 
Conflict Research (2002) 
114 Sousa Santos, Boaventura, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and 
Emancipation, Cambridge University Press (2002), pp. 45 - 68 
115Chaliand, Gérard, “La Mesure Du Terrorisme” in Revue Stratégique, Nº 66/67, from 1997, p. 9. 
116 Laqueur, Walter, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Continuum Ed. (2004), pp. 
86 - 105 
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 These tactical and operational changes were enabled by technological advances, 
especially in the manufacturing of weapons with variable degrees of power, in the air 
transportation system, as well as in the media, with regard to television channels.117  
   This illustrates, in Veres’ words, a fundamental truth concerning contemporary 
terrorism: the fact that is a form of mass terrorism, highly resonated through the media, 
and which aims for the death of the highest number of people (civilian or not) as a 
means of social and political unrest using the media to widen the attention of its actions 
118. Pinheiro notes that “whilst terrorists of the nineteenth century were idealistic, with 
moral rigor and unable to kill innocents, those of our days perform most infamous tasks 
with complete insensitivity."119 
This situation takes on impressive proportions in any empirical analysis, for 
example, of the various media sources. Let us consider, by way of example, the cases of 
Portugal and Spain. In the year 2000, the most widely-read national newspaper in 
Portugal (Correio da Manhã newspaper) published about 45 articles related to terrorism, 
mostly concerning the situation in the Middle East. In 2004, the same newspaper had 
roughly about 2805 articles related to terrorism.120 
Since the 1980’s, terrorism has again gained new life and actions have become 
increasingly violent. It can be said that the 1980’s were a milestone for the 
indiscriminate spread of terror. Terrorist acts have become increasingly violent and are 
intended to affect the greatest number of people.  
Sousa Santos identifies this phenomenon as “mediatic terrorism”, that is, a type 
of criminal activity that seeks to achieve its goals through the global dissemination of 
                                                
117 Piçarra, Nuno, Electronic Surveillance and European Union, ALFA (2008), p. 76 
118 Veres, Luis, La retórica del terror: Sobre lenguaje, terrorismo y medios de comunicación, Ediciones 
de la Torre ( 2009), pp. 25 and following 
119 Pinheiro, Joaquim A. Franco, Revista Militar, Lisbon (2003) p. 474 
120 Rodrigo de Castro, André, Estatisticas sobre terrorismo e jornalismo, Verbo ed., Lisboa (2012), pp. 
56 - 57 
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fear, panic, and its imperialistic or destructive objectives. This element is relevant 
insofar as it enables the understanding of governments desire to control the media and 
in a certain way, to control the freedom of expression of its citizens.121 
Methods have also evolved. Bombs, explosive devices and kidnappings are now 
the most widely used instruments, whilst the use of airplane hijacking has curiously 
declined in the last decade (see Appendix below). A novelty in the new era of terrorism 
is the action of suicide bombers known also as kamizes.122 With them, the world 
watched in horror as a new medium was being used: th  innocent-bomb.123 
 The damages resulting from terrorist actions during the 90s, translate the 
intensification of the destructive nature of terrorist operations. When terrorists attacked 
the World Trade Centre for the first time in 1993, they intended to kill thousands of 
people, although the number of victims was much smaller. Another situation, which has 
been occurring with some frequency, is the appearance of religious "sects" that instigate 
the idea of a better world for their believers. These groups have caused many problems 
to governments they are part of. Such was the case of the attack with "sarin gas" 
perpetrated by the Japanese religious cult "Aum Shin Rikio" inside the Tokyo subway 
in 1995. 12 people died in this attack and over 5,000 were injured.124 
It should be noted that since that time authors like Hubback, Bowers, Hoffman 
and Laqueur, drew attention to“the growing danger manifested by many extremists and 
                                                
121 Sousa Santos, Boaventura, A linguagem sociológica do terrorismo, Universidade de Coimbra (2003), 
p. 78 
122 Men and / or women bombers who sacrifice the lives of innocent people as well as their own lives on 
behalf of the cause they advocate.. Islamic extremists believe that such acts are not suicides, but acts of 
martyrdom, and thus truly acceptable in the holy war. 
123  http://islam.about.com/cs/currentevents/a/suicide_bom .htm accessed August 2008. 
124 Smith, Paul J., “Ameaças Transnacionais e a Sobrevivência do Estado: um Papel para o Militar?” 
Military Review, Brazilian – 1st Quarter 2000, p. 72. 
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fanatics of religious nature, insofar that they represented - and still remain – a serious 
threat to international security".125  
The 1990’s were, as such, the seed of this new terrorism that acquired global 
dimension and had mass destruction as an objective. This phenomenon - and the 
corresponding responses by the criminal justice system , will be the subject of the 
analysis herein. As Albuquerque refers, it is important to locate the birth of global 
terrorism in the 1990’s as it was during that decad that States began to comprehend the 
scope and the potential dimension of the dangers and threats related to this problem. 
According to the same author, it was during the 1990’s that the deadliest attacks that the 
world witnessed began to be planned, developed and finally executed.126 
In 1993, Al-Qaeda’s Muslim terrorists failed with teir intention in the first 
attack to the World Trade Centre, but they also made it clear that "New York, the centre 
of the economic and political power of the West, would be attacked again."127 Thus, it 
was that on September 11, 2001, in New York, the largest single attack in history took 
place. 
 Jenkins, one of the most prominent and acute observers of terrorism, claimed in 
1985 that "simply killing many people has rarely been the purpose of terrorism (...). 
Terrorists operate on the principle of the least necessary effort. They find it unnecessary 
to kill many since killing some may be enough for their purposes."128  
However, this statement no longer made sense after th  attacks of 9/11. 
Terrorism, which has since long been present in the history of human societies, now 
                                                
125 Nascimento, José Miguel de Fraga, O Terrorismo e seus intérpretes – Uma abordagem psicos ocial, 
Lisbon, Hugin, February 2002, p. 8. 
126 Albuquerque, Martim, Estudos sobre terrorismo global, Almedina, Coimbra (2009), p. 87 
127 Pohly, Michael and Duran, Khalid, Ussama Bin Laden e o Terrorismo Internacional, Lisbon, 
Terramor, November 2001, p. 6. 
128 Jenkins, Brian, International Terrorism: the other world war, Rand Corporation ed., New York 
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heightens its main feature to the highest expression: the ability to terrorize and to 
intimidate the most. Hoffman characterized the attacks of 9/11 as follows:  
"Ambitious extent and dimension; perfect synchronization and coordination; 
professionalism and skills in keeping such a big operation in secret; strong 
determination and dedication of the 19 aircraft hijackers who willingly killed 
themselves as well as the passengers and crews of the four taken aircrafts and the 
thousands of people who were visiting the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
and those who worked there." 129
 
 Moreover, these attacks left a warning: “future terrorist attacks [will happen] in 
the metropolises of modern industrial societies.”130  
 The majority of antiterrorist laws in the United States and in several European 
countries are the result of the analysis carried out after the 9/11 attacks. It is therefore 
necessary to observe how this change in the nature of the terrorist threat conditioned the 
responses by different states.  
By considerably raising the level of the threat and the potential degree of 
destruction, States were forced to formulate more sphi ticated and effective responses, 
which however, were also more intrusive of citizens’ rights, as Donohue points out.131 
Global and massive control programs of electronic surveillance and wiretapping were 
included as part of an imperative need to contain that potential threat of mass 
destruction. 
On the other hand, whilst the terrorist phenomenon of the XIX century and of the 
greater part of the XX century was confined to actions by certain relatively small 
groups,132 modern techniques of massive recruitment, using new technologies, have 
required states to adopt control and surveillance measures in a degree never seen before 
                                                
129 Ibid., p. 23 
130 Pohly, Michael, and Khalid Duran, supra note 69 at 6. 
131 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at 67 
132 Moledo, Miguel, O terrorismo na Europa: perspectiva histórica, Almedina (2003), pp. 56 - 78 
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in the history of mankind, as Marques da Silva observes.133 It also brought about new 
international partnerships and new instruments of international legal cooperation.  
The point, as Wagner notes, is the following: terrorism of Islamic inspiration 
assumed global objectives, positioning itself as a threat to all secular and democratic 
states in the world. This new paradigm of threat forced states to adopt new instruments 
of international cooperation regarding the sharing of information, even among countries 
where such was highly unlikely to occur.134 
The first years of the second decade of the XXI century have been particularly 
relevant to understand the adaptation capability of muslim extremist groups, namely 
does affiliated with Al-Quaeda. The western, US lead offensive against these groups 
struck the heart of their leaderships and led many to consider that by dealing significant 
blows to the main structure of those organizations, they would succeded in dismantling 
their networks and therefore their capacity to produce significant attacks on the west. 
This was emphasysed by American authorities when they declared that such 
organizations would only be able to carry out “lone wolf attacks, carried out by misfits 
and madmen indoctrinated over the internet.”135 This proved only partially true. Whilst 
killing many of the top operational leaders of Al-Quaeda and its affiliated groups did 
hinder the ability to organize sophisticated and complex attacks on the West (also called 
“spectaculars”), Al-Quaeda and others have concentrated their attention to more 
immediate targets closer to their bases. This has also been possible due to the failures of 
the Arab Sping, which in many ways gave momentum to the propaganda of extremist 
muslim ideology.   
                                                
133 Marques da Silva, Germano, Direito Penal Português, Vol II, Ed. Verbo (2004), p. 67 
134 Wagner, Patrick, Deterrence and Terrorism: Can Global Terrorism be Dterred?, GRIN Verlag 
(2011), p. 6 
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 For a better understanding of this it is important to study in detail the objectives 
of those groups, directly or indirectly affiliated to Al-Quaeda.136 
 
4. Extremist-Muslim Terrorism. The objectives of al- 
Qaeda’s "Terrorist Organisations"  
 
Al-Qaeda and its associated groups such as the Abu Sayaf Group, Al Shabab and 
Boko Haram, among others, operate on the basis of an Isl mic political-religious 
fundamentalist ideology called Salafism137. They employ extremist and selective 
interpretations of Islam which determine all operating aspects of these organisations, 
from the process of recruiting new members to their use in the perpetration of terrorist 
acts, involving also strategic decision-making, obtaining financial and logistical support 
as well as operational planning. 
But what are the objectives of Muslim extremist terrorism (or global or 
"catastrophic" terrorism)? 
 According to Loureiro dos Santos, "the objectives of organisations in which the 
use of catastrophic terrorism is legitimate, are political, in the purest sense of the word. 
They intend to change power relations."138 These political objectives consist of three 
                                                
136 It must be underlined here that this new kind of terrorism, perpetrated by muslim extremists groups 
such al-Qaeda, is distant from the tolerance towards other faiths that has been central throughout the 
centuries to Islamic tradition. The history of Islam provides some of the earliest examples of pluralist 
tradition and of the earliest codes of human rights, and played an important role in shaping human 
civilisation. Furthermore, the Quran explicity promtes diversity, compassion, forgiveness and restraint. 
In fact,,it actually advises its followers to beware of extremism. The views that are proclaimed by 
terrorists are very much at odds with what is generally agreed to be the principles of Islam (Transnational 
Terrorism – The Threat to Australia, 2004, Page ix and following, available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/transnational_terrorism.pdf, accessed July 2013) 
137 Malet, David, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts, Oxford University Press 
(2013) pp. 189 and following. 
138 Loureiro dos Santos, Um futuro sem terrorismo? Almedina (2007) pp. 39-43. 
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types of objectives: the ultimate goal, the intermediate (or "sectorial") objectives and the 
lower targets (or "geographically restricted"). 
 Its aims are global and they are not willing to any compromise in order to 
establish a pan-Muslim super-state: 
“The demands of these terrorists are absolute. Unlike other known forms of terror, 
they are not contained by geography, political dispute or particular historical 
grievance. Their rhetoric often seeks to exploit loca  populist concerns to their own 
ends. They do not allow for remedy or compromise. Their views on means and 
ends differ from previously known forms of terrorism. They know their goals 
cannot be achieved through persuasion. Their violence is not designed to get a seat 
at a negotiating table. It signals a committed path to t eir final end”139 
 
Thus, another order would emerge against, “a centre formed by Islamic countries 
(Islam), whose core would be located somewhere in one of these countries (or outside 
by virtue of the possibilities offered by the use of cyberspace),"140 where the Sharia 
would be imposed in a fundamentalist interpretation of the precepts of the Holy Book of 
Muslims, the Qur'an, and once more implementing the "Caliphate"141 
All those who do not follow their cause are deemed legitimate targets. This 
includes other Muslims as has been seen throughout the years of their terrorist 
operations which have been carried out in predominantly Muslim-populated 
countries.142 However, an attack on the U.S. (in political, economic and sociological 
terms) or UK is still the primary intermediate objective and thus forcing a retreat from 
the power relations and occupation/exploitation exercis d upon the Islamic world (the 
presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia is considere  a provocation by Muslims, since 
it is the birthplace of Islam). With the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. assumed a Grand 
                                                
139 Transnational Terrorism, supra note 78,  at page vii, accessed July 2013 
140 Loureiro dos Santos, upra note 80 at 48 
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on a global scale 
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Strategy in order to prevent other attacks from occurring. The so-called USA Patriot Act 
was only the first of these reactions. 
The second objective is to recover the Sharia in the the lost territories of the 
Islam, such as the Caucasus, the Balkans, and an important part of the Iberian peninsula 
(al-Andalus); regions that belonged to Muslims for centuries. Such frustration over the 
lost Muslim territory originated therein, the existence of Muslim terrorist organisations 
willing to fight the "infidel invader."143 
Europe is, thirdly, another intermediate target of great importance, insofar that 
excluding those countries belonging to the "Great Cliphate", other countries, or at least 
the most of the important urban centres, would become key pieces used to bend 
European policies so that the Muslim will can flourish. Likewise, Muslim enclaves 
would be constituted throughout the numerous Muslim communities residing in 
Europe.144 Through this objective, the U.S. would become isolated, which would lead to 
a weakening of its influence and intervention in inter ational affairs. 
It is important to note that while the tactics and immediate targets may change 
according to the leadership of groups affiliated with Al-Quaeda and with present 
objectives, the goals of muslim extremism are clear, as has been noted by The 
Economist: 
 
                                                
143 Basically, as Moghadam refers, the main idea is to recover the "Great Caliphate", which is a big, 
geographically divided territory - huge area of continental and insular land, extending from al-Andalus, in 
the West, to the extreme Eastern Indonesia, in the East. It would separate Eurasia, in the South from 
Africa turning the Mediterranean world into an Muslim fundamentalist lake; It would include the 
Petroleum regions (the Gulf region) and it would hold geostrategic key positions to control the oil routes 
to India and China, which one might also call the Pan-regions, which are regions of large importance 
within the global economy. In other words, as Moghadam advocates, in global geopolitical terms, those 
who would dominate this vast territory ("Great Caliphate"), would have significant if not decisive 
advantages143, with regard to the ownership of natural energy resources, and would thus weaken the 
current Unipolar World Order represented by the United States, as well as other emerging and expanding 
powers.(Moghadam, Assaf, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion 
of Suicide Attacks, JHU Press, 2011, p. 77 and following) 
144 Carmo, Nuno da Câmara, Enclaves islâmicos na Europa Ocidental, Verbo ed. (2009), pp. 67 and 
following. 
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“While attacks on the far enemy are important both as a deterrent and as source of 
jihadist inspiration, they are not al-Quaeda’s main purpose. Its overriding aim 
remains, as it has been since bin Laden saw the retr at of the Soviet Union, the 
creation of a new caliphate across the Islamic world based on unswerving 
adherence to Sharia Law. That requires the corrupting influence of the “Zionist-
Crusader alliance” in the region to be extirpated and all apostate Muslim 
governments removed.”145  
 
Soares da Veiga, mentions more specific, intermidiate objectives of global 
terrorism, such as: "1) replacing corrupt Muslim governments throughout the Muslim 
world; 2) to oust U.S. forces from the most sacred Muslim grounds - Saudi Arabia, 
where the shrine cities of Mecca and Medina are located; 3) to oust the Jews from 
Palestine; 4) to release the European and Asian regions that were once Muslim: 
represented by the great Albania in the Balkans, Chechnya and other Asian regions in 
the Caucasus, Kashmir in India, Xingjian in China ad some areas of Central Asia."146 
The central issue in these objectives is the choice f a country where a 
significant effort is made to replace non-fundamentalist governments with 
fundamentalist ones. Loureiro dos Santos indicates th  following as the most probable 
nations: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt or Pakistan.147 
 Fundamentalist Muslim groups have recently considered Iraq a “top” prioriy. 
Zarkawi the former number one of al-Qaeda in Iraq, said that Iraq would be the best 
place to establish the generating power of the "new great Islamic civilization". 
At a lower level, there are objectives that seek to educate, organise and census 
the Jihadist "battalions". Such requires large physical spaces that must be poorly 
controlled and inhabited that could be found in failed states. The best and most likely 
place is centred in the Pashtun tribal border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
which is going through a rapid ‘Talibanisation’ process. 
                                                
145 The Economist, September 28, 2013, pg 23. 
146 Soares da Veiga, Raul, O Terrorismo e os Direitos Fundamentais, Universidade de Lisboa (2010) pp. 
44-56. 
147 Santos, General Loureiro dos, supra note 80 at 94 
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According to Fawaz, an assessment of al-Qaeda’s achieved and failed 
objectives, shows us that some have not yet been met, such as: "jeopardising the 
International order led by the U.S148; attacking the U.S. again or taking measures in any 
European country since 2005, with the exception of Turkey; overthrowing regimes of 
Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia and expelling the Israelis from Palestine."149 
Donohue underlines here the impact of actions for the prevention and containment of 
terrorist attacks, resulting from various antiterrorist legislative packages approved by 
Western countries.150 
 However, Al-Qaeda has achieved some major goals. Such can be seen, in 
particular, in causing restrictions to the civil rights in democracie. They have succeeded 
in causing serious economic losses, especially in the tourist sector of developed 
countries. We have also seen a continuation to instigate Muslim crowds against the 
West, they attract funding, there is an increase in the number of volunteers for the Jihad, 
increasing militant anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism and putting pressure on U.S. 
forces to leave Saudi Arabia. 
 Understanding the motivations and immediate objectiv s of terrorist groups is 
also a fundamental element to ensure an adequate response to the research questions 
posed in chapter I. The efficiency of the responses to terrorist threats depends, as 
Sageman refers, on the knowledge of its immediate obj ctives and its underlying 
causes.151 
 Fundamentalist ideologues are in charge of the development and interpretation 
(and updating) of religious ideology. They base thems lves on ideological and political 
motivations and on the fact that Muslim societies have struggled to cope with the 
                                                
148 Fawaz, Gerges, The far enemy, Cambridge University Press (2005), p. 82  
149 Loureiro dos Santos, upra note 80 at  97. 
150 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33, at 267 
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challenges of modernity in order to justify the importance of implementing the Qur'an in 
these fundamentalist societies. They take on Wahhabism, a extremist branch of Sunni 
Islam 
The feeling that is most applied to the fighters by ideologues of the Jihad is the 
feeling of humiliation. According to Kosrokhavar, it is important to differentiate three 
kinds of humiliation: the one arising from social inferiority and economic marginality, 
the one that is reported by the media and accounts for the Western “offensive” against 
Islam (Palestine, Afghanistan) and also, the one which lies in the cultural and religious 
threat of a secular and domineering West: 
“Terrorists justify and feed their ideology through skilful exploitation of dynamics 
within mainstream societies. They use adverse political, social and economic 
conditions as a rallying cry to recruit and motivate their members. They exploit 
distrust of the West and feelings of humiliation and anger.”152 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prisons in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Chechnya, the Kashmir issue, among 
others, trigger a feeling of humiliation in the mujahedeen, which ideologues take 
the opportunity to encourage, spread and adjust in accordance with good 
propaganda techniques. It is this feeling that leads to the sacrifice of suicide or 
according to al-Qaeda’s interpretation, to "martyrdom". 
This aspect has been notoriously absent from the reforms undertaken by European 
States and the USA, which have mostly targeted the criminal side of terrorism, rarely 
addressing the political – propaganda and fundraising – aspects of extremist religious 
terrorism.153 
 
 
                                                
153 Gunaratna, Rohan ,Transnational Terrorism, Support Networks & Trends, LTDA Publishers (2010), 
pp  45 - 62 
 
 
84 
5. New types of terrorist threat 
Understanding the evolution of how terrorists act and the new shapes they can be 
manifested is key for the analysis of the antiterrorist reforms that will be carried out in 
chapters III and IV. Only by understanding this phenomenon comprehensively will it be 
possible to understand the prevention, control and surveillance programs initiated in the 
past decade as well as the legal reforms undertaken in criminal and criminal procedure 
areas. 
In what way is the understanding of the new types of terrorist threats relevant in 
regard to the research questions set fourth in Chapter I? 
From the outset, the fact that it is a phenomenon with levels of threat of a 
potentially catastrophic level has forced States to ad pt measures of preventive nature, 
which are relevant as they are behind the changes occurring within the criminal justice 
systems (namely regarding the differentiation betwen different phases of the criminal 
process). Also – and this is a fundamental aspect – the fact that these systems face a 
common and global threat has forced different system  to adopt common and 
coordinated answers, which in turn is behind the convergent evolution of legal systems 
traditionally belonging to distinct families (mostly regarding common law and civil 
systems). Bacelar Gouveia goes as far as claiming that “ errorism of global nature and 
the associated panic have caused the greatest converge c  of the last centuries between 
families of common and civil law.”154 
One of the major threats which however hovers latent over the world, relates to 
the possibility that terrorist organisations posses weapons of mass destruction. What 
spreads the greatest terror are not the handmade explosives or even the conventional 
ones but the possibility of terrorist commands gaining access to chemical, biological or 
                                                
154 Bacelar Gouveia, Jorge, Estudos de Direito e Segurança, Almedina, Lisboa (2010), p. 87 
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nuclear weapons and being able to use them in theirattacks. Past events have shown 
that it’s no transcendental thing for these weapons t  be in the possession of terrorist 
organisations. The case supporting this theory goes back to the 90’s, specifically in 
1995 when the Japanese religious cult "Aum Shin Rikio" attacked the interior of the 
Tokyo Underground with "sarin gas" and where 12 people died and over 5,000 were 
injured. 
The Western world is extremely vulnerable in this field, although the combined 
efforts between intelligence services, security forces and civil protection are an 
undeniable given in the prevention of this phenomenon155. 
There is a strong suspicion that al-Qaeda is in possession of weapons of mass 
destruction. Marvin Cetron, adviser to the President of the United States, stated in 2004 
that: "terrorists will have access to weapons of mass destruction and large-scale attacks 
will take place within the Western powers. The question is when”.156  
 This possibility [of some terrorist groups being in possession of weapons of 
mass destruction] has strongly influenced the respon es of States to terrorist threats, 
namely in what concerns the strengthening of surveillance and prevention (in the United 
Kingdom for instance) and the control over communications (in Portugal and Spain, for 
example). 
We must therefore conclude, that we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
range of terrorist events, with growing impact on the various antiterrorist laws, which 
have been approved, in the last decade. This phenomnon should be studied precisely, 
accurately dividing the new forms of terrorism that ve been analysed by experts.  
                                                
155 This is what can be deduced from the instructions dis eminated by the Office for Civil Protection 
Liaison Agents Civil Protection. (Ref 916/dspc01). 
156 Cardoso, Joana, News on Terrorism – Portuguese edition, Lisboa (2007), p. 78 
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Stern explains that the greater part of antiterrorist eforms approved by western 
governments had the objective of containing the risk of new types of highly lethal and 
devastating threats.157  
 It should be noted that terrorism does not need such efficiency. The mere 
possibility that a fatal disease can be spread by mail and arrive in unsuspecting forms 
anywhere in the world, causes a considerable psychological impact, and is sufficient to 
destabilize a society - one of the goals of terrorist groups 
 Legislators have been concerned mainly with the following forms of 
terrorism: nuclear and radiological terrorism158; bacteriological, chemical or biological 
terrorism159; and cyber terrorism160. 
 
                                                
157 Stern, Jessica, The Ultimate Terrorists, Harvard University Press, 2000 pp. 48 - 54 
158 Developments since World War II up to the present day have made it possible for "dirty bombs" 
(bombs made with radioactive material mixed with conventional explosives), which may be as designated 
small atomic bombs with considerable effects, weighting between 15-20 Kg, to be transported by a 
terrorist in a backpack. The end of the Cold War and Russia's loss of its former Soviet republics, allowed 
for many weapons of mass destruction to be "dispersed" throughout the now independent countries, 
whereby Russia has no longer any effective control over these weapons. Russia’s race in nuclear weapons 
lost as much of its sense at the end of the Cold War and consequently some of the scientists who 
manufactured this type of weaponry became “unemployed”. Some of these “unemployed” scientists, in a 
true state of economic need, sold the formulas for the production of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons on the black market to strangers, possibly terrorists. This kind of situation causes an immediate 
concern to take into consideration that enhances th threat that the use of these weapons by terrorists 
poses.  
159 This type of weapon, besides its devastating effect, can have a number of agents that will originate a 
number of diseases. Bacteriological and chemical wepons are easier to prepare given the easy access to 
its components on the chemical or pharmaceutical industry’s market. Chemical weapons are usually 
classified into four groups (which in turn can bebe subdivided into several types):Group I against people 
and their effects; Group II against vegetables and their effects; Group III against people and their effects; 
Group IV against vegetables and people (Crone, Hugh, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Scientific 
Background, Cambridge University Press ,1992, pp. 45 and following; Wecht, Cyril, Forensic Aspects Of 
Chemical And Biological Terrorism, Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, 2004, pp. 307 – 313) 
160 Cyber terrorism or computer terrorism translates into new forms of terrorist activity that, according to 
the definition by the European Union, "are aimed at the destruction or decay of computer systems such as 
civilian or military databases, or telecommunications systems, in order to destabilise the State or exe t 
pressure over public powers” (Ribeiro, António Silva, AAVV, As Teias do Terror, Novas Ameaças 
Globais, Edições Esquilo, 2003,  p. 121). In this sense, countries are not only confronted with the spectre 
of violent terrorism, but also with a new threat that is technologically advanced, poorly understood, 
painless, and against which it is difficult to defend. 
 
 
87 
6. Transnational Organised Crime and its connection to 
terrorism 
 
 How relevant is the connection between terrorism and organised crime in 
relation to the research questions set forth in the opening chapter of this study?  
Terrorism in itself is not responsible for the entire framework of legal reforms 
undertaken in the past decade as Costa observes. According to this author, the relation 
between terrorism and organised crime is an essential factor that provides insight into 
the antiterrorist reforms and the fundamental changes in criminal law.161 
 Transnational organised crime has an increased relvance regarding the initial 
premise as it enables to point to the similarities and differences in treatment and 
responses adopted by inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. 
 As  Bacelar Gouveia points out: 
 “The new characterization of the crime of transnational organised crime generated 
common responses among considerably diferent criminal justice systems, as well 
as unlikely alliances. The connection between terrorism and organised crime as a 
global threat became, unexpectedly, a source of convergence between systems of 
civil and common law.”162  
 
The social and political changes that occurred at the end of the last millennium 
and at the beginning of this one, caused significant shifts at different levels of life in 
general and of community organisation.163 The dismantling of the former Soviet Union 
catalysed the end of the "Cold War" and deeply transformed the balances established up 
to that time, paving the way for globalisation.164 
                                                
161 Faria Costa, José, Noções fundamentais de direito penal, 3ª ed., Coimbra Editora (2012), pp. 101 - 103 
162 Bacelar Gouveia, Jorge, Estudos de direito e segurança, Almedina (2007), pp. 52 – 53 (translated by 
the author) 
163 Lewicki, Roy J., Essentials of Negotiation, 3rd edition, Burr Ridge, IL Editions, London (2003), pp. 89 
- 99 
164 Severiano Teixeira, José, A guerra fria e o terrorismo moderno, Quid Juris (2004), pp. 34 -36 
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The globalisation we live in today affects not only the flow of goods, services 
and capital, but involves also large flows of peopl, ideas, information and technology. 
Organised crime also reached a global dimension165, just as the phenomenon of 
terrorism, in a way that the current discourse on security, almost necessarily integrates a 
reference to organised crime as it is considered on of the new threats.166 
Today, society identifies organised crime as an ethically homogeneous criminal 
organisations with a rigid structure headed by a powerful leader or godfather167. The 
reality though is far more complex and diverse: organised crime is a phenomenon built 
of a large number of many and complex factors, mostly f clandestine nature, making it 
difficult to clearly define. This has been subject to analysis by various academic studies 
and international organisations, with the aim of establishing an agreed definition of 
organised crime.168 
 
a) Conceptual Framework 
 
One of the most pragmatic ways of defining organised crime is via the definition 
of its actors - criminal organisations. In this sen, the United Nations, through the 
Convention Against Organised Transnational Crime, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in November 2000, in its Article 2, defines a criminal 
organisation as a "structured group of three or more persons with a certain temporal 
permanence, acting specifically with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other benefit". The same 
                                                
165 Santos, Loureiro dos, A globalização do crime, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (2003), p. 43 
166 Hobsbawn, Eric J., Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism, Abacus ed. (2008), pp. 62 - 73 
167 Council of Europe, Combating Organised Crime: Best-practice Surveys of the Council of Europe, 
Business & Economics (2004), p. 179 
168 Ibid. at p. 182 
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convention defines a felony, "as conduct that constitutes the offense punished by 
deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least four years, or a more serious 
penalty." 
  In the current legal context and in global terms, it is common to speak of two 
types of embodied crime: general or common crime and and organised crime. 
• General or common crime - consisting of a series of criminal acts, usually 
practiced separately and individually, assuming random, non-strategic and 
unforeseen forms of violence169, where geographic implementation seldom 
exceeds regional borders and where its victims are di ctly related to the 
consummation of the crime; and 
• Organised crime - which consists of criminal acts committed repeatedly as a 
result of a continuous activity and systematically operated by a structured group 
implemented on a national, international and transntio al level, with a clear 
strategy or objectives for profit or power erosion f sovereignty and security 
bodies170.  
One can also identify and subdivide organised crime into two classifications, 
taking the motivations and objectives as a differentiati g criterion: one with dominant 
motivations and objectives relating to profit (drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human 
trafficking, banditry, kidnapping and extortion, organised economic crime, 
counterfeiting of money and means of payment, forgery and trafficking of 
administrative documents, cybercrime, corruption, money laundering etc.); and the 
other having predominately political and religious motivations and objectives: 
(terrorism and groups of ideological or environmental contestation). 
                                                
169 Guedes Valente, Manuel, A violência militar e o terrorismo, Almedina (2004), p. 12- 35 
170 Beleza, Teresa, A criminalidade organizada do século XVIII ao século XXI, Universidade de Lisboa 
ed. (2008), p. 67 
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Understanding this theoretical framework is important as great part of 
contemporary terrorism can be identified with highly sophisticated groups of organised 
crime, in what concerns their methods and structure. As Fiedler, observes, it is not 
possible to understand anything about contemporary ter orism without understanding its 
permanent (historical and conceptual) links to organised crime.171 
 
b) Fields of action of organised crime 
 
 There are deep historical roots in organised crime. It has developed in order to 
meet the marginal needs of society, but has always aimed at ensuring that the 
illegitimate needs of society are met, contributing to its "stability" through illegal 
activities, which currently are among the following: ambling, illegal immigration, 
exploitation of prostitution, tobacco smuggling and drug trafficking, cybercrime, etc.172 
Organised crime has lucrative purposes and motivations and presents a large 
capacity to internationalise and to obtain high incomes of which a part is applied in 
legitimate businesses as a form of money laundering173. As an outcome of this economic 
power, there have been situations in which organised crime groups prompted to assist 
governments in solving problems174 within the legal framework, which means that they 
are not always socially frowned upon, and are in some cases even "protected" by some 
sectors of the community in which these criminals are inserted. 
Thus, groups of organised crime are sometimes seen as any other business. 
Indeed, organised crime also works on the market, th  only difference is that it acts 
                                                
171 Fiedler, Robert, Links Between Terrorism and Transnational Crime Groups, GRIN Verlag, (2010)  p. 
7 
172 Beleza, Teresa, supra note 113 at 89 
173 Block, Alan, All is Clouded by Desire: Global Banking, Money Laundering, and International 
Organized Crime, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004, pp. 45 - 85 
174 Fiedler, Robert, supra note 114, at 78 - 79 
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illegally and if necessary may resort to violence to enforce its purposes175. This is the 
reason why most antiterrorist legislations worldwide (including Israel, Portugal, Spain, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) have included strong measures of control on 
financial transactions. As Donohue has observed, financial counter-terrorism has moved 
to the frontline of the battle against terrorism and organised crime in modern societies.176 
However, groups involved in organised crime and that ve predominantly 
political and religious motivations generally have, as their primarly aim, national, 
international and transnational terrorism. Such being highly socially and politically 
disapproved.177 
Organised crime poses a threat to societies and governments, failing to respect 
internationally recognized human rights standards. This situation became globally 
evident through the September 11, 2001 attacks, where t  actors involved proved they 
could target any place in the world, demonstrating great capacity to in several fields of 
action, with innovative modus operandi, threatening the life and security, socio-
economic stability as well as the confidence in structures of authority and power. 
The globalisation of new communication technologies al o facilitated the 
internationalisation of organised crime178, favouring the rapid displacement of capital 
and goods from one corner of the world to another, as well as instant contact between 
people via the Internet and mobile phone, regardless of the distance separating them. 
The intense dislocation of products and revenues within nternational circuits provides, 
among other things, for the extension of criminal activities of organised groups 
throughout several countries, leading to international cooperation and interdependence 
between the national criminal organisations of the involved countries. 
                                                
175 Guedes Valente, Manuel, Direito Processual Penal, 2ª ed., Almedina (2004), p. 67 
176 Donohue, Laura , supra note 33 at 67 
177 Guedes Valente, Manuel,, supra note 112 at 57 
178 Santos, Loureiro dos, A globalização do conhecimento e o terrorismo global, Almedina (2003), p. 56 
 
 
92 
Modern terrorism has known a high degree of sophistication partly due to the 
development of organised criminal groups. It must be emphasized here that many of the 
measures adopted as antiterrorist were incorporated in o ordinary criminal legislation 
after a few years, so as to be applicable to non-terrorist criminal organizations. Donohue 
views this phenomenon as a progressive penetration of a titerrorist laws in the criminal 
justice system.179 
Supranational crime, which knows no boundaries and covers a wide range of 
offenses, can be integrated in the concept of organised crime180. It is, therefore, a vast 
and broad concept, that is important to clarify for the purpose of this study. 
A set of variables exist that regulate the differentiation process in the 
identification and classification of organised crime, evidencing the participation of a 
plurality of individuals that carry out criminal actions; the eventual distribution of 
functions among them due to the affirmation of principles of control, internal discipline 
and hierarchical obedience; demonstrated operational capacity in the execution of 
serious crimes within transnational context, using violence when necessary;  motivation 
and determination of the criminal conduct based on the expectation of obtaining 
monetary payouts which may come from entities incorporated in the legal economy. 
According to these criteria there are numerous criminal organisations that 
engage or invest in the practice of crime and fall within the category of organised 
crime181. Thus, we can find criminal organisations such as mafia clans; networks that 
sponsor and encourage illegal immigration; gangs who exploit illegal gambling, 
prostitution and human trafficking; organisations engaged in theft and burglary, 
                                                
179 Donohue, supra note 33, at 10 - 25 
180 Groenhuijsen, Marc, Usual and Unusual Organising Criminals in Europe and Beyond: Profitable 
Crimes, from Underworld to Upper World, Liber Amicorum Petrus Van Duyne, Maklu ed., (2011), p. 
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tampering and theft of vehicles used for trafficking, crimes of abduction, kidnapping 
and extortion; organisations engaged in drug trafficking and tobacco smuggling. 
Organised crime therefore represents a serious threat to the security of many 
European countries. Upon reaching a level of power that was previously reserved 
exclusively to countries, this phenomenon has achieved the capacity to stabilise 
economically, socially and even politically the countries where these organisations 
operate. This implies that the threat addressed also the safety of citizens themselves, 
undermining the most basic rights such as the human life. 
Such criminal organisations have proven to be eager to expand their range of 
intervention, thus multiplying their area of action through a supranational perspective. 
The exact outline behind the motivations of these mafia groups in Europe is not yet 
clearly defined. However, it should be noted that there is the possibility of violent 
action, theft and robbery, money laundering, drug and human trafficking, etc. 
In the European Union, organised crime has developed in various areas of criminal 
activity: drug trafficking, car adulteration and trafficking, arms trafficking, robberies of 
banks and value transportation companies, human trafficking, document forgery, 
economic crimes (smuggling of tobacco, alcohol and lcoholic beverages as well as 
mineral oils), money laundering, cultural crimes (illegal market of artworks) and 
computer crimes182. Even if developed by relatively small groups, one can not fail to 
take into account that the European territory is an operating scene for foreign or 
international groups, including groups from South America and Central Asia. We will 
now take a deeper look at some of these crimes becaus  they are the most relevant ones 
                                                
182 Beken, Vander, Measuring Organised Crime in Europe: A Feasibility Study of a Risk-based 
Methodology Across the European Union, Maklu ed., (2004), pp. 143 and following 
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that occur in the European Union, according to statistics registered by the security 
forces and intelligence services of some of the countries we are analyzing.183 
One of the most important connections between terrorist groups and other criminal 
groups lies precisely in mutual assistance regarding ocument forgery. As Conde refers, 
a great part of forged documents used by terrorist g oups comes from small suburban 
groups that do not care for whom they are working.184 Many antiterrorist measures 
adopted in countries like Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom cannot be understood 
without making such connections.  
States have become greatly dependent on computer structures, which make them 
a primary target for terrorist organizations.  Furthe more, terrorist groups have become 
aware of the potential devastating effects that a large scale cyber attack could cause, 
especially at a financial and economic level – but also at an energetic one – among 
western nations. This new reality has significant impl cations as states have been forced 
to gain knowledge of cyber criminality in order to be able to face modern terrorist and 
to respond by adopting the necessary antiterrorist measures, as Colarik has observed.185 
Criminal organisations seem increasingly skilled in the illegal transportation of goods or 
persons and have developed their capacity to interact within criminal structures and to 
corrupt customs’ officials, allowing them to carry out their activities. In fact, weighing 
the possible profits and risks, there is a favourable terrain to the flourishing of this type 
of activity, which can yield great profits to criminal organisations without incurring 
high risks of being intercepted.The laundering of capital from crimes carried out in the 
European Union and United States by criminals based in other parts of the globe 
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184 Munoz Conde, Francisco, De nuevo sobre el derecho penal del enemigo, Universidad de Buenos Aires 
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presents serious challenges, both in terms of the values involved, as in the difficulty to 
prove the causal link between these capitals and the associated crime. The European 
Union has taken on several measures to fight money laundering. In late 2001, after the 
9/11 attacks, the EU paved the way for the cooperation between national financial 
intelligence units. An initiative, which was quickly followed by legislation destined to 
identify, trace, freeze and seize assets and products of riminal origin.186 
Trafficking in human beings is of crucial importance in regard to global terrorism, 
notably as a source of income. The transnational nature of human trafficking, often 
sustained by networks organised on a global scale, determines the need to establish 
interconnections with international organisations, promoting knowledge and the sharing 
of information. Valente explains that the relation between terrorist groups and 
international criminal groups has become so close that i  no longer uncommon to see 
terrorist organizations being used as platform for trafficking human beings or 
facilitating human smuggling as a quick way to obtain profits.187 Only in such manner is 
it possible to understand how antiterrorist legal refo ms in countries like Israel, Portugal 
and Spain have included specific measures dealing wth human trafficking and money 
laundering that may result from such activities.188, 189 
 
                                                
186 Another piece of legislation to fight money laundering, adopted in December 2001, extends its 
definition to cover all serious crimes, including offenses related to terrorism. This legislation is no longer 
applicable only to banks and financial institutions as the previous one, but also to encompass accountants, 
lawyers, notaries, real estate agents, casinos and dealers in high-value goods. (Truman, Edwin, supra note 
159, at p. 45). All persons exercising these professions have now an obligation to inform the authorities 
on suspicious transactions that come to their knowledge within the exercise of their functions. This 
measure is meant to promote greater control over these professions and has been extended to all Member-
States that adopted antiterrorism legislation since 2003.  
187 Guedes Valente, supra note 112 at 56 
188 Fernandez, Ruben, El Derecho Penal de la Unión Europea: Situación Actual y Perspectivas de 
Futuro, Univ de Castilla La Mancha (2007), p. 207 
189 The European Union, which elaborated a worldwide strategy since 1996, took a major step forward by 
establishing, in 2002, a common definition of human trafficking. This definition has been applied in all 
Member-States of the extended E.U. and, in certain circumstances this crime is punishable by a minimum 
prison sentence of eight years. The Union's work draws heavily on the Brussels Declaration (September 
2002), which recommends the implementation of concrete measures and standards, as well as norms and 
better practices to eradicate the exploitation of human misery. 
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c) International and transnational organised crime in the new 
international context after the attacks of 9/11. 
 
The geopolitical fragmentation that occurred in the eighties and the subsequent 
breakdown across central Europe and the various Balkan wars190 led to profound 
changes in the geography of organised crime both in Europe and in the rest of the world. 
From this decade onwards, criminal organisations started to reinforce the expansion of 
their activities across the globe, becoming eminently transnational organisations.191 
Within the current framework, criminal organisations with greater potential 
dominate the major trafficking channels on a global scale. Transnationalisation was a 
natural process for these organisations considering that they tend to maximize 
opportunities and minimize risks, which led them to locate their activities in those 
territories where the risks represented by the action of state authorities was reduced and 
therefore the opportunity to expand their activities was increased.192 
Organised crime takes advantage of the existing differences between the national 
legislation of the different countries where they operate. These are often represented by 
differences in the definition of a certain type of crime, which makes it easier to enter 
some markets than others. The lack of harmony in judicial proceedings as well as the 
absence of significant international judicial cooperation is also worrying in the sense 
that national authorities are unable to legally cope with organised crime.193 
New technologies allow greater access to communication, either by phone or e-
mail, as well as new types of transportation, thus contributing to increase the expansion 
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of criminal networks. For organised crime groups linked to counterfeiting money, 
documents or artwork, technological advances enabled almost perfect results, making 
the intervention of the police and judicial authorities increasingly challenging.  
On the other hand, human trafficking and illegal immigration are surely the most 
important sectors next to the drug trafficking sector moving an estimated 8 billion 
dollars per year194. This is essentially caused by the attractiveness of western European 
economies, combined with resentment towards home countries, generated by economic 
and political instability. Following the dismantling of the former USSR and the 
enlargement of EU borders, migration fluxes increased from countries south of Russia195 
caused by poverty and the search for better living conditions. The trafficking of human 
beings mainly originates from Eastern Europe, but also Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
With regard to financial crimes these consist essentially in activities related to 
fraud, counterfeiting and money laundering, i.e. classical operations with economic 
consequences through the disturbance of financial markets and their use for criminal 
purposes. 
 Trafficking includes diverse activities such as smuggling of alcohol and tobacco 
or arms trafficking, robberies and vehicle thefts. Each of these activities has specific 
grounds and is structured according to the target, origin and destination of the goods, 
but perpetrators always aim at high profits. These profits are then often used to fund 
terrorist activities. 
According to Reno, states that present a weak consolidati n of their sovereignty 
structures facilitate the creation, dissemination and consolidation of coalitions and 
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networks of terrorist activities. Such spring up due to the economic benefits, the ability 
to create employment and the possibility of reinvesting profits in local economies.196 
Organised crime might currently be a secondary consideration due to 
mediatisation of terrorism, although a part of organised crime is demonstrably linked to 
terrorism by providing weapons or funding operations. There is even the possibility that 
in some areas of the world, a merger between terrorist and criminal groups is underway, 
which can create, in fact, a more dangerous threat th n before because of the 
accumulation of financial capacity and the spill over into political motivations.197 
To aggravate the current framework of threats, there is nowadays a symbiotic 
relationship between some kind of criminal organisations and some terrorist groups as 
well as between political activities and lucrative criminal activities198, giving rise to 
what Xavier Raufer called hybrid entities. As a typical example of these organisations 
we have the case of Colombia, the country responsible for producing about 80% of the 
world's cocaine and 75% of the heroin consumed in the United States of America. The 
Colombian government maintains, for a few decades now, a conflict with the 
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), funded by the drug cartels, which 
control a significant area of inland where they protect the activities of drug traffickers - 
drug plantations, laboratories, landing lanes for planes that intervene in the 
transportation of traffickers and drugs, etc.199 
Considering that this phenomenon is an obvious threa  to society, the United 
Nations, drafted a legislative guide in March 2003, aiming to assist those countries 
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wishing to ratify the UN Convention against organised transnational crime, in order to 
elaborate their own legislation to be used in the fight against organised crime.  
This has therefore forced national criminal justice systems to respond 
adequately, particularly through a considerable increase in applicable criminal penalties 
for certain types of crime, which were once almost in ignificantly punished. Crimes 
such passport forgery, tax fraud, money laundering, concealment of relevant financial 
information, the spread of terrorist or subversive d ology, etc. are on this list. 
Moreover, this phenomenon has forced a closer cooperation both between agencies and 
security forces within a country and between intellig nce services of different countries, 
in order to effectively fight criminal networks, whic  are highly geographically 
dispersed and diverse in terms of the nationalities of the group members. 
The problem is serious, both in Europe and in the rest of the world insomuch 
that several international organisations have been d voted to studying transnational 
organised crime. Furthermore, the UN organised in Naples, in 1994, an international 
conference on transnational organised crime, where 140 countries were represented. 
This form of crime was considered a great danger and given the extent of money 
laundering in all countries, the need for greater international cooperation to deal with 
this phenomenon was agreed upon.  In April 2000, the Tenth United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in Vienna reaffirmed once 
again this concern with organised crime and its links with terrorist groups.200 
Also other organisations such as the G8, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union have repeatedly addressed this phenomenon and are trying to establish 
some preventive measures for its proliferation.  
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However it is up to each Member-State, as an independent decision centre to act 
and if necessary to use force, in order to ensure the achievement of the ultimate goals of 
security, justice and welfare and strongly resisting the exercise of any powers which 
lack state legitimacy in its territory. 
One cannot disregard that these criminal organisations are devoid of territory201, 
and that their activities may be located in different territories from those from which 
they project their power. Therefore the problem of fighting them is not just a police 
matter but requires also a strong strand of foreign policy, of relations with those states 
that provide coverage for these organisations and those states that are victims of 
criminal activities. It becomes thus understandable that the fight against transnational 
organised crime encompasses the collaboration between all states in the creation of a 
minimum level of conditions that may end this scourge. Globalisation has provided 
ways to surpass traditional borders, which has facilit ted the action of criminal 
organisations and hampered the identification of these groups and their elements, thus 
hindering the development of an internal security system and requiring at the same time 
the promotion of a global security to fight transnational organised crime.  
In Europe, empirical data shows202 that this part of the world acts as a centre of 
attraction for the various criminal organisations operating globally because: 
* Organisations involved in vehicle theft, vitiation or trafficking, illegal 
immigration, human trafficking and prostitution come from Central and Eastern Europe 
and Russia. 
* Organisations of Polish, Hungarian and Russian involved in vehicle 
adulteration and theft, posing a high danger and damage to the European Union. The 
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high demand for certain vehicles that are circulating within the EU, make them a target 
insofar that these criminal organisations ultimately meet the market demand through 
theft and adulteration, introducing these vehicles in countries like Russia, Kosovo 
among others. A scourge to which Portugal, Spain and the UK do not escape, with the 
aggravating circumstance of having a broader market covering certain African and 
Asian countries with a high vehicle shortage; 
* From Latin America comes cocaine originating from Colombian cartels203, 
which use local European criminal organisations, such as criminal organisations from 
Galicia in Spain or some organisations based in Italia, to enter and distribute within 
Europe, through the various means of transport and the most varied forms of 
concealment. 
* Organisations involved in drug trafficking and elaborated fraud schemes from 
West Africa, especially from Nigeria. 
* The Triads from Asia export drugs to Europe, contr l networks of illegal 
immigration and human trafficking and are also involved in extortion and prostitution.  
The Asian communities in several EU Member-States facilitate their activity here. 
* The big heroin trafficking from the Middle East and Central Asia arrives in 
Europe via Turkey and Pakistan. The import routes cross several Eastern European 
countries, and the main entry point is Germany, where mostly Turkish and Kurdish 
citizens are employed for the distribution in Europe. 
* Synthetic drugs, which are considered fashionable and increasing in 
consumption, are distributed throughout Europe from the Netherlands. The 
organisations from the Netherlands are the main manufacturers of these types of drug, 
competing with those from Poland and Hungary. 
                                                
203 Paz Neves, Eduardo, Tráfico de droga na América do Sul: perspectivas e inovações, Biblioteca 24 
horas (2009), pp. 78 - 98 
 
 
102 
Transnational organised crime is a global threat aginst fundamental rights of 
human beings, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons among other growing 
criminal threats204. Indeed, the activity and even the very existence of criminal 
organisations with the objectives identified above represent a threat to the security of 
states and certainly harm the fundamental rights of citizens. 
 Although there is no concrete data to analyse in full and statistically the 
evolution of organised crime, it is undoubtedly fitted to and rooted in contemporary 
societies and seeks to respond to the ever increasing demand for their goods and 
services. 
Given the risk that organised crime poses to societies and States, it is up to the 
political power to develop commitment policies and to define the resources to be 
allocated to fight this scourge. Within this point of view, terrorism and organised crime 
are different problems with similar consequences and that need to be addressed in a 
common path. Understanding this point is an essential step to organise the legal fight 
against terrorism within the international community. 
The political concern with the fight against organised crime is clearly felt 
European-wide.  It was mentioned in the Hague Programme and adopted in the 
European Council on November 4 and 5, 2004, as one of the ten priorities of the Union 
for strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice. 
The European Union has been developing an integrated system for border 
management and visa policies205. Special attention shall be given in the short and 
medium term, to creating the conditions that allow the abolition of controls at internal 
borders of the new Member-States. This measure was also provided for by the European 
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Council on November 4 and 5, 2004 against the backdrop of a growing concern with the 
phenomenon of global terrorism and its social consequences. 
As for granting visas, a policy has been developed that should address the 
requirements in terms of document security and enabl  better consular cooperation206.  
The credibility of a common positive approach to immigration depends largely 
on the United States and European Union's ability to control illegal immigration. 
Developing an effective policy on repatriation and readmission is essential in the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime.207 
Hence a stronger stance against human trafficking ca  be obtained which may be 
largely facilitated by the effectiveness of the involved authorities in matters of security 
and by a strong solidarity. 
 
7. Organised crime and terrorism: a dangerous liaison 
 
On the one hand the connection to organised crime is one of the fundamental 
characteristics of modern terrorism and as such has been behind the responses that 
stated adopted in the aftermath of 9/11. On the othr hand, as  Forest refers, it is only 
possible to understand the financial and economic antiterrorist measures when taking 
into account the deep connection between terrorist activities and other economic 
activities (legal or illegal).208 
 It is important to stress that terrorism and organised crime walk, more than ever, 
hand in hand and rarely collide with each other. The problem of this interconnection lies 
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precisely in the fact that both can reinforce one aother, emerging stronger from such a 
union209. Criminal groups and terrorist groups realised that ey can systematically co-
operate, exponentially increasing the benefits for their respective activities. Moreover, 
the cooperation of both these universes hampers investigations and prosecutions by the 
police, due to the human and geographical dispersion of the activities, as well as their 
increasing complexity.  
Transnational terrorism works through loose networks rather than through hierarchy or 
within borders. It is neither dependent on nation-state sponsors, nor responsive to 
conventional deterrents. To defeat one is not to defeat all. It is constantly evolving, with 
a capacity to regenerate and adapt where its forces are degraded.210 The data presented 
above, whether from the European Union or the United States, leaves no room for 
doubts that this link is growing,211 especially in the Western world, where criminal 
gangs and highly experienced professionals (e.g. in the forgery of passports and human 
trafficking) put their activities at the service ofterrorist organisations in return for 
extremely large sums. Meanwhile, other groups involved in financial crimes help to 
launder and hide the necessary funds for the continuous prosecution of this cycle.212 
Since the beginning of the last decade and especially after the attacks of 9/11, 
contemporary criminology has been insisting that one f the new features of this global 
terrorism is the permanent connection with parallel activities and organised crime 
groups. These groups have proved to be essential for the development of functional and 
complementary activities to the very terrorist activity, such as obtaining explosives, fake 
identities, money laundering and concealment of information, etc. 
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 Cooperation between terrorist groups and "professional organised crime" entails 
a progressive sophistication of the terrorist methods213. Terrorist activities have thus 
become more complex, diverse and technologically supported. This fact also forced the 
criminal justice systems of the various countries involved in the fight against terrorism 
to an intense overhaul of its legislation in areas such as the interception of telephone and 
electronic communications, house searches and a general strengthening of police 
powers against citizens’ rights. 
It must however be noted that in what concerns legal international cooperation in 
this matter, there is still much to be done: 
“Despite the existence of co-operative legal frameworks, bilateral co-operation has 
been limited and multilateral co-operation is largely non-existent. (...) The 
international experience in this realm, and to thispoint in time, indicates that, with 
the criminalization of terrorist fundraising and close enforcement by host agencies 
and authorities, terrorist fundraising receded. Nevertheless, only a few countries 
have been able to criminalize the support networks f certain terrorist groups.”214 
 
Finally, the growing connection between organised crime groups and the terrorist 
phenomenon also caused serious consequences in terms of legal regulation of 
immigration and migration215, especially to western countries. Indeed, the use of false 
identity documents and the use of international networks for human trafficking and 
smuggling forced criminal justice systems to strengthen the legal prevention and 
prosecution of such crimes. In turn, changes were also made to the legislation regarding 
nationality and Residence permits, as well as to the criminal and customs control 
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mechanisms used in the various internal and external borders of the European Union. 
According to Farrall, the emergence of terrorism as a global threat imposed the biggest 
change in the criminal justice system since World War II216. It is this change that we will 
analyse in detail in chapters III and IV. 
 
8. Social panic and the speech of fear: the expression f 
contemporary global terrorism 
 
 Contemporary terrorism is skilful in using one of the greatest resources made 
available by the West technological development: the mass media. In effect, terrorists 
base their strategy not only on the concrete damage they can produce but also in the 
capacity to broadcast worldwide the images to the media.217 
 Most recent studies on this matter demonstrate the impact of terrorist attacks on 
the economy, financial markets and politics as never before. This is due to, as Amaral 
Argolo observes, the attention of mass media over ph nomenon of terrorism.  
 An element of undisputed relevance, which is intima ely related to modern day 
terrorism is the mediatic coverage of terrorism, is panic as a weapon of social 
aggression.  
 Panic and the message of panic have become elements of the terrorist threat by 
themselves. As Marques da Silva observes, the perman nt threat of a borderless 
terrorism has become the most lethal and efficient weapon that terrorist and criminal 
organizations can use. On the other hand, this new type of social panic has become 
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responsible for the stigmatization of certain communities, that have been associated, in a 
superficial way, to the terrorist phenomenon218 
 This point is of extreme importance. Social panic, stemming from the threat of 
terrorism has been able to provoke high social conflictuality and rising suspicion 
towards certain communities which have been difficult to repel. It has also been behind 
was is called the “criminal law of the enemy.” In chapters III and IV the impact and the 
scope of this phenomenon in regard to the marginalization of certain communities will 
be further developed. 
 Qian notices how panic has become a viral consequence of contemporary 
terrorism and one of the main causes of unrest in modern societies.219  Several indicators 
demonstrate the growing importance of terrorism among mass media and general 
society. The topic has become, from 9/11 onwards, one f the highest concerns of 
Europeans and one of the themes most covered by newspapers and television 
broadcasts. 
 In what way does this social phenomenon relate to he responses that States have 
designed as an answer to terrorist threats? On the other hand, the general panic that took 
over societies after September 11 forced more repressiv  measures but also the adoption 
of preventive measures. This - as we will see in the following chapters - resulted in the 
increase of pre-trial detention powers and the expansion of surveillance and other 
privacy related controls.  José Argolo notes that “panic served as a justification and 
pretext for western governments to approve highly intrusive and restrictive measures of 
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citizens freedoms, which never would have been possible in a normal context. Fear is 
the true moral foundation of these antiterrorist measures”.220 
 Finally, the spread of panic throughout different sectors of society has obvious 
implications regarding the dominant model of criminal process, which has had to adapt 
accordingly, as we will analyse in detail in the final chapter. From this we can draw that 
not only regarding preventive measures but also regarding the language and objectives 
of criminal justice in the wake of 9/11, new kinds of crime, new terminology and new 
objectives for criminal policy have emerged. And in this way, as Jakobs advances, these 
new categories and goals progressively paved the way for a new criminal law of the 
enemy that aims to provide answers to societies dominated by fear.221 
 The idea of a ‘new threat’ of terrorism, which is al o new and different in how it 
needs to be combated in different ways in jurisdictions, is a central key to understand 
the antiterrorist reforms of the last decade in Europe and United States. 
 In what way does this new global terrorism justify original and innovative 
responses by the criminal justice systems? In what ay are these new types of terrorism 
behind the main legislative changes in criminal process law in most western countries?  
 As a starting point, the global nature of the threat forced national criminal laws 
to adapt towards international cooperation. This is highlighted by Noemi, claiming that 
this has been the most significant shift as it created  fundamental need to cooperate in 
this area, setting aside classic sovereign stances.222   
 On the other hand, the features of this new emerging terrorism - access to 
sophisticated technological and computers instruments, disperse geographic settings, 
large and complex international financial movements - compeled the adoption of 
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appropriate legal instruments, which as Sousa Santos otices, became acceptable to 
society.223 We will look deeper into these measures in chapters III and IV.  
 New measures to respond to threats that are increasingly perceived as global 
menaces, specially considering that some of these terrorist groups are openly set out to 
destroy modern society as we have come to know it, may be demanded, as Barros 
argues, and which may further attack migration policies and freedom of speech224.  This 
author indicates that States are more aware now that in spite of their firm position in 
protecting freedom of speech, they would have to agree to set limits to such rights in 
order to defend their own survival.  
 This new global terrorism - that aims to cause the highest possible number of 
casualties and which has become international and mobile - has led to two significant 
changes in criminal proceedings as Chandra has observed: pre-trial detention and 
intercepting communications.225  
 The fact that individuals belonging to terrorist organizations can originated from 
different countries, with different nationalities, and still be able to carry out activities in 
different countries, has forced States to increase pre-trial detentions as a way of securing 
public safety and restraining mobility between national and regional territories.  
 On the other hand, the employment of sophisticated communication techniques 
by terrorist groups has compelled criminal laws to become more flexible in the use of 
wiretapping or e-mail interception. This thus raises questions regarding the citizens 
right to privacy and intimacy.  This is also strongly emphasized by Donohue. 226 
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 Contemporary terrorism cannot be analysed today without looking at its 
relationship with the “criminal law of the enemy” as defined by Jakobs. The global 
nature of terrorist threats has led to the revival, or strengthening, in many places of a 
category of a “criminal enemy” or “civilisational adversary". This new criminal law 
seeks to expand the instruments and powers of police authorities in order to achieve 
maximum results in crime prevention, eliminating obstacles and legal barriers in the 
name of “efficiency” and “prevention”.227 
 On the backbone of a climate of fear and a permanent state of exception, this 
criminal law has justified similar responses, from both accusatorial and inquisitorial 
systems, which strongly collide with the Western liberal constitutional tradition. Those 
State responses and the evolution of the criminal justice systems in different countries 
after 2001 will be now be carefully assessed in chapters III and IV.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
Antiterrorist legislation and Civil Liberties - 
(2001-2010) – the Inquisitorial Systems228 
 
 
“ In the aftermath of a terrorist attack stakes are high: legislators fear being seen as lenient or 
indifferent and often grant the executive broader authorities without thorough debate”229 
Laura Donohue 
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1. Introduction: Setting the context 
 
a) The Impact of the Fight against Terrorism and Organised Crime 
in Civil Law Systems 
 
As a starting point, it is important to define the legal and social context that will be the 
framework of this chapter. When dealing with global phenomena like terrorism and 
transnational organised crime, the context in which such threats appear must be 
apprehended in order to gain insight on states’ reaction to them. Realising the context in 
which these reforms take place is essential to understand the evolution and reasoning 
behind them. In the last decade terrorism has becom the main threat to national 
security and to regional and international stability. I  has also revealed an extremely 
dangerous aspect for social sustainability: the panic and fear associated with the 
permanent threat of new terrorist attacks and the rep rcussion on the political debate, 
legislative action and social media. This is due not only to the actual logistics of 
terrorism but as Clive Walker refers, to three interrelated aspects: the fight against 
terrorism by military and police forces, to the social panic caused by attacks and to the 
uncertainty of new threats and the constant restrictions on  fundamental rights of 
citizens.230 It is under this triple perspective that the impact of terrorism on inquisitorial 
systems of criminal nature will be examined. The prsent analysis is carried out with 
reference to the Portuguese, Spanish and French legal systems, however with a clear 
preponderance of the first two systems. 
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Terrorist threats have developed a sense of constant fe r throughout society. This is a 
situation that merits some reflection and compels a distinction between inquisitorial and 
accusatorial systems. As Aldé points out:  
“Since 2001 the phenomenon of terrorism caused a shock of exceptional 
dimensions to continental political systems, demonstrating the lack of experience 
and preparation of political and cultural actors to firmly and sturdily discuss such a 
vast and complex matter as international terrorism”.231  
 
Consequentially, the perspective and analysis of inquisitorial systems regarding this 
matter must be specific and properly addressed.  Aldé a so notices how the media and 
political actors of anglo-saxon countries were much better prepared to deal with this 
new foreign threat even though they were, in most ca es, directly involved in military 
conflicts.232 
In systems of inquisitorial nature233 – namely Portugal, Spain and France – this aura of 
fear, social unrest, and political and legislative bewilderment became common place in 
the analysis of the post 9/11 legal framework. This context influenced most of the legal 
reforms of the past decade regarding criminal procedure and is clearly identified in any 
study on this matter. As Azuela states, fear and the spectre of an unidentified and not 
comprehensible threat, represent an important impulse for the sketching of antiterrorist 
reforms approved by southern and central European cou tries.234 This phenomenon 
requires specific assessment in the context of inquisitorial systems.  
Indeed, according to Gouveia, terrorism has caused in Western societies, the spectrum 
of internal and external enemies, and the need for all types of measures - even the most 
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radical and inhumane ones - to contain and eliminate these same enemies.235 According 
to Sousa Santos, criminal justice models in countries like Portugal and Spain have never 
been so affected by the fear and panic of imminent t rrorist attacks. According to the 
same author, terrorism has somehow become a legitimising source for new criminal 
legislation. 
The elements gathered in 2004 by Sousa Santos, demonstrate that even in Portugal, a 
traditionally peaceful country with few episodes ofterrorist violence, the most 
significant concern of citizens was precisely the potential presence, in the country, of 
“terrorist sleeper cells” that at any moment could launch similar attacks to those 
witnessed in Madrid on 11 March 2004.236 This perception was mirrored in countries 
like Spain, Germany and France, despite their opposition to the invasion of Iraq and to 
the counter-terrorism methods adopted by the United States. 
In Spain, the most widely-read national newspaper (El Pais) published 
approximately 1300 articles related to terrorism in the year 2000, while in 2004, it had 
more than 6000 articles or editorial comments on terrorist incidents. Similarly in 
systems of accusatorial nature the impact of mass media is evident albeit in a smaller 
dimension as will be seen in the following chapter. Nunez suggests that: 
 “Although there has been a notorious eagerness of the media to publish everything 
that relates to terrorist threats (and specially imm nent threats on our societies), this 
media obsession has affected more the continental systems, eventually less 
prepared to deal with a phenomenon of global and catastrophic dimensions”. 237 
 
This small field research aims to demonstrate more precisely the idea of a 
widespread panic (that Cohen has called ‘moral panics’238) related to the ongoing 
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terrorist threat. Little by little, an almost obsesive connection has been established 
between the individual and collective spheres, and the reason behind this, as Jack 
Young argues, is becoming irrational, permeable to all sorts of adverse effects and 
abusive projects of political and social change.239 Terrorism has motivated an enormous 
expansion in police powers over the last decade in cou tries like Portugal and Spain.  
In so far as this topic is concerned, it is necessary to establish a connection with 
the theoretical framework presented in chapter II. As was explained therein, the 
evolution of the criminal procedure system after 2001 was based on the significant 
reinforcement of executive and police powers [in the preliminary stages of the criminal 
process], while simultaneously creating compensation mechanisms in the later stages of 
proceedings, namely during the trial stage. The theoretical framework, set forth in 
chapter II, proves extremely useful in this regard: the exponential reinforcement of 
police powers and the reduction of citizens' rights in relation to the investigation and 
prevention of terrorism can be explained by the logic f the 'bifurcation' of the criminal 
justice system, specifically analysed in chapter II.  
In relation to statistic data, for example, Sousa Santos produced an interesting 
study that shows an increase of about 45% in arrests made by the police since 2002 for 
"suspicious activity" or "suspicious conduct" without any concrete evidence.240 Also, 
Guedes Valente  examined police functions in most cn inental systems and found that 
there clearly has been an 'extremely broad' increase of powers and modes of action, both 
in criminal investigations and preventive acts.241 Another interesting fact related to 
Portugal, Spain and France presented by Sousa Santos, is linked to the establishment of 
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a new and consistent relationship between police and military authorities, which had 
been quite ineffective since the 1980’s. Indeed, the military also began acquiring 
important intelligence skills for the fight against terrorism and started integrating 
platforms for the cooperation and communication with civilian programs for the 
research and prevention of terrorism. Sousa Santos calls it the 'militarisation of national 
security, with important consequences in terms of fundamental rights.'242 
On the other hand, the constant restriction of fundamental rights has been 
especially controversial in systems of an inquisitorial nature. Despite the historical 
criticism of some of aspects related to the inquisitorial nature in continental criminal 
proceedings, the last decade has involved, as Christina Eckes noted, a constant 
degradation of the fundamental rights in criminal mtters. For instance, in areas such as 
privacy and communication protection and the right to appeal in courts, the restrictions 
imposed by antiterrorist laws have been the most severe in the last forty years243. 
In systems of inquisitorial nature, the necessary blance between national security 
and fundamental rights has become their greatest idntity challenge, as Munoz Conde 
refers. Indeed, if criminal justice systems want to retain their fundamental identity in the 
coming years, they will have to look for a more balanced and moderate way of dealing 
with the phenomenon of terrorism and organised crime.244 
This climate has been fuelled by a number of political factions engaged in drafting 
and passing legislation that under normal circumstances public reason would never 
allow to be enacted. As Guedes Valente argues, this climate of “permanent state of 
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exception” has been one of the main sociological chracteristics of Western countries in 
the post-9/11 world.245  
This “permanent state of exception” has become a phenomenon of great interest to 
researchers, but also of grave concern. In Spain, in 2000, more than 62% of Spanish 
citizens claimed to be against the death penalty and any kind of life sentence, but by 
2005, this percentage had dropped to 46%, i.e. more than half of the respondents agreed 
to such penalties for certain types of crime, in particular terrorism. Similarly, while in 
1998 the main concern of Spanish citizens was employment and economic growth, in 
2005, more than 76% claimed terrorism and illegal imm gration to be their chief 
concern. This reflects an obvious connection with the errorist attacks of 11 March, 
committed mostly by foreign nationals resident in Spain.246 
Another very curious fact is connected with the draft legislation on criminal and 
national security policy presented to the Spanish and Portuguese parliaments between 
2004 and 2006. In Portugal, 60% of this draft legislation presented to Parliament was 
directly or indirectly related to the fight against terrorism. In Spain, this issue was 
addressed in 71% of the draft legislation submitted.247 
Finally, in both countries, more than 50% of the legislative changes made to the 
criminal codes over the last decade are related to terr rism or organised crime, either 
extending penalties or creating monitoring and investigation mechanisms, or even 
limiting the rights of suspects that could eventually jeopardise the investigations lead by 
the authorities. 
                                                
245 Guedes Valente, Manuel Monteiro, Terrorismo – fundamento de restrição de direitos in Terrorismo 
(org. Adriano Moreira), Almedina Ed., 2004, pp. 422 - 457 
246 Mitchell Silber, The Al-Qaeda Factor: Plots against the West, University of Pennsylvania Press 
(2011) p. 195 
247 Gabinete do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Projectos legislativos parlamentares (2002 – 
2012), Universidade Católida ed. (2013), pp. 45 – 98. 
 
 
118 
According to Jackson, this is a new dominant legal and political language based 
on imagery of the ongoing terrorist disaster that is felt in all areas of legislation, from 
criminal law to banking law.248  
As Jackson also argues, the specific language of the new “war on terror” extended 
to all areas of social life249 eventually reaching its highest form of expression in what 
Gunther Jakobs called “the criminal law of the enemy”.250 Indeed, criminal justice 
systems have explicitly or implicitly created certain abstract categories of prime 
suspects of terrorism: foreigners, Islamic fundamentalists, religious minorities. This is 
why one of the areas that underwent most changes in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
was precisely that of immigration, nationality and asylum policies. Despite this being a 
particularly sensitive and prominent topic in anglo-saxon countries, also in nations like 
Spain, France and even Portugal, policies that were followed up until the year 2000 
regarding immigration and nationality were severely affected on foot of this terrorism 
threat.  
Finally, attention should be drawn, as Odysseos does, to the “context of 
legitimacy” that arises from the permanent state of xception related to the phenomenon 
of terrorism.251 In this study – in which various elements are gathered from different 
countries – L. Odysseos clearly demonstrates the social willingness – and often its 
manipulation through the media – to adopt criminal and administrative measures that 
can only be characterised as highly oppressive and restrictive of citizens’ fundamental 
rights. This predisposition is generated by the permanent state of fear of new terrorist 
attacks and of the possible existence of, however small, sleeper cells in any country, city 
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or community,  that are often provided by national governments in a premeditated and 
confused manner. 
It is this “context of legitimacy” before the eyes of citizens that allows the deepest 
attacks on the core of their intimacy and private life, in the name of the vague concept 
of “national security and defence”. By presenting an ever-present deadly enemy 
engaged in an obsessive war of civilizations, governments obtain the support of the 
majority of the population for the approval and ratification of measures that were 
considered unthinkable and unsustainable until a decade ago.252 The rationale of this 
phenomenon lies precisely in an uncritical social context of legitimacy, which actually 
explains the approval, by national parliaments, of criminal law and criminal procedure 
measures that are highly restrictive of fundamental rights (such as the Portuguese Arms 
Law or the Spanish legislation on communications surveillance) without any 
justification. 
We are therefore, as Young argues, faced with a specific permeable and supple 
social context, that brings many Western countries closer to phenomena already 
observed in countries that are used to living with the problem of terrorism on a 
permanent basis, such as Israel, Russia or India.253 
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2. Main Trends: Fighting Terrorism in Inquisitorial 
Systems  
 
a) The right to freedom and the increase use of pre-trial detention 
 
The analysis of pre-trial detention in the context of antiterrorist reforms in systems 
of inquisitorial nature reveals that changes have focused mostly in the nature and 
meaning of pre-trial detention rather than on the duration of detention (in spite of a 
small increase). In effect, as Soares da Veiga points out, the significant change that 
terrorism brought to continental justice systems wa that pre-trial detention, previously 
regarded as a precautionary measure only to be applied in exceptional circumstances,  
began to be applied on a regular basis in cases involv g suspictions of terrorism or 
organised criminal organizations.254 
This idea merits a deeper explanation. Pre-trial detention has, even in inquisitorial 
systems, an exceptional and cautionary nature (albeit its use has become increasingly 
usual). This means it should only be applied by courts when other less restrictive 
measure are not considered effective or when there is a credible threat of evasion of 
justice. What Soares da Veiga argues is precisely this paradigm change where pre-trial 
detention becomes customary and routinely used, shifting its nature from exceptional 
and cautionary into a sort of pre-punishment. 
However, this profound change to criminal justice systems of inquisitorial nature 
should not go unnoticed. In fact, it should be considered as one of the most important 
consequences of criminal reforms approved in Portugal and Spain. The analysis, in 
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legislative terms is not easy: while articles 186º and 203º of, respectively, the 
Portuguese and Spanish Criminal Procedure Codes only altered the duration of pre-trial 
detention by about 15 days, articles 188º and 204º (of the respective codes) changed 
significantly the requirements for the application f pre-trial detention. In Spain, pre-
trial detention becomes mandatory when the investigation deals with crimes of terrorism 
that involve international affairs. As for Portugal, the exceptional nature of this 
measure, only to be applied in cases of risk of flight or destruction of evidence, is now 
left aside and can be applied to almost any serious offence (penalty of 5 years and 
above).  
This change in the very nature of pre-trial detention in inquisitorial systems is of the 
utmost importance and, as Sousa Santos observes, has produced a deep change in the 
identity of criminal justice systems. According to the same author, the regular and 
systematic enforcement of pre-trial detention amounts to making principles, such as the 
presumption of innocence, secondary to fighting violent crimes, namely terrorism.255 On 
the other hand, these changes reveal - both in Portugal and Spain - a progressive 
weakening of the right to freedom. Thus, not only do suspects see their freedom set 
aside whilst not having been formally accused (or sentenced) of having committed any 
crime, but also the reforms undertaken in the last decade have drastically reduced the 
judicial defense and appeal of pre-trial detention measures. In this sense, as Moraes 
notes: 
“With these antiterrorist reforms, the principles of freedom, guilt and presumption 
of innocence give place to a new criminal law of enemy (Jakobs) where the main 
objectives are characterized by permanent fear of social unrest or of terrorist 
attacks capable of affecting the survival of democrati  institutions”.256 
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According to the data recently presented by the Observatory of Terrorism and 
Organised Crime of Lisbon in 2009, systems of inquisitorial nature,  already 
accustomed to applying an extremely high rate of pre-trial detention (in spite of its 
exceptional nature), have seen its use further multiplied and becoming a somehow 
normal practice.257 Sousa Santos and Soares da Veiga have claimed that no o her 
phenomenon has caused such an intense transformation over the past two centuries, in 
terms of pre-trial detention and judicial remedies as the recent phenomenon of global 
terrorist threat.258 
Also in terms of communication and privacy rights of suspects, civil law systems 
have undergone significant changes relating to the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime, restricting more than ever the communication r ghts of individuals held in pre-
trial detention due to activities directly or indirectly related to the phenomenon of 
terrorism. 
Another interesting phenomenon should be mentioned: i  countries like Portugal, 
Spain and even Italy, at the same time as the application of pre-trial detention in terrorist 
related proceedings became customary, the legal means available to suspects to appeal 
against such decisions have also been significantly reduced.259 
Some of these jurisdictions, such as Spain, France d even Germany, have a long 
history of combating terrorism and organised crime, especially related to political and 
ideological issues. Santin points out, that the legis ation of civil law systems focused 
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mainly on fighting and preventing political and ideological terrorism and not on this 
new global terrorism. 260 
In inquisitorial systems the shock produced by the legislative packages adopted 
after 9/11 has not perhaps been as significant as in other countries. Indeed, as Santin 
argues, long periods of pre-trial detention, relatively frequent wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance, as well as secret proceedings during initial investigations were already, 
features traditionally associated with this type of jurisdictions. However, he also 
explains that civil law systems too have undergone changes as a result of the fight 
against terrorism and transnational organised crime.261 These changes have had, as 
Munoz Conde refers, profound consequences within the context of the right to freedom 
and intimacy.262 In fact, as this author demonstrates, the respective sections of the 
Portuguese and Spanish Criminal Codes concerning the rig t to freedom and intimacy, 
have become virtually unrecognisable with the changes introduced in 2003 and 2006, 
respectively. Also the Setence nº. 86-B/2006 of August, 12 of the Spanish Supreme 
Court, specifically pointed out this phenomenon to conclude that: 
 “After the profound reforms that occurred in the criminal proceedings following 
the approval of antiterrorist legislation, fundamental rights to freedom and intimacy 
must have a new perspective, a new formulation that is suitable to the demands of 
justice systems in the post September, 11 era”.263 
 
The changes brought about in jurisdictions such as Portugal, Spain or even France 
and Italy, unlike common law systems, were not so much about pre-trial detention 
periods or other coercive measures, but rather about interference in citizens’ private 
lives and banking and financial control.  
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 As has been said before, the changes regarding the rig t to freedom and the 
presumption of innocence occured because of the way in which states began enforcing 
pre-trial detention. Even when the offenses are financial and economic crimes related to 
financing of terrorism or money laundering it has become common to place suspects in 
pre-trial detention, in many cases without formal charge.264 
 Guedes Valente observes that a reasonable suspicion of a connection, direct or 
indirect, to the financing of terrorist activities i sufficient ground for the total 
restriction of citizens freedom.265 
For example, Spanish criminal procedure law no longer requires that a given 
crime be punishable with a prison sentence of more than 5 years (thus allowing, for 
example, the pre-trial detention of perpetrators of the crime of falsification of 
documents intended for terrorist groups or other mafia groups). In turn,  Portuguese law 
imposes pre-trial detention where a crime – regardless of its nature – is committed with 
the use of firearms (the “Arms Law”, passed in April 2006) and suspected of being 
linked to terrorist activities, although this concept  is not expressly defined in the 
Portuguese Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. About this law, Prof. Dias 
explained that:  
“The traditional idea that pre-trial detention should be a restraining, preventive 
measure to protect society in exceptional cases has been completely replaced by the 
fact that it is now a normal and recurring feature of the criminal justice system”. 266 
 
As for statistics, the Observatory on Terrorism and Organised Crime provided 
very important data for this research, regarding Portugal and Spain. According to this 
Observatory, between 2001 and 2011 Portugal almost doubled the number of pre-trial 
detainees, while Spain almost tripled its figures. Similarly, while from 1995 to 2000 
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only 2% of prisoners in Portugal were held in pre-trial detention for terrorism-related 
activities, this figure rose to 10% in 2003. In turn, in Spain, the number of pre-trial 
detainees linked to terrorism was around 19% from 1995 to 2000 and in 2003, this 
figure rose to 26%, i.e., more than a quarter of the country’s pre-trial detainees. As 
Manuel Iribarne said, after 2001, terrorism became the major concern of the Spanish 
criminal justice system, which includes not only the courts and criminal police forces, 
but also the intelligence and information service.267  
Costa Bandeira considers that the right to freedom was the most severely affected 
by the antiterrorist reforms in Portugal and Spain. According to Bandeira, although the 
growing and uncontrollable State interference in the private life of citizens is a very 
serious issue, the restrictions to the right to freedom have affected the stability as well 
as the confidence of societies in the justice system  in a particularly serious way. The 
extension and the strengthening of pre-trial detention regimes, as well as the changes in 
the system of judicial remedies –as we will see - only confirms, according to Costa 
Bandeira, this legislative trend in systems of inqusitorial nature.268 
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b) The Right to Privacy and the emergence of new methods 
for surveillance and criminal investigation. Preventive 
powers of law enforcement - a new paradigm of 
cooperation between police forces and intelligence 
services 
 
As with accusatorial systems, in inquisitorial systems the phenomenon of 
international terrorism has also produced important changes in the form of action of the 
police authority, especially in terms of the sharing of sensitive information about the 
lives of citizens and companies. In Portugal, for example, the Legislative Decree nº. 
34/2005 of 15 March, has ignored the recommendations f the OECD regarding 
information that ought to be considered confidential or of sensitive nature and granted 
the Portuguese’s information services full access to the data of individual citizens, 
authorising the same department to use them almost without discretion in cases of 
potential terrorist or serious international crimes. On the other hand, a specific platform 
was created in which this data would be shared among the intelligence service and the 
various bodies of the criminal police, for the purpose of investigating organised crime, 
without any judicial supervision. According to Faria Costa, "this was the biggest offense 
to the right of privacy of citizens of the Iberian Peninsula in the last century ".269 
It is clear that the emergence of a global terrorist threat compels agencies 
responsible for coordinating the security of citizens and the defence of a State territory, 
to make an increased effort in terms of harmonising a d sharing information. However, 
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what was witnessed in Spain and Portugal over the last decade was the destruction of 
those barriers and legal rules that protected certain types of information traditionally 
considered as sensitive, such as information of intimate or sexual nature or information 
on citizen’s geographical mobility, their banking or financial status. As Munagorri 
refers, "in just ten years, Portugal and Spain reced d a century in terms of protecting the 
privacy of citizens and the State’s agency”.270  
Also in terms of communication and privacy rights of suspects, civil law systems 
have undergone significant changes with regard to the fight against terrorism and 
organised crime, restricting more than ever the communication rights of individuals 
held in pre-trial detention due to activities directly or indirectly related to the 
phenomenon of terrorism. According to the reform of the Portuguese Code of Criminal 
Procedure adopted in 2006, terrorism suspects may remain without any communication 
with the outside world – except once with their attorney and in the presence of the 
Public Prosecutor – for a period of up to seven days, under a court order. Spanish law 
has also undergone changes in this context, moving closer to the Portuguese legislation 
on this matter and allowing for suspects to be detain d in isolation for up to six days, by 
means of specific court order.271 
 This last point has led to important debates in Spain and France, two countries 
particularly affected by the terrorist phenomenon. The right of detainees to 
communicate with the outside (either with their families or even with their legal 
representatives) has been strongly restricted by the legislative reforms of the last 
decade. In Spain for example, the detainee can communicate with his or her legal 
representative after a 48 hour-period; but this communication can be intercepted by the 
                                                
270 Munagorri, Ignatio y Falcon, Maria José, Punishment And Culture: A Right to Punish?, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2006), p. 234; Moral Garcia, Anto io del, Criminal Law in Spain, Kluwer Law 
International, Madrid (2010) p. 42 
271 Ventura, André, “A vítima e o processo penal: subsídio  para uma compreensão jurídico-dogmática” 
in Revista de Direito Publico, Almedina (2011), pp. 5 - 12 
 
 
128 
authorities when dealing with terrorism or organised crime. Similarly, France adopted 
legislation in 2008 which has caused heated debates about the right to communication 
of detainees, that only allows detainees to communicate  with their representatives 48 
hours after their arrest. 
In any case, as stated by Sena, a new paradigm in terms of police action and the 
right to privacy of citizens, seems to be emerging272: criminal police bodies, along with 
the intelligence services and with the approval of Governments, have increasingly 
developed ways of intercepting communications as well as control platforms that 
virtually nullify the scope of the fundamental right to privacy of citizens.  
As Monet refers, another important consequence of the terrorist phenomenon on a 
global scale is the strengthening of police powers and the reduction of judicial 
guarantees, in such a way that a comparison can be drawn  between police powers in the 
Iberian Peninsula before the fall of dictatorships and after the March, 11 bombings in 
Madrid.273 These enhanced powers aimed to streamline procedures and enhance skills, 
although they have, still according to Monet, transl ted into unparalleled restrictions to 
fundamental rights and guarantees of citizens. 
Indeed, as Soares da Veiga refers, police authorities have moved away from being 
an auxiliary resource at the service and dependence of judges and courts to become 
almost independent forces, reinforced with discretionary and immunity powers when it 
comes to matters of terrorism and organised crime.274 In Spain, for example, the Royal 
Decree-Law 34/2005 of 21 April created a number of exceptions to the requirements of 
court orders to carry out house searches in cases of t rr rism suspects. In other words it 
designed a wide range of situations in which police forces can enter suspects’ home 
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without a warrant. In Portugal this legislation has not yet been finally approved, but it is 
under discussion in the Parliament.275 These situations infringe upon citizens right to the
inviolability of their dwelling, a right which is historically connected and therefore 
strongly protected in systems of common law, and that will be discussed in the next 
chapters. 
Furthermore, reforms undertaken suggest a rise in the control of financial flows 
and relevant banking information as in Spanish Royal Decree nº. 451/2001 which, in 
addition to the obligation to inform regional governments of any suspicious wire 
transfer (particularly those made from certain countries or areas of the world), allows 
the same credit institutions to freeze any amounts also considered ‘suspicious’, even 
without any judicial or administrative order. Luis Veres even believes this to have been 
a paradigm shift in the Spanish financial and banking law, which will have 
consequences for many years to come.276 
Therefore, as Ernesto Dias points out, radical changes were introduced in the 
control of national and international financial transfers, as well as in the fight against 
money laundering.277 
In the case of Portugal, Government approved the Decree-law nº. 193/VIII of 20 
December 2001, by which a list of unprecedented duties for banking and/or financial 
institutions was created with the specific aim of preventing the financing of terrorism 
and organised crime, Also in Spain, Royal Decree nº. 451/2001 of 3 November created 
a paradigm shift in terms of banking and financial legislation, imposing on these 
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institutions a set of transparency and monitoring rules much stricter than those in force 
in most liberal economies.278 
In countries like Portugal and Spain, as Albuquerqu notes, this increased 
flexibility of powers became a real transfer of powers from the judiciary to the 
executive: while the legal framework prior to 2006 required the intervention of a court 
for house warrants, after 2006 the system created an arr y of cases where such warrants 
are unnecessary and police forces can operate by themselves.279 Faria Costa argues in 
the sense of a “subversion of the constitutional model” caused by this increased 
flexibility regarding warrants as a result of the antiterrorist reforms undertaken in 
Portugal and Spain.280 
On this matter, it is important to note that state intelligence services have 
acquired a set of discretionary powers in relation o terrorist investigations, regaining a 
position that they previously had and was taken from them following the democratic 
movements of the 1970s. This aspect should deserve further clarification: as a matter of 
fact, Intelligence agencies in Portugal and Spain hd a leading role in the defence of 
their dictatorial regimes, as noted by Rosas.281 This weakened their position as well as 
power significantly after the advent of democracy in these countries in the 70’s and, 
contrary to what happened in countries like France and the Netherlands, their 
surveillance and investigation powers were extremely limited during the 80’s and 90’s. 
Now, with the advent of terrorism on a global scale, these powers were significantly 
extended, giving these organs, powers that are very similar to the powers of criminal 
police. In Portugal, this scheme was expressly defined in the new organic law of the 
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Information and Security Service (SIS), which equated the SIS and the criminal 
investigation bodies, in terms of their powers and prerogatives. 
This resulted in what Soares da Veiga called “a pardigm shift in terms of police 
action and cooperation between the various security and information forces”, a 
paradigm that privileges promptness and efficiency over the fundamental rights of 
citizens, a model that favours a tougher response to the terrorist phenomenon over the 
constitutionally established  guarantees of citizens.282 
It should be noted that these new powers are not exceptional and are intended to 
be exercised in the context of extremely hazardous sit ations or social upheavals. On 
the contrary: some of the new police forces have highly invasive powers in terms of the 
violation of banking information, health information and information on the mobility of 
citizens, even within the European Union. 
This new paradigm of police action is therefore characterized by:283 
a) Massive and coordinated performance of the several criminal police bodies in cases 
of terrorism and organised crime. 
b) Access by the police and intelligence services, to virtually all kinds of information on 
citizens, even to the most sensitive ones. 
c) Real-time sharing of information, such as elements related to terrorism and organised 
crime, through rational platforms for data sharing, specifically created for this purpose. 
d) Increased police brutality and “aggressive interrogation techniques” committed on 
suspects of terrorisms and organised crime. 
e) Creation of specific mixed units formed by security and intelligence forces to achieve 
complete efficiency of the channels created for the solid and permanent sharing of 
information foreseen by the criminal and procedural law. 
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c) Freedom of expression and the limitations imposed by the law 
against terrorism, within the framework of freedom of 
expression and communication 
 
Another most significant fact in terms of the impact of the antiterrorist laws 
approved after 9/11 is precisely related to the fredom of expression and freedom of 
communication. Figueiredo Dias and Fátima Matamouros g  as far as sustaining that 
the Portuguese antiterrorist legislation adopted in the last decade caused serious damage 
to the country’s development in terms of freedom of thought.284 If, on the one hand, 
Portugal did not include in its jurisdiction crimes such as "apology for terrorism", on the 
other, the media was prohibited from, directly or indirectly, promoting or inciting 
terrorism.285 
But antiterrorist laws in inquisitorial systems did not only impact the freedom of 
the press or the freedom of thought, they came to affect a principle once considered 
sacred: the disclosure of criminal proceedings and the principle of public scrutiny of the 
criminal justice system. 
Although civil law jurisdictions are traditionally known for the confidentiality of 
investigations (i.e. the impossibility for suspects or third parties to access any 
information related to the case in question), this feature was radically changed by the set 
of antiterrorism laws passed after 9/11.286 
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This point is particularly complex in the Portuguese and Spanish criminal 
systems287 and, therefore, deserves a more in-depth treatment. Indeed, both the 
Portuguese law and the Spanish law had made significa t progress concerning 
confidentiality of investigations, coming very close to the Anglo-Saxon systems. While 
Spain, through Royal Decree nº. 43/2004 of 15 March, set out the guidelines for the 
reform of criminal procedure (which included the principle of the public nature of 
proceedings), article 86 (approved in 2006) of the Portuguese Code of Criminal 
Procedure stipulates that the whole proceeding should be public, unless the court orders 
otherwise and in cases specifically foreseen by law.288 
In Portugal, Spain and France the vast majority of cases brought before criminal 
court only become public once the investigative stages have finished, which often 
occurs more than 18 months after the beginning of pr ceedings. On the other hand, in 
inquisitorial systems, even when criminal proceedings are disclosed, a number of 
elements considered essential by the Public Prosecutor, remain under investigation 
secrecy.  
On the one hand, the Portuguese legislative reform c eated important and 
mandatory exceptions for cases of terrorism and organised crime289, keeping 
proceedings confidential, in these cases, virtually until the trial hearing.290 On the other 
hand, in cases of terrorism and organised crime of complex nature (Article 86 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure) information cannot be provided even if it requested by the 
suspects to defend their reputation or honour in the eyes of society. Moreover, in the 
above mentioned cases where there is a connection to a y transnational terrorist group, 
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the confidentiality of proceedings can be kept even b yond the time limit set by the 
previous statutory scheme. 
Until 2002, in Spain, no detainee (even in cases of terrorism and/or organised 
crime) could be deprived of communicating with the outside world (including the 
defence counsel or legal representative) for more than 24 hours after the arrest291; since 
2002, this period has been extended to 62 hours and c  even go up to 13 days in cases 
of strong evidence of terrorist or organised crime activities. Nonetheless, until 2002, 
criminal proceedings were usually public and could only be restricted in terms of their 
publicity in cases of serious offense to public decency or disturbance of the criminal 
investigation, always through a court order, which had to be renewed every three 
months; since 2002, the publicity of criminal proceedings has always been restricted 
when international terrorist crimes are concerned an  their outcome is no longer in the 
hands of the court, but instead taken on by the Attorney General. 
It must be concluded, therefore, that in spite of the reforms that have taken place, 
the terrorist phenomenon has produced and continues to produce important exceptions 
that cannot be ignored. As the USA General Accounting Office notes, the fight against 
terrorism after 9/11 has stalled, if not terminated, most of the liberal reforms that were 
underway in Southern Europe countries during the 1990’s.292 
According to the reform of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 
2006, terrorism suspects may remain without any communication with the outside 
world – except once with their attorney and in the pr sence of the Public Prosecutor – 
for a period of up to seven days293, under a court order. Spanish law has also undergon  
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changes in this context, moving closer to the Portuguese legislation on this matter and 
allowing for suspects to be detained in isolation fr up to six days, by means of specific 
court order. 
 
d) The doctrine of criminal equality & the development of marginal 
communities: the legal status of immigrants and the control of 
migration flows within the ‘war on terror’ 
 
Finally, the field of immigration and asylum underwnt major changes after 9/11 
in the United States, March, 11 in Madrid and July, 7 in London. Even countries with a 
traditionally benevolent attitude towards immigration, such as Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Spain, have introduced new restrictions in this field.294 
Two distinct aspects should be highlighted on this subject: one related to the 
direct control of migratory flows coming from countries considered potentially 
dangerous in terms of connections to terrorist groups; and another related to the 
strengthening of the powers of police and customs authorities in this matter. Both 
aspects are naturally interrelated. The emergence of a criminal law of the enemy has 
compelled a double action policy: a strengthening of the control mechanisms of 
migration flows from a selected number of countries and at the same time the 
strengthening of police powers in customs and border controls. In Spain for instance, 
Royal Decree nº65 – A/2009, of January 12, broadened th  powers of the different 
municipal police forces for identifying and detaining foreign citizens when suspected of 
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illegally overstaying in the country and allowing for continuous detention until proper 
identification and the origin of suspects is cleared. 
However, where this criminal law of the enemy can best be observed is in the fact 
that immigration control policies are not universal in their scope, but rather are directed 
to a group of communities or selected countries, where Muslims are the majority, or to 
certain areas of the world home to “pariah or failed states”295. For example, by official 
rule nº 563/2010 of June 12, the Spanish Government instructed custom and maritime 
authorities to pay special attention to a specific number of countries defining a set of 
actions to be undertaken when involving individuals from those countries when 
involved in such situations. 
In regard to the first topic, the reversal of the direction of immigration policies in 
the civil law systems within the European Union is an undeniable occurrence. With Law 
No. 34/2004 of 21 March, Portugal began to consider th  immediate expulsion of all 
foreigners involved in terrorist activities, regardless of whether or not such activities 
were committed on Portuguese soil. Similarly, the granting of permanent residence 
visas or nationality (with the so-called Nationality Law of 2006) began to be subject to 
the condition that there was no prior conviction directly or indirectly linked to terrorist 
activities or international criminal networks (mainly trafficking in human beings), 
considering as such the mere participation in a group r organisation deemed to be 
“inspired on terrorism”. This, again, is a preventive criminal law specifically focused on 
terrorism. 
The Portuguese Constitutional Court – as well as the Spanish one, since Spain 
enacted similar legislation a few months later – would subsequently mitigate the effects 
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of the Nationality Law, obliging the State to observe the appeals brought by suspects 
and thus discarding the concept of “immediate expulsion”.296 
Also Germany, for example, substantially amended its immigration and asylum 
legislation and, in 2003297, it denied to any citizen belonging to any group or 
organisation included in a long list approved by its Home Office, which contained 
several Islamic-inspired organisations and others rlated to Islamic charities and social 
services. It should be noted that, according to German legislation, no court order or 
prior administrative or police proceeding would be required to prevent the entry of any 
citizen in the country, merely on the grounds of their participation in or association with 
a group that the German authorities consider to be suspected of perpetrating or 
supporting, directly or indirectly, terrorist activi es. 
In this specific area of immigration and asylum, civil law countries have seen a 
true change of direction, largely due to the terrorist phenomenon, as Evelin Brouwer 
points out298. In some cases, such as Portugal and Spain, the constitutional courts have 
made legislation more flexible and introduced some i provements that were required to 
ensure compliance with their respective constitutions and with the provisions of 
Community law. However, the criminal codes of several countries, such as Portugal, 
Spain and Germany, were not indifferent to this phenomenon and imposed much 
harsher penalties for illegal immigration and human tr fficking, when related to terrorist 
groups.299 
In these cases, it should be noted that the penaltis for terrorism-related crimes 
have become extremely high when compared to those applied to the same type of 
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crimes but not associated with terrorist groups. In the case of Portugal, for example, 
while the crime of falsification of documents can be punished with up to three years in 
prison or a simple fine, the crime of falsification f documents for a terrorist group is 
punished with a minimum mandatory sentence of 2 to 5 years in prison. Similarly, in 
Spanish law, while the crime of aiding illegal immigration is punished with 
imprisonment from six months to four years, in the case of aiding illegal immigration 
for terrorist purposes, the penalty can range betwen four and eight years in prison. 
It can therefore be said, as Robert Megoli (2012) argues, that the fight against 
terrorism has become the primary concern of criminal law, making a number of new 
aggravated crimes revolve around that phenomenon, pr ving it to be the highest priority 
in the criminal law of risk driven societies.300  
 
e) The creation of new criminal offences and the development of 
the framework of a criminal policy to fight terrori sm and 
organised crime 
 
In criminal justice systems of inquisitorial nature there has been a proliferation of 
new offenses relating to the terrorist phenomenon. As stated by Beleza, terrorism and 
transnational organised crime became the central guiding principle of criminal policies 
of Governments of Southern Europe.301  
Still, another important aspect regarding civil law systems should be highlighted. 
Due to the phenomenon of international terrorism, most of these systems created or 
improved certain types of crimes, some of which were p eviously non-existent and 
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others unclear as to their meaning. In fact, specific types of crimes were created, mostly 
related to the financing of terrorism and international criminal groups (the case of the 
Austrian Criminal Code).302 Also herein we can observe the creation of the crime of 
terrorist association (rather than mere criminal association, which existed in the 
Spanish, Portuguese and French jurisdictions), and of the crime of propaganda and 
dissemination of terrorist ideology (in France and Belgium). From a strictly legal point 
of view, the number of terrorism-related crimes, in countries like Spain, Portugal, 
France and Germany, virtually doubled.303 As Duff explained, the concept of terrorism 
has become part of the soul of criminal law.304 
On the other hand, considering the possibility of terrorist acts being committed 
with the use of various kinds of weapons or materials, most of these legal systems also 
created specific crimes related to the sale or sharing of chemical or nuclear material 
with terrorist networks and the use of specific biological agents against civilian targets. 
Such is the case of Belgium, for example, where article 331(3) of its Code of Criminal 
Procedure was amended to include all activities related to the design, sharing, sale or 
dissemination of this type of hazardous materials for terrorist purposes in the concept of 
“terrorist activity”. In this case, the maximum penalty was extended to ten years in 
prison, even if such acts did not cause any casualties or damage. As Ramsay explained, 
the phenomenon of terrorism has forced us to move from a criminal law of facts (and 
their punishment) to a criminal law of targeted prevention and protection of threatened 
legal interests.305 
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This seems to be a key aspect of the development of criminal justice systems as a 
result of terrorism. The creation of a new list of offences specifically related to terrorism 
and organised crime has assaulted the criminal codes f most civil law systems, such as 
the aforementioned cases of Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Spain, France, Germany and 
Luxembourg. Norway, for example, through the Decree of 5 October 2001, introduced a 
whole new legislation on the financing of terrorism, creating two new types of crime 
with aggravated penalties: the crime of financing iternational terrorism and of money 
laundering for terrorist groups or activities. Similarly, in Germany, the antiterrorism 
package known as ‘Otto-Katalog’ introduced a new list of offences related to the direct 
or indirect support or the mere participation in terrorist groups. 
Still with regard to civil law systems, another point s readily identified when we 
carefully examine the measures that have been adopte  to combat terrorism and 
organised crime: the substantial extension of criminal penalties – in some cases more 
than twice the limit set at the beginning of 2001 – for crimes potentially related to 
terrorism, such as falsification of documents, assisting illegal immigration and arms 
trafficking. In Portugal, for example, with the reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
adopted in 2006, if such crimes are somehow linked to current or ongoing terrorist acts, 
the penalty applied will be aggravated by 2/3, which is identical to the model used in 
Spain since 2003. 
Italy specifically introduced the offence of “participation in international terrorist 
organisations” as well as the mere provision of assistance to these organisations, while 
criminally punishing all acts, even auxiliary, aimed at supporting the organisation, 
financing or development of organisations that intend to attack targets on Italian 
territory. 
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The same thing happened in France with the approval of the law of 15 November 
2001306, which substantially extended the penalties applicab e to members and leaders 
of terrorist organisations vis-à-vis members and leaders of other types of criminal 
organisations. According to Masferrer, the new criminal law of the enemy is essentially 
counter-terrorism criminal law.307 
Still in the specific context of civil law jurisdictions, the case of Luxembourg 
should be mentioned because of the sudden and profound changes it underwent with the 
approval of an antiterrorism law on 8 July 2003. This created a new list of terrorism-
related crimes – envisaging both the financing of terrorism and terrorist activities 
themselves – and substantially extended the applicable penalties. In the specific case of 
Luxembourg – unique in the European Union – it even introduced the possibility of 
applying the maximum sentence of life imprisonment (although requiring regular 
review by a specialised court) where the terrorist offence is associated with serious 
human and material loss. In this case, we have a situ tion where the phenomenon of 
terrorism not only added new types of crime and extended the penalties applicable to 
others, but it also gave rise to a new core identity of the criminal justice system.  
 
f) Modifications to the right of appeal system under legislative 
antiterrorist reforms  
 
One of the most important changes undergone by civil law systems in the fight 
against terrorism has to do with the right to appeal against court decisions. While in 
2001 the Portuguese and Spanish criminal procedure systems were characterised as 
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being highly generous in terms of appeals against court decisions (including the 
application of pre-trial detention and other coercive measures), since the reforms of 
2003 (Spain) and 2006 (Portugal), the right to ‘habeas corpus’ has been highly restricted 
and the allegation of any irregularities or illegalities committed during the investigation 
are now permitted only in a limited number of circumstances.308  
 The 'habeas corpus' regime and the changes introduced by antiterrorist reforms 
are factors that should be taken into account. The paradigm shift of the last decade, both 
in Portugal and in Spain is well known.  For example, Sentence nº. 45/2008 of 
December, 12 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, did in fact acknowledge this 
paradigm shift by referring to a new perspective that as to guide the courts in the 
application of the system of habeas corpus, and that is suitable to the new criminal and 
procedural law system in force since 2006 and to the new requirements of the fight 
against new crime phenomena.309 
 However the changes in habeas corpus cannot be ignored when studying the 
impact of antiterrorists reforms because what is at t ke here is the right to judicial 
review but also the right to freedom. As per Cavalcante: 
“One of the main changes under this scheme is precisely the idea that habeas 
corpus should be a restricted and exceptional figure, almost a rarity. This idea, in 
fact, is completely different from the conception that guided the majority of courts 
before the antiterrorist reforms of the last decade”.310 
 
 This is an aspect of the utmost relevance concerning the antiterrorist reforms 
undertaken in inquisitorial systems that has not acquired the same significance in 
accusatorial systems, as noted by Costa Pinto.311 However, the reform of the appeals 
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system must be included as one of the main trends of the new antiterrorist framework 
adopted in inquisitorial systems. 
 The 2006 reform of the Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code foresees now only 
two types of appeals against pre-trial detention: violation of material ou territorial 
competence by a court or gross mistake in the evaluation of the case. All other 
situations - that constitute the vast majority - are to be made in routine revisions which 
should take place between three to six months after th  sentencing. The same has 
occured with the reform of the Spanish Criminal Procedure Code (articles 205º and 
onwards).  
This demonstrates a clear trend in limiting the judicial appeals provided to 
suspects and, has the general objective of diminishing the power of the judiciary in 
prevention and repression of serious crimes. That is he element which is most 
underlined by Portuguese and Spanish doctrine: the progressive curtailing or even the 
suppressing of the role of the courts in investigating, preventing and repressing 
terrorism and the concentration of powers in the Executive. This idea has two 
dimensions: on one hand, the growing tendency to avoid the involvement of courts in 
these processes (avoidance of legal process), so that they remain almost completely 
under the control of the Executive, who can better manage and steer them through the 
public opinion. On the other, the basic sense of restricting some fundamental rights 
inherent to criminal procedure using the exceptional character brought about by the 
fight against terrorism and the need to act swiftly and firmly against this phenomenon.  
 This restriction of the right to appeal is so broad and impacting that it has led to 
several requests to the Spanish Constitutional Court f r the review of such reforms. In 
2008, the Spanish Constitutional Court (by decision 56/2008 of March 12th) declared 
the Royal Decree 78/2006 unconstitutional for “sever ly restricting the right of Spanish 
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people to effective legal protection of their rights and for basically revoking suspects’ 
rights in cases of terrorism or organised crime.” 
The result was that the Spanish Government presented, i  2009, a draft project to 
review the constitution (Legislative Project nº 34-A/2009) with a view to defining the 
meaning and the extent of the right to effective judicial protection of individual 
interests.   
As Losano observes: 
“This limitation to the right of judicial appeal in pre-trial detention situations and 
of defense of fundamental rights will continue and grow in a near future while the 
spectre of the fight against terrorism continues to be, as has been, the inspiring 
source of our legislative reforms”.312. 
 
In this respect, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Courts in Portugal and Spain 
have been particularly critical, with a list of very important decisions that have 
somewhat minimised the impact of legislative reforms (please refer to sentence no. 
45/2008 of April, 15 and no. 34/2010 of May, 12 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
and to sentence no. 32-B of October, 1 of the Spanish Constitutional Court). 
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3. The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on the 
Liberal and Democratic Nature of the Constitutional 
Rule of Law 
 
At this stage it is important to look at some of the findings regarding the trends 
we encountered in the recent development of systems of inquisitorial nature. Thus, as 
was outlined, the pre-trial detention framework was substantially altered, not necessarily 
in the length of pre-trial detention periods but significantly in the transformation of its 
nature and enforcement conditions. However, as Guedes Valente states, it cannot be 
denied that this change implies that citizens saw their right to liberty and presumption of 
innocence seriously restricted.313 
Nonetheless, the reforms that have taken place regardin  the confidentiality of 
proceedings, wiretapping and video surveillance, as well as the control of financial 
information, indicate a new and serious unbalance between fundamental rights and the 
need of the State for security and ensuring its ownsurvival. As Dershowitz observes, 
the antiterrorist reforms gave priority to security concerns over the liberal illuminist 
paradigm of the right to freedom and to privacy.314  
There is yet another conclusion to be extracted from this: in some way, as 
Hespanha states, the phenomenon of terrorism compelled systems of inquisitorial nature 
to return to their past, disregarding or ignoring the liberalization waves of the past 
decades. According to Hespanha, some elements such as t e thorough control of 
financial flows or the regular use of pre-trial detention are nothing more than a return to 
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the past, to the true identity of inquisitorial systems. The conflict that terrorism caused 
was between the movement towards modernisation and liberalisation that had been 
taking place in the past decades entailing a regression since 2001. According to this 
author, suchdevelopments would thereforerepresent a historical process of regression in 
inquisitorial systems. 315   
Whatever position one takes, it cannot be denied that antiterrorist reforms approved in 
the past decade represent a move backwards in legal systems: the Portuguese system of 
pre-trial detention before 1989 was very close to the existing framework since 2006, 
regarding requirements and enforcement of pre-trial detention. Even so, there are some 
important specificities in antiterrorist reforms ofthe last decade in spite of this 
regression: electronic surveillance, communications’ control, restrictive immigration 
policies and movement controls that cannot be compared to any other historical period 
and must be analyzed in the specific context of the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime after 2001. 
Countries like Portugal and Spain have experienced some difficulties in 
implementing this model, insofar that Sousa Santos even mentions that the dominant 
models of criminal justice in the Iberian Peninsula have consistently failed to define a 
balance between citizens’ fundamental rights and the interest of the State in criminal 
law enforcement. 316  
With the reforms that have been discussed above it is clear that the core values 
and principles of criminal procedure models in civil law countries are in peril. We must 
now analyse to what extent this transformation has produced an identity crisis that 
affects the very nature of criminal justice systems. 
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The Spanish case deserves a more detailed analysis in regard to the measures 
taken concerning the confidentiality of investigations and suspects’ communication 
rights. Although legislation made confidentiality of investigations gradually more 
flexible and (in some cases) even extended the rights of detainees in criminal 
proceedings (the case of the Royal Decree of 23 June 1997) over the 1990’s, the 
situation changed radically after 2001 and was consolidated following the terrorist 
attacks at the Atocha railway station in Madrid, in 2004. 
Although the Spanish criminal system is already widely familiar with the terrorist 
phenomenon – the first antiterrorism law dates back to the late 19th century – Law of 10 
July 1894 –the Spanish Criminal Code and criminal legislation have also been adapted 
to the new context of the threat of transnational terrorism, especially after 2004. In this 
regard, it must be highlighted that the extension of the maximum penalty from thirty to 
forty years, in case of a terrorist crime (under Organic Law No. 7/2003) and, on the 
other hand, the total ban on external communications by terror suspects, even to the 
point of prohibiting religious and legal support (the lawyer will be appointed by the 
state and not chosen by the detainee, which has raised serious concerns as to the right to 
defence enshrined in the Spanish Constitution). 
After the March 11 attacks in Madrid, there was also a thorough reform of the 
detention system for prisoners involved in terrorist activities. Thus, under the Law of 22 
June 2004, ‘1st degree prisoners’ would be all those whose crimes ar  related to terrorist 
activities, which implies, firstly, a situation of near isolation and transfer to a prison 
establishment outside of their area of residence. On the other hand, the same law 
specifically prohibits the benefit of parole for prisoners connected to terrorist crimes, 
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which has caused a definitive conceptual and legal divide between common criminal 
law and antiterrorist criminal law.317  
Nevertheless, the greatest impact of antiterrorism legislation on the Spanish 
criminal justice model occured,  in the extension of the maximum pre-trial detention 
periods that can be imposed on terror suspects, as was also the case with Portuguese 
antiterrorist legislation.318 Although the maximum period for which a suspect can be 
detained before being brought to a criminal court is 72 hours in Spanish legislation, this 
period may be extended up to five days in cases of terrorism and transnational organised 
crime, pursuant to Organic Law No. 7/2003. Similarly, while the maximum period of 
pre-trial detention was set at 12 months, this period has been extended from 24 up to 36 
months in cases of terrorism and organised crime, which has raised significant questions 
as to the compatibility of this legislation with the principles of swift justice and 
presumption of innocence enshrined in the Spanish Constitution. 
However, in the same way that the rights of suspect (and also of convicts) have 
been strongly limited and restricted in these early stages of criminal proceedings, the 
Spanish Parliament – as well as the Constitutional Court – have introduced significant 
changes to the extent of the rights of suspects in trial hearings and appeals to higher 
courts. For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court J dgement No. 235/2007 
provided that the right to freedom of expression and the right of communication cannot 
be arbitrarily limited or curtailed, even in cases of terrorism, and should in any case be 
fully protected – as in any other type of offence – during the trial, which should be open 
and public. On the other hand, Judgement No. 102/209 (also of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court) established the obligation to allow the evaluation, at trial, of all 
the evidence and legal issues that were not admitted during the pre-trial stage. 
                                                
317 Farré, Juan Aviles, El Terrorismo en España: de ETA a Al- Qaeda, Arco Libros ed. (2011) p. 87 
318 Costa Pinto, Frederico Lacerda da, Prisão preventiva e terrorismo em Portugal, A medina (2006), pp. 
67 - 89 
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Finally, the powers of the suspect’s attorney or lega  representative, highly 
restricted during the pre-trial stage where terrorist offences319 are concerned, are fully 
active during the trial stage and subsequent appeals, in which they can examine all 
existing evidence against the suspect and the methods used to obtain it, particularly to 
investigate any cases of torture.320 
Thus, a deliberate balance, desired by the legislator, is achieved based on a clear 
proposition of current crime policy: criminal proceedings should be driven by different 
values and objectives during the pre-trial stage and the trial stage.321 While the first 
stage criminal proceedings should focus primarily on s cial prevention and criminal 
investigation, allowing evidence to be obtained quickly and social order and tranquillity 
to be restored, during the trial stage, the justice system should aim to ensure that the 
suspect's rights are fully respected vis-à-vis the public accusation, allowing for a 
balanced justice model. 
Also in the case of Portugal, the criminal justice system changed profoundly as a 
consequence of counterterrorist legislation, especially after the reform of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in 2006. 
With this reform, pre-trial detention practically ceased to be – like I mentioned 
before - an exceptional preventive measure and becam  a common and recurring feature 
in the administration of justice. Indeed, while befor  the reform of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 2006, pre-trial detention could only be applied if three specific conditions 
were met (risk of compromising the investigation, risk of escape, and criminal offence 
punishable with more than three years imprisonment), since this legislative reform, pre-
                                                
319 Beiras, Iñaki, Política Criminal y Sistema Penal: Viejas y Nuevas Racionalidades Punitivas, 
Anthropos Editorial (2005), p. 65 
320 Lee, Steven, Intervention, Terrorism and Torture: Contemporary Challenges to Just War Theory, 
Springer, (2007), pp. 119 and following. 
321 This idea will be developed and specified within a proper theoretical framework within the last chapter 
of this thesis. 
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trial detention can be applied provided that, for example, the crime is connected to any 
international terrorist network or has been committed using firearms (in what became 
known as the “Arms Law” of the Portuguese Republic.322 
On the other hand, the reform drive of the late 1990s – notably in Draft Law No. 
34/97 and Draft Law No. 86/99, presented to the Portuguese Parliament323 – has 
diminished, if not disappeared altogether since the 9/11 attacks. In fact, after the attacks, 
the organising committees of the these draft laws never met again and the reform of the 
criminal code in 2006, together with the “Arms Law”, reversed the intention to restrict 
the use of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. On the contrary, the 2006 reform 
further broadened the scope of State intervention in cit zens’ personal data, authorising 
criminal police authorities to access information on financial and banking transactions 
and even telephone conversations and electronic communications. 
Criminal justice systems of inquisitorial nature have had an interesting evolution, 
which will be studied in more detail in the final chapter. It is however inevitable to 
highlight that the reforms presented in this chapter were aimed mostly to the 
preliminary stages of criminal proceedings. This situation illustrates the fact that the 
antiterrorist reforms of the past decade must be analysed separately and thoroughly in 
regard to their global impact on criminal justice systems, in order to avoid premature 
and poorly grounded answers. As Sousa Santos states:  
“Antiterrorist reforms and their impact in restricting fundamental rights should not 
be seen in a generic way because undeniably their eff cts are concentrated mainly 
on the initial phases of criminal proceedings”.324 
 
This situation is illustrated by historical evidenc: during the 1990s, the great 
debates around the Portuguese criminal justice focused on the issues of wiretapping, 
                                                
322 Marinho Pinto, António, Justiça à Portuguesa, Leya ed., Lisboa (2009) p. 52 
323 Portuguese Parliament,  Actas e Projectos lei, 1990 – 2000, Almedina, Lisboa (2003) 
324 Sousa Santos, Boaventura, Democratizar a democracia: os caminhos da democracia participativa, 
Civilização Brasileira ed. (2002), p. 314 (translation by the author) 
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pre-trial detention and the appeals system. As to the first two issues, most Portuguese 
scholars began to agree on the need to restrict the possibility of intercepting telephone 
conversations and electronic communications, as well as a more careful and exceptional 
use of pre-trial detention. On the other hand, the appeals system began to be seen as too 
mild and one of the causes of the endemic delays in the Portuguese criminal justice 
system. 
However, the rise of terrorism as a global priority in terms of criminal legislation 
significantly changed this historical pattern, creating an interesting distinction in the 
reforms adopted by the Portuguese legislator (as we also observed in the case of Spain). 
Indeed, while the draft legal reforms in the areas of wiretapping and pre-trial detention 
were abandoned and gave rise to much more stringent and privacy-intrusive laws,325 the 
appeals system did not change as expected, as it somehow sought to offset the tight and 
often disproportionate restrictions imposed on the ex rcise of fundamental rights during 
the pre-trial stage. 
Some authors, such as Miguel Fernandes, have identified this phenomenon as the 
“two-speed development of Western criminal justice systems”, seeking precisely to 
highlight this distinct reality of the criminal justice system during the pre-trial stage 
(which in Portugal and Spain is known as criminal ivestigation) and the trial stage.326 
This reality can also be measured statistically. A 2012 study carried out by Costa 
on the Portuguese criminal justice system shows that the number of appeals to the 
higher courts is 15% higher during the pre-trial stage than during the trial stage. 
Likewise appeals to the Constitutional Court are 35% higher during the pre-trial stage 
than during the trial stage,327 which means, as Costa points out, that it is currently 
                                                
325 Latas, João, supra note 242 at  65 
326 Fernandes, Luís Miguel, “As sociedades contemporâneas e a ameaça terrorista” at Terrorismo (org. 
Adriano Moreira), Almedina Ed. (2004), pp. 461 - 481 
327 Costa, Faria, Noções Fundamentais de Direito Penal, Coimbra Editora (2012), pp. 75 - 101 
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during the pre-trial stage when most of the possible violations of the constitution occur, 
either in terms of the right to freedom and in terms of the right to a fair and unbiased 
trial. Such restrictions to the right to freedom, to privacy or of expression, curtailing the 
right to appeal before a court of law, amount to infringements on the very foundations 
of the Rule of Law. Donohue refers to this as 'counterterrorism costs'.328 It is important 
to mention the impact of antiterrorism legislation on the liberal and democratic nature of 
the Rule of Law, as well as its own constitutional structure. It has now become clear 
that profound concessions and structural changes were made to the Rule of Law as a 
result of the phenomenon of global terrorism.  
These changes, in the specific context of systems of inquisitorial nature, can be 
systematised in the following topics: 
• Increase in the restrictions of citizens’ fundamental rights over the consolidation of 
executive powers; 
• Crisis of the constitutional regime of fundamental rights, namely in terms of the 
hermeneutics and application of procedural criminal law. 
• Increased sense of control and surveillance on behalf of Governments. 
• Crisis in the very nature of the liberal Rule of Law and the principle of proportionality 
as a basic rule of exercising power329. These topics summarise under a broader 
perspective, the changing trends analysed in section II f this chapter. In fact, as Teresa 
Beleza330 refers, the main changes that occurred following the antiterrorist reforms of 
the last decade, could be divided into two essential ideas: a growing feeling of control 
(at all levels) on behalf of Governments over the lives of citizens and a sense of 
                                                
328 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at  p. 15  
329 Professor Caroline Fennell 
330 2004 
 
 
153 
decreasing security and protection of citizens vis-à-vis the State. Teresa Beleza calls this 
phenomenon the "constitutional reversal" of continental justice systems.331 
It is within this scope that the impact of antiterrorism legislation on the criminal 
justice model in systems of inquisitorial nature and the impact on the Rule of Law itself 
should be analysed. Miguel Fernandes observes that "i  is a true mutation in the liberal 
nature of continental States and eventually a new paradigm of criminal justice will 
emerge”. 332 A criminal justice system focused on the enemies of contemporary society 
and the permanent obsession to prevent terrorist threats that seem increasingly 
ubiquitous.  
Having defined the framework for the analysis of justice systems of inquisitorial 
nature, we carry forward with the detailed study of the main legislative changes, which 
have occurred in the systems of accusatorial nature over the last decade. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
Antiterrorist legislation and Civil Liberties - 
(2001-2010) – the Accusatorial Systems333 
 
The decline of morality, the unwillingness to accept responsibility and the confusion 
that our current legal system generates are all contributing factors to the deterioration of 
common sense in our society.334 
Frank Fuller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
333 According to Adofikwu “the Adversarial system is a legal system where two advocates represent their 
parties‘positions before an impartial person or group of people, usually a judge, who attempts to 
determine the truth of the case. The Adversarial system is a two sided structure under which criminal tri
courts operate, that puts the prosecution against the defence. Justice is done when the most effective 
adversary is able to convince the judge or Jury that his or her perspective on the case is the correct one”. 
See Adofikwu, Aje, Understanding the adversarial and inquisitorial justice, Routledge (2010), p. 6.  For 
a proper definition of ‘Accusatorial Systems” see Stacy, Helen, Beyond the Adversarial System, 
Federation Press, Melbourne  (1999), p. 140
334 Fuller, Frank, Studies in Criminal Justice, Terrorism and International Political Conflicts, Universal-
Publishers (2009), p. 45 
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1. Introduction: Setting the context 
 
a) The Impact of the Fight against Terrorism and Organised Crime 
on Common Law Systems 
  
Similarly to the previous chapter, this analysis will begin by looking into the 
legal and social context that will be the framework f this chapter. The study of the 
impact of the phenomenon of terrorism and organised crime within the framework of 
accusatorial systems, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Israel, should 
take into account the specific historical evolution that has taken place over the last 
decade335, as well as its underlying principles. Overall, the legislative changes occuring 
in the last decade will be scrutinised from the viewpoint of the dominant constitutional 
and legal principles in those systems. This analysis will enable us to perceive systematic 
and global changes and the impact that they are having. 
 From political discourse to the religious approach,336 from academic analysis to 
the opinion of the masses, the entire public discourse has been imbued with fear337 and 
towards a permanent state of exception338 related to the phenomenon of terrorism. In 
2002, for example, more than half of the draft laws presented to U.S. Congress were 
directly or indirectly related to terrorism. 
The protection of the fundamental rights in accusatori l systems (namely in the 
United Kingdom, United States of America and Israel), is closely linked to the common 
                                                
335 Abraham, Nabeel, Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade, Wayne State University Press, (2011), p.2 
336 The point being made here is that religious speech, in its different appreciations, has also come to 
know significant radicalization trends as a consequence of fear and panic caused by terrorism. See El 
Houdaigi, Rachid, Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tackling It IOS Press 
(2012), p. 117. 
337 Hodges, Adam, Discourse, War and Terrorism,  John Benjamins Publishing (2007), p. 10 
338 Orezen, Suleyman, Understanding Terrorism: analysis of sociological, IOS Press (2007), p. 244 
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law system and will be the main focus of this study. As will be observed, constraints in 
the protection of the basic rights of suspects in the first stages of criminal proceedings, 
in systems where those rights traditionally were heavily safeguarded from the start of 
any proceedings, naturally assume paramount importation.  
Common law systems, have been traditionally characte ised by extensive 
protection of the rights of suspects, granting them a set of rights and guarantees339 that, 
since the English Magna Carta, constitute a sort of insurmountable barrier that must be 
respected, at all times, by the democratic state of law. 
Some of these rights derive from the very concept of human dignity (an idea that 
would strongly influence German law after World War II340) such as the right to 
defence,341 the right to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, the right to appeal to 
higher courts, the principles of proportionality and equality. 
Others refer to a set of guarantees that have been progressively and substantially 
granted by the higher courts, especially throughout the 20th century. Such guarantees 
were aimed at ensuring rights of due process of law, s the suspects’ rights of 
communication, in the maximum number of days of detention permitted before being 
brought before a judge, in the possibility of opposing any detention that is considered 
unfair or illegal, in the need to obtain warrants for all acts that are particularly 
destructive of fundamental rights and, most notably, in the maximum periods of pre-
trial detention.342 
It is curious to note that common law criminal justice systems, characterised by 
their accusatorial nature, usually differ from their civil law counterparts precisely for the 
                                                
339 Costa, Pietro, The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism, Springer, (2007), p. 179 
340 Kretzmer, David, The concept of human dignity in human rights discourse, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, (2002), p. 52 
341 The right to defence herein means the right to a defence, or the right to present a defence (more 
information on this: http://analedrept.utm.ro/ver_en/Lucrari/2009/2009_articol_12.pdf; http://www.uni-
mannheim.de/edz/pdf/dg4/LIBE115_EN.pdf)  
342 Loureiro dos Santos, Nuno, Fundamental rights within the age of terror, Universidade de Lisboa 
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increased and strengthened set of rights that they grant to suspects, even during the pre-
trial stages.  
The Council of Europe, for example, notes that there is no substantial reason for 
suppressing or diminishing the suspects’ fundamental rights during the pre-trial stage. 
On the contrary, it is precisely when their rights – including the right to freedom – are 
under greater threat that their guarantees should be strengthened and implemented.343 In 
turn, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed 
that the principle of presumption of innocence should limit the intervention of the state 
and criminal police authorities as much as possible during the pre-trial stage, in order to 
avoid violation of the fundamental rights of citizens.344 In the 1983 case Minelli v. 
Switzerland, the ECHR mentioned “the presumption of innocence is not respected if, 
without anterior legal establishing of guilt of the d fendant […] a judicial decision 
regarding him or her reflects the feeling that he may be guilty”.345 In the 2003 case 
Duriez-Costes v. France, 346 the ECHR in Strassbourg referred to the precedent 
(Decision X v.Holland, 1978, ECHR),347 in which it was established that the obligation 
of an automobile driver to take some blood tests while suspected of being inebriated is 
not contrary to the presumption of innocence. Also, it was mentioned that this 
presumption is violated through statements made by public officials about pending 
investigations, which in turn encourages the public to believe in the guilt of the suspect 
before a sentence has been issued by a competent auhority (the 1995 case of Allenet of 
Ribemont v. France). 348 Also, the right of not incriminating oneself is strongly linked to 
                                                
343 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism: The Council of Europe 
Guidelines, Council of Europe, (2005) 
344 Brice Dickson (org.), The Judicial House of Lords: 1876-2009 , Oxford University Press (2009), p. 
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the presumption of innocence, as was demonstrated in the 1996 case Saunders v. Great 
Britain.349 In this case, the ECHR established that the presumption is not intended only 
for the judge, but other authorities of the state, regarding public statements which can be 
made about the accused who have not yet been sentenc d.350 
A comparative statistical analysis shows precisely that in the 1995-2000 period, 
countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand had shorter periods of 
pre-trial detention and comparatively the lowest number of pre-trial prisoners, i.e. those 
detained without charge. Even in terms of serious and complex crime, usually 
associated with terrorism and organised crime, system  like the Australian and the UK 
legislation had strengthened the rights and guarantees of suspects throughout the 1990s, 
in particular regarding their communication with the outside world, the possibility of 
appealing to the courts and even their placement in prisons close to their families and 
homes. 
 Although some countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, 
have a long history of terrorist activities within their own territory – and, consequently, 
of counter-terrorism measures – criminal justice systems in these jurisdictions remained 
highly protective of the rights and guarantees of suspects, namely in comparison to the 
continental European doctrine.351 This idea, although sustained by some renowned 
European writers, has not earned broad support within e Anglo-Saxon legal 
literature.352 Indeed, the legislative evolution, especially during the last decade, has 
                                                
349 Saunders v. the United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, § ..., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 -
97 
350 Chihaia, Gabriela Nicoleta, “Short essay on Presumption of innocence.ECHR precedent” in  Legal 
Practice and International Laws, University of Transilvania Publ. at 
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351 Vercher, Antonio, Terrorism in Europe: an international comparative legal analysis, Clarendon Press 
(1992), p. 65; Masi, Carlo Velho, Criminalidade econômica e repatriação de capitais: um estudo à luz da 
política criminal brasileira, EDIPUCRS ed  (2012) p. 194 
352 For a historical perspective see Simpson, Alfred, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and 
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159 
brought the rules of criminal legal procedures in Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems 
closer to each other and at a remarkable speed, namely in terms of means of obtaining 
evidence and restrictions to suspects’ fundamental rights. This is, for example, 
Chkheidze’s opinion that has increasingly emphasised th  emergence of elements of 
Continental systems within the British legal system. 353 
The conceptual sphere has also undergone substantial changes in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. While before 2001, the concept of terrorism was associated 
with a strong political and paramilitary component, af er the 9/11 attacks, this concept 
has evolved into a much more substantive and comprehensive perspective: the UK 
Terrorism Act 2000 was amended precisely in 2001 so as to expand the concept of 
terrorism to include all forms of violence based on religious, ethnic or political reasons 
aimed at destroying or threatening to destroy the social fabric or the state. 
       Another very important factor was the expansio  of the counterterrorist finance law 
after 9/11, both in United States and United Kingdom.354 The 2001 Antiterrorism and 
Security Act (ATCSA) allowed the UK government to cnfiscate any money it believed 
to be related to terrorist operations, whether or not a court had brought proceedings in 
regard to an offense connected with the cash. The Statute completely blocked the 
judiciary from playing a role in the freezing asset of non-UK entities: where the 
Treasury had reason to believe that a non-UK entity posed a threat to British economy, 
British nationals, or United Kingdom residents, theS cretary of Treasury could issue a 
statutory instrument seizing that individual’s asset . The legislation also expanded the 
function of freezing orders: not only did the issuance result in a suspension of access to 
                                                                                                                                    
Monitoring Fundamental Rights In The EU: The Contribut on Of The Fundamental Rights Agency, Hart 
Publishing (2005), pp. 130 - 185  
353 Chkheidze, Giorgi, Adding Inquisitorial Judicial Elements to the British Criminal Justice System: 
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354 Yager, Loren, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needd to Coordinate U. S. Efforts to 
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funds but it could also require discloser of personal i formation. There were criminal 
penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment for falling to abide by the order, to or 
provide the requested data.355 All of this has strained the fragile balance between 
security and freedom. The balance between a traditionally accusatorial approach of 
common law systems and the protection of fundamental rights becomes a challenge for 
reviewing criminal procedures as a consequence of increased security purposes. 
 The context in which these antiterrorist reforms happen is of utmost importance. 
As Seidl refers, the balance between freedom and security is extremely delicate and 
problematic in countries like the United States, Engla d and even Israel, partly due to 
important historical reasons.356 As Seidl points out, antiterrorist reforms have generated 
an important impact as well as public discussions in countries like the United States and 
England, much more than in continental systems.357 This is due to historical, cultural 
and contextual reasons that must be understood. The dim nsion and the impact of 
legislative reforms in the public sphere had intense and lasting consequences for 
criminal justice systems. These lines of change will be the object of the examination 
hereafter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
355 Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, chapter 24, Part I. The new provisions replaced section 
24 with section 31 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
356 Seidl, Florian, Terrorism and the Balance Between Freedom and Security, GRIN Verlag, 2007 pp. 5 
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2. Main Trends: Fighting Terrorism in Accusatorial 
Systems 
 
a) The right to freedom and the increase use of pre-trial detention  
 
Pre-trial detention periods in the United Kingdom, were substantially extended in 
2001, from a maximum of 48 hours to a period of seven days in which a suspect could 
be detained without charge. Previously the United Kingdom had a substantially more 
generous and humanistic normative system in regard to preventive detention that the 
majority of European countries. Under that regime the suspect could not be detained for 
over 48 hours without formal charge and could not be stopped from contacting his 
defense. As Hatchard and Harding observe, cases where communication with the 
outsider were completely prohibited were practically non-existent since the late 70’s 
and always required validation by the courts.358  
Yet, the United Kingdom rapidly went from being one of the European countries 
with the shortest periods of pre-trial detention to being one in the opposite situation. In 
2006, with the Terrorism Act, the British Parliament approved the extension of pre-trial 
detention from 14 to 28 days, a period that had not been seen in this legal system since 
the late 1970s, in the fight against Northern Ireland related terrorism (the term originally 
proposed was forty-two days, but it was eventually settled at twenty-eight days). This 
extended 28 day period required however an annual renewal by an affirmative order 
without which it would revert back to the 14 days term. Successive orders were made in 
2007, 2008 and 2009, without challenge to the Executive orders. Since 2011 pre-charge 
                                                
358 Hatchard, John, Harding, Andrew Preventive Detention and Security Law: A Comparative Survey, 
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detention has reverted back to the 14 days period but remains however subject to s 25(2) 
of the 2006 Act which allows the Executive to restore the extended 28 day pre-charge 
detention.359 The Protection of Freedoms Bill,360 contains provisions which will repeal 
the powers contained in the 2006 Act that enable the reinstatement of the 28 day pre-
charge detention. 
Note that terrorism takes on full significance in this respect: while terror suspects 
could be detained without charge for up to twenty-eight days, pre-trial detention for any 
other common offence cannot, in principle, go beyond two days. In this respect, 
terrorism becomes once more, as Horgan refers, the central topic and the underlying 
concern of criminal justice systems of accusatorial nature.361 
 The recent case law of the House of Lords with rega d to detention powers in the 
fight against terrorism within the United Kingdom should also be mentioned here. 
Although successive British Governments increased th  powers to detain suspects of 
terrorism or terrorist activities since 2005, the courts and especially the House of Lords 
have imposed some limitations to these powers.362 It is worth mentioning the Belmarsh 
decision363 which considered the arrest of a group of terrorism suspects under the legal 
provisions of national emergency disproportionate – and consequently illegal.  
The Lords essentially had to address two central issue . The first was whether the 
Government’s derogation from the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
respect of the detention measures was lawful. The second was whether the statutory 
                                                
359 This situation prompted an outcry from the oppositin: “Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper 
argued that the Government had taken a "chaotic" appro ch to national security by allowing the powers to 
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extended pre-charge detention if this became necessary” Horne,  Alexander, Brman, Gavin,  Pre-Charge 
Detention in Terrorism Cases - Commons Library Standard Note, Published 16 March 2012, Standard 
notes SN05634. 
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363 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL, p. 56 
 
 
163 
provisions under which the appellants had been detained were incompatible with the 
ECHR. The Lords thus addressed the designation issue a  well as the interference issue. 
By an eight-to-one majority, the derogation by the UK Government from the ECHR 
was quashed and a declaration issued to the extent that section 23 ATCSA was 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
 The House of Lords judgment can be divided into three different moments : 
Seven members of the Court — Lords Bingham, Nicholls, Hope, Scott, Rodger, 
Carswell, and Baroness Hale — held that, while a ‘public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation’ could be said to exist, the detention provision could not be said to be 
‘strictly required’ by that emergency. It was dispro ortionate and discriminatory and 
hence unlawful. One judge — Lord Walker — dissented. He held both that there was a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation and that the detention provision of 
section 23 ATCSA was neither discriminatory nor disproportionate to the aim the 
measure sought to achieve. Lord Hoffmann agreed with the majority that the provisions 
in question were incompatible with article 5 of the ECHR. However, he was the only 
judge who held the derogation unlawful on the ground that there was no ‘war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ within the meaning of article 15 of 
the ECHR.364 
 This decision demonstrates, with enough reliability, that the case-law has not 
always followed the objectives of the executive branch in the fight against terrorism and 
has been an essential element of control and restraint of the derogations proposed by 
Governments to the principles of Community and International law with regard to 
rights, freedoms and guarantees.365 
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The Belmarsh Case also drew significant limitations in respect of the derogation 
regime of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, regarding the unlimited detention periods and to the absence of formal 
charges of terrorism suspects.366 As Feldman states: 
“The Belmarsh decision marked a dramatic change in direction. While the 
judgment itself changed little, especially for the individuals caught up in the 
government’s detention/control order/deportation strategy, it was remarkable for 
the rejection by eight of the nine Law Lords of theappropriateness of deferring to 
the executive in assessing the proportionality of measures taken under the cloak of 
national security.[…]) More significantly, perhaps, Belmarsh has opened up the 
political and legal debate about the necessity of adhering to the logic of the cycle of 
terror and repression. In particular, the decision served to embolden campaigning 
NGOs and political opposition to the legislation, by confounding the automatic 
assumption that counter-terrorism measures were untouchable”.367 
 
The phenomenon of "Control Orders"368 issued by the Home Secretary in the 
United Kingdom, which led to the detention of about 2,500 foreigners between 2002 
and 2007, for being suspected of belonging to a terrorist group or of being connected to 
financing terrorist activities, also deserves some ref rence. Actually, this kind of action 
of the executive branch has been one of the chosen methods by successive British 
Governments to effectively – and without further need of control or judicial verification 
- fight terrorism and organised crime, especially when related to international sources.  
However, it cannot be said, that these measures have been – and continue to be – 
peacefully accepted in the United Kingdom, in fact it is also undeniable that legal and 
academic literature continue to analyse them extremely critically.369 
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In the United States, the pre-trial detention period was substantially extended, 
both in terms of permissible period and in terms of the reasons that legally justify the 
application of pre-trial detention.370  
Before 9/11, the United States had a very similar detention procedure to, and 
based primarily on, the procedure that was followed in the United Kingdom. The 
interpretation that resulted from case law gave citizens the right to communicate with 
the outside, the right to a counsel of the suspect’s choosing or appointed by the state and 
a maximum detention period of 48 hours without formal charge. In some ways the law 
in the United States was even stricter than in the United Kingdom, requiring the 
presence of counsel during any questioning to a suspect regardless of the crime at hand, 
including terrorism.371 
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, even unlimited detention of terror suspects was 
permitted, provided that it was confirmed by the Attorney-General. In fact, on March 
11, 2003, a federal appeals court ruled that the 650 detainees have no legal rights in the 
United States and may not ask courts to review their detentions. The unanimous ruling 
by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
consisting of judges A. Raymond Randolph, Merrick Garland, Stephen Williams, means 
that the detainees can be held indefinitely without access to lawyers or judges. The 
decision upheld a federal court ruling issued in August of 2002.372 and 373 
This broadening and substantial change of the rules for preventive detention is 
probably the most direct expression of counter-terrorist measures adopted by Western 
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States. However, as Williams refers, this is not a simple extension of probation, but 
truly a new culture that conceives and implements preventive detention as a tool to fight 
crime.374 
 This idea must be further explained. Criminal justice systems have implemented 
preventive detention as a customary and permanent measure within the scope of 
proceedings involving terrorism and organised crime - allowing the precautionary and 
exceptional aspects of these measures - that were at its historical origin to wane. It is 
this "profound historical change", as indicated by Professor Munoz Conde that 
determined an increase of over 30% of pre-trial detentions in countries like the United 
Kingdom and Israel.375 
Within this topic, one must distinguish between States that have simply extended 
the legally allowed deadlines for pre-trial detentio  and those that have moreover began 
to make a permanent and constant use of pre-trial detentions in proceedings related to 
terrorism and organised crime. In the wide range of systems of accusatorial nature, we 
can say that the British, American and Israeli legal systems have begun to consider 
detention as a recurring and usual instrument for the prossecution of terrorism and 
organised crime.376 
 Once more, Munoz Conde draws attention to this aspect, which should be 
emphasised: the increased use of pre-trial detentions and the related extension of its 
terms is a characteristic trait of the major reforms to the post 9/11 criminal legislation 
and relates to the emergence of a new criminal law that is directly focused on a specific 
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objective of criminal policy: fighting terrorism and its supporters. In a word: the 
criminal law of the enemy.  
 
b) The Right to Privacy and the emergence of new methods for 
surveillance and criminal investigation. Preventive powers of law 
enforcement - a new paradigm of cooperation between police 
forces and intelligence services 
 
In common law systems, the most significant changes probably occurred in the 
surveillance and prevention powers of law enforcement authorities. Prior to 2001, in the 
USA and the United Kingdom, most of the surveillance activities carried out by 
criminal police authorities – which do not include th  actions carried out by intelligence 
agencies – required a warrant. Now, after the attacks, the situation changed 
dramatically: surveillance and monitoring by law enforcement authorities became 
constant, intense and often discretionary.377  
In the United Kingdom, for example, no raids or interception of communications 
could be carried out without a warrant, even in cases of terrorism and organised 
crime.378 In the United States, although in some cases law enforcement authorities could 
intervene autonomously in cases of terrorism – especially after the Oklahoma City 
bombing – their autonomy was restricted to situations f flagrante delicto and cases 
where it was not possible to obtain such warrants in due course. 
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Even in the specific case of wiretapping by criminal police authorities, in 1990s, 
the United Kingdom enacted highly restrictive legislation – when compared with 
continental systems – requiring a warrant in most ca es and restricting the admissibility 
of such evidence to strictly necessary and potentially serious cases – when such facts 
could not be obtained through less restrictive means.379  
But, with the new antiterrorist legislation, the state proposed to expand the 
interception of communications sent using public telecommunications systems or via 
post to all communications by telecom operators or mail delivery systems. Second, the 
state sought to relax warrant applications, tying them not to addresses, but to 
individuals, with a list of addresses and numbers attached and easily amendable by 
lower level officials. Third, to allow the state flexibility to react to emergencies, the 
power to request wiretaps would be extended from the Senior Civil Service to the head 
of the agency involved. Fourth, the Labour Governmet wanted to expand the length of 
time for which a warrant operated: under the previous statutes, taps remained in place 
only for a two month period, with the possibility of monthly renewals in cases of 
serious offenses, and on a six-month basis for matters of national security and economic 
well-being. The state proposed to change the length of time, for serious offenses, to 
three months, to be renewed every three months, and, for matters of national security 
and economic well-being, to be renewed every six months. Fifth, the government also 
proposed to expand its powers of interception to include private networks, with the aim 
of making it legal for businesses to record communications in both public and private 
sectors. Sixth, where previously communications data could be turned over voluntarily, 
the state wanted to compel targets to do so. Ultimately, the new legislation forced 
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Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to attach devices to their systems enabling 
communications to be intercepted en route.380 
Furthermore, monitoring extended to areas not traditionally covered,381 such as 
cyber activity and financial movements, which are now considered central to the fight 
against terrorism382 and organised crime. In this context, the UK Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 empowers authorities to carry out a different set of surveillance 
practices on terror suspects, making their administrat ve authorisation dependent on the 
Home Secretary and not on any judicial authority. Much of the British Parliament’s 
discussions in 1994 and 1995 suggested that wiretapping should be restricted to cases of 
great complexity and, as a rule, of a transnational nature. During the same period, some 
of the most important associations that deal with the protection of citizens’ rights, 
freedoms and guarantees -such as the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
(BCCLA), whilst analysing the situation in the United Kingdom - defended that 
mandates or court orders to intercept telephone communications should specify exactly 
what kind of elements are targeted and have a twenty-four hour period for their 
implementation. It is important to mention that theUnited Kingdom's legal literature has 
been deeply divided over this subject, swinging betwe n a shy interpretation of 
antiterrorist legislation and a fierce opposition. Doyle, for example, has been one of the 
most consistent critics of the telephone interception legislation in England and the 
United States in the last decade.383 In turn, Aleksander Avkov has brought consistent 
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and extremely critical studies regarding the evoluti n of telephone interception in recent 
decades.384  
In this respect – as would actually happen with most Southern and Central 
European countries – police powers in road surveillance, control of financial flows, 
monitoring telephone conversations and electronic communications have increased 
exponentially, in flagrant violation of the fundamental right to privacy enshrined in 
most European constitutions and in the jurisprudence of the higher courts.  
Accompanying and leading the global wave of antiterrorist security, the United 
Kingdom, along with the United States, introduced further provisions to combat 
terrorism. The Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) was the United 
Kingdom’s response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
The ATCSA came into force on 14 December 2001, amending the counter-
terrorism provisions already in force in the United Kingdom to provide the Government 
with increased powers to combat all forms of terrorism. 
The measures were intended to: 
• Cut off terrorist funding without a court order. 
 • Ensure that government departments and agencies can collect and share information 
required for countering the terrorist threat, including the interception of telephone 
conversations and electronic communications, with no limits and without a court order. 
• Ensure the security of the nuclear and aviation industries that now constitute classified 
information are protected and maintained by British intelligence services.385 
In relation to electronic surveillance, the United Kingdom significantly expanded 
the closed-circuit television network. By 2003, two and a half million, or roughly 10 % 
of the globe’s total number of CCTV’s operated on British soil. Donohue  explains that: 
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“The net effect is substantial: each person travelling through London is caught on 
film approximately 300 times per day. These devices do not just watch and record; 
some use facial recognition technology to scan the public against a database of 
persons sought by the state”. 386 
 
A particular consideration should be given to the paradigmatic case of the above 
mentioned ‘control orders’, i.e., administrative orde s aimed precisely at ensuring an up-
to-date database of terror suspects and their changes. Similarly, the recipients of these 
orders were also automatically subjected to the colle tion of evidence (such as DNA 
and fingerprints) that previously required a court order too. The Terrorism Act 2006 
allowed law enforcement authorities to immediately gather fingerprints and other DNA 
evidence deemed necessary to prevent future terrorist acts, even if there was no 
indication of such a threat. 
As Gallant points out, changes recently introduced in the British criminal justice 
system were unthinkable in terms of confidentiality of investigations.387 In a system 
accustomed to the highest levels of publicity in criminal proceedings compared to all 
other European systems, the changes introduced in 2006 regarding terrorism prevention 
legislation definitely reversed this trend, bringin the structure of British criminal 
procedure closer to its civil law counterparts, such as Portugal and Spain. Indeed, as 
with these two countries, also the UK law (Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Bill) went on to consider the possibility of keeping proceedings confidential 
until the trial in cases of terrorism or connection t  terrorist activities. 
In turn, in the USA, the USA Patriot Act made two important changes to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): it allowed applications where foreign 
intelligence constituted only ‘a significant purpose’ for an investigation, and it 
authorised the state to obtain tangible objects, such as computer disks and drives. Where 
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previously FISA applications requires that the gathering of foreign intelligence be the 
sole reason for search or surveillance, the new legislation allowed for applications when 
foreign intelligence provided a merely significant reason. The Attorney General quickly 
seized on this power and issued guidelines that said such authorisation could be sought 
even if the primary ends of the surveillance related to ordinary crime.  
In relation to the USA Patriot Act, the idea of a strong concentration and 
strengthening of Executive power must be once again emphasised. The strengthening of 
both, the Executive and Police power and its dimension are, according to Susana 
Bonetto, the main features of the antiterrorist reforms of the last decade.388 The 
strengthening of the internal security structure under Title I (sections 101 to 106) 
consists of the following measures389: 
a) Establishment of a Counterterrorism Fund (Sec. 101) which shall remain available to 
repay the Department of Justice for any costs incurred in connection with: 
- (1) re-establishing the operational capability of an office or facility that has been 
damaged or destroyed as the result of any domestic or international terrorism incident; 
- (2) providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international 
terrorism, including, without limitation, paying rewards in connection with these 
activities; and 
- (3) conducting terrorism threat assessments of Federal agencies and their facilities and 
reimburse any department or agency of the Federal Government for any costs incurred 
in connection with detaining in foreign countries individuals accused of acts of 
terrorism that violate the laws of the United States. 
b) Increased funding for the Technical Support Center at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. (Sec. 103). 
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c) Expansion of the National Electronic Crime Task Force Initiative (Sec. 105): "the 
Director of the United States Secret Service shall take appropriate actions to develop a 
national network of electronic crime task forces, based on the New York Electronic 
Crimes Task Force model, throughout the United States, for the purpose of preventing, 
detecting, and investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including potential 
terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment systems."  
d) New presidential authority (Sec. 106) to order the confiscation of property under 
IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) and TWEA (Trading with the 
Enemy Act). Section 106 amends Section 703 of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702), allowing the 
President to confiscate foreign property as retaliation of attacks perpetrated by foreign 
nationals. However, Section 106 goes further and amends IEEPA to authorise the 
President to freeze foreign property located in the United States or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, during any investigation under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, without having to wait for the conviction of the 
perpetrator of the crime or threat. In this context, the Government can confidentially 
submit any information provided by intelligence services on which the IEEPA relied on 
to decide to prosecute a given individual. This possibility does not confer or imply any 
right to judicial review of the decision, which has been highly disputed in the United 
States for directly violating the constitutional right of citizens to judicial review. 
e) Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in certain emergencies (Sec. 
104). The Department of Justice may request assistance during emergency situations 
previously provided for under the exceptions, i.e. emergency situations involving 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, (18 U.S.C. 2332e, 10 U.S.C.175a, 229E, 
831(e). This section amends section 18 U.S.C. 2332, including emergency situations 
with other weapons of mass destruction. 
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With regard to the confidentiality of investigations and the rights of 
communication of suspects, common law systems saw significant changes after the 
September 11 attacks.390 For example, while in the United Kingdom the maximum 
period for which a suspect could be held without communication and formal charge was 
extended from three to seven days in cases of terrorism,391 in the United States there 
was not even a prescribed maximum period of non-communication, leaving that 
decision to the US Attorney General or the special military tribunals when the suspect is 
detained under military jurisdiction, pursuant to the Patriot Act.392 To avoid the 
possibility of judicial appeal and the access to a lawyer by suspects of terrorist acts, the 
United States approved the Military Commission Act in 2006, establishing a special 
jurisdiction of military courts for suspects of terrorism, wherein traditional safeguards 
such as Habeas Corpus, the right to a lawyer in any stage of the procedure and the right 
to a judicial appeal were denied. Under this new detention system, suspects of terrorism 
could easily be forced to total isolation from the outside world for an almost unlimited 
amount out time.393 
Israel is an important case study in this matter. The Israeli state has always been, 
within the common law family, one of the great exceptions to the general principle of 
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publicity of proceedings. Indeed, in cases of investigations related to terrorism and 
organised crime which undermine national security, the whole proceedings should be 
conducted on a basis of strict confidentiality, so much so that the trial may be closed to 
the public under special circumstances. Similarly, it must not be forgotten that after 
2001, many of the trials relating to terrorism or criminal activities related to 
international organisations were conducted in special m litary tribunals394, in most cases 
without any publicity. 
 Israel has for many decades also resorted to military jurisdiction as way to 
bypass fundamental rights and civil jurisdiction rules. On the one hand, the concept of 
enemy combatant has been very broadly interpreted by police authorities, allowing 
detention in isolation of hundreds of suspects of terrorist activities. On the other, in 
2013, the Israeli Parliament approved the Anti-Terror Bill, which authorizes 
administrative detentions - without any judicial intervention – of terrorism suspects and 
specifically prohibits communication with the outside – even with a counselor – for a 
period of up to 30 days.395 
It should also be noted that the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom are 
not the only examples of this situation. Also New Zealand, for example, has 
considerably restricted the publicity of criminal proceedings related to international 
terrorism, which has drawn heavy criticism at home for being contrary to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Furthermore, there are the legal costs – or the direct mpact on the legal systems 
of most Western countries – identified by Donohue, especially in related to the rights to 
freedom, privacy and property in the American and British legal systems. According to 
Laura Donohue, the impact of counter-terrorism measures has been significant, in the 
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context of the right to privacy of citizens – with increased interference in 
telecommunications and electronic communications. This is a true legal cost of the war 
on terrorism and organised crime.396 
The report presented by the European Parliament in 2007, relating to EU Member 
States in the fight against terrorism, clearly shows that citizens’ privacy rights were the 
most severely affected. This is a consequence of authorities having been empowered to 
take surveillance measures that brink upon the personal life of citizens while only 
requiring administrative authorization to do so. 
This privacy relates not only to telephone conversations and electronic 
communications, but also to the protection of personal data and financial banking, 
clinical and other information, etc. In no other are  of social life were citizen’ rights so 
restricted in the last decade in the name of the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime. 
The consideration that has to be addressed is related not only to the phenomenon 
of terrorism in itself, but also to the perception that companies, as a whole, have of the 
phenomenon, its consequences and implications. As Furedi points out, the phenomenon 
of terrorism is, in contemporary society, an amplifier for people’s fears and 
insecurities.397 
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c) Freedom of expression and the limitations imposed by the law 
against terrorism, within the framework of freedom of 
expression and communication 
 
Although financial counterterrorist laws may be causing an incremental erosion 
of areas already subject to substantial government co rol or regulation,398 they have 
infringed on a broad range of rights – free speech, religion, privacy, and property – all 
important to the overall health of a democracy. They ave caused other political and 
humanitarian damage as well.  
A very interesting point in this respect is related o freedom of expression, of 
association and of artistic creation. Such values have long been protected and are 
considered part of the pillars of the common law lega  family, representing an extremely 
important element in the case law of countries like th  United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia. 
For example, the United Kingdom, which has been one of the most enthusiastic 
advocates of people’s freedom of expression at the United Nations General Assembly 
and the Security Council, is precisely one of the countries that have restricted this 
freedom in the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, it began to criminalise the 
discourse in defence of Islamic fundamentalism and of incitement to revolt against the 
United Kingdom, in spite of the lack of any concrete action; on the other hand, the mere 
fact of belonging to what the Executive considers to be a terrorist organisation or 
associated with any terrorist group, is punishable by up to five years imprisonment 
                                                
398 Kraft, Michael,  U. S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What, CRC Press, (2012) 
pp. 21 and following; Huckerby, Jayne, Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism, Routledge 
(2013)  p. 183 
 
 
 
 
178 
without the need for any actual action or activity. As Conde argues, the right to free 
expression was probably the most affected – along with the right to freedom – by the 
fight against terrorism waged by Western governments, and the one that most 
expressively led us to ask ourselves about how far we are willing to go to save our way 
of life.399 
This is one of the most relevant aspects of the constrai ts in terms of civil rights 
in the context of the fight against terrorism. Freedom of expression, whether in terms of 
the media, whether in terms of freedom of thought or academic freedom, has been 
severely affected by emerging antiterrorist legislation. Streb reviewed academic 
freedom in the post September 11 period and concluded that, under all possible 
analytical perspectives, a significant decrease of freedom had indeed occurred.400  
Walter also points out that the continued restrictions to the freedom of the press 
and freedom of thought, is one of the most serious consequences of the "war against 
terrorism" and suggests a compensation rationale, which he recommends be adopted by 
all Common Law jurisdictions:  
“Countries should compensate for the restriction of fundamental rights (such as the 
intimacy and privacy of communications) with a strengthening of freedom of 
expression and freedom to criticise, as a way to ensure democratic scrutiny of the 
executive branch.”401 
 
 The case of Israel has proved to be a perfect example in this regard. The Jewish 
state has frequently applied restrictions on freedom of expression and association, 
always in defence of national security and the fight against terrorism. From the closing 
down of public television channels to the censorship of certain radio programmes, the 
Israeli Government has, since its inception in 1948, frequently enacted highly restrictive 
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laws on freedom of expression and communication. The September 11 attacks 
undeniably worsened this trend, notably with the adoption, in 2005, of a legislative 
package specifically designed to combat “the dissemination and propaganda of 
terrorism”, which was passed in the Knesset by a 2/3 majority of members. Once again, 
this reflects the maintenance of a “permanent state of xception”, this time applied to 
the freedom of communication and expression.  
 In addition to the formal (or legal) aspects of these reforms, there is another 
aspect that should be highlighted, as Sousa Santos refer : the considerable restrictions to 
the freedom of information and to the freedom of the press402. Indeed, the eagerness of 
Governments to control information and to predict any type of threat, also led them to 
impose to the media, severe restrictions to their fr edom to inform the public. These 
limitations, as Sousa Santos furthermore stressed, have not always been enacted through 
specific laws or direct orders, but were disguised with economic or political pressure. In 
fact, the number of legal proceedings and criminal vestigations against the media, 
have not only increased exponentially- in particular in the United States– but also in the 
majority of accusatorial systems, heavy fines were applied to the boards of directors that 
violated secrecy rules of criminal investigations or that, in the understanding of 
Governments, made the apology of terrorist movements.  
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d) The doctrine of criminal equality & the development of marginal 
communities: the legal status of immigrants and the control of 
migration flows within the ‘war on terror’. 
 
The United States and the United Kingdom have been th  countries  most active 
in adopting anti terrorist measures, which cannot be disconnected to their close 
involvement in the war against terrorism403 and their military presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. These states acquired a certain perception that they were the real targets of 
terrorist groups and that their way of life was what truly mattered in the defence of 
freedom. 
In July 2006, the British Government presented its counter-terrorism strategy 
(“Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy”). This 
document points out the main causes of terrorism and c lls on internal cooperation, of 
State officials, representatives of the Muslim communities and the general public, to 
join efforts and work in partnership with the Government to manage and undertake 
effective action against this threat,404 stating that part of the counter-terrorism strategy is 
run by the British secret services and obviously contains information that cannot be 
disclosed to the Parliament and general public. A survey conducted by The Guardian 
newspaper, published in late December 2004, demonstrate  exactly that: 80% of the 
respondents who in the past supported the labour party declared themselves opposed to 
the British Prime Minister’s policy. 
This new context of “constant fear” and “sense of underground war” had 
significant consequences, particularly in the form of police action and in current 
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immigration and asylum policies. These two phenomena were particularly visible in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
With regard to the treatment of foreigners, Donohue shows that in the United 
States alone, more than 4,000 foreigners were detained without charge under executive 
orders. The FBI became a constant presence in mosques and in the headquarters of 
Muslim organisations, which was rare or virtually non-existent until 2001.405  
 These activities were carried out by police and other security forces often based 
on acquired perceptions of nationality, race or religion, as evidenced by the tragic fatal 
shooting of Brazilian national Jean Charles de Menez s at the Stockwell underground 
station in South London. On the other hand, the application of house arrest orders or any 
other form of detention for an indefinite period of time and without any sustainable 
evidence has been frequent, with devastating consequences in terms of the mental health 
of suspects and of society itself. As Donohue points out: 
“Beyond the anxiety about physical safety, indefinite detention’s long-term 
psychological effect on suspects can – even without c ercive interrogation – be 
devastating. The European Court of Human Rights brought these effects to public 
notice in Ireland v. United Kingdom. But the problem was not limited to the 
treatment of Northern Ireland detainees. Many people subject to detention and then 
control orders in United Kingdom after September 11 became severally mentally 
disturbed. Mahmoud Abu Rideh, for instance, one of the first post 9-11 detainees, 
was transferred to Broadmorr psychiatric hospital. By March 2005, 4 of the 10 
placed under control orders were suffering from acute psychiatric or other medical 
problems”. 406  
 
In turn, Amnesty International, the European Parliament and many other 
important political actors, including The UK Government's independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew, have heavily criticised the application of 
these restrictive measures implemented by the United Kingdom, seeking to demonstrate 
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the negative psychological impact they are having o civil society which, through these 
actions, raises fear of new and more deadly terrorist attacks.407 
The so-called 'criminal law of the enemy' conceptualised by Gunther Jakobs 
deserves special mention.408 This is a point emphasised by Donohue particularly when 
considering that: 
 “Criminal law systems after September 11 in countries like the United Kingdom 
and the United States have now incorporated some obvious objectives such as the 
repression of certain specific communities as well as their control, with the purpose 
of fighting transnational terrorism”409 
 
A true foreigners’ criminal law in the words of Professor Guedes Valente, to the 
extent that the criminal law system takes on the very specific purpose of protecting the 
national community in view of external threats. 410 
Among the areas in which more restrictions were imposed on personal rights have 
been precisely citizenship and immigration laws. With the conviction that a great deal of 
terrorist attacks were and are planned beyond theirborders and by ‘foreigners’, British 
and the United States governments adopted significat restrictions to the entry of 
foreigners in their territories, regardless of the academic or commercial nature of such 
mobility. In effect, those governments strongly engaged in modifying their respective 
immigration laws in order to control and prevent the mobility of possible suspects of 
terrorist activities.  
The USA Patriot Act for instance produced significant impact on immigration as 
it modified immigration law, increasing the ability of federal authorities to prevent 
foreign terrorists from entering the US, to detain foreign terrorist suspects, to deport 
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foreign terrorists, to mitigate the adverse immigration consequences for the foreign 
victims of September 11, and authorised appropriations to enhance the capacity of 
immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence agenci s to more effectively respond to 
the threats of terrorism.  
As Guild states, based on statistics of recent attacks, the British and the United 
States governments believe that by reducing the entry of foreigners from some countries 
– even when the purpose is to study or to make investm nts – they will strengthen their 
surveillance and control capacity of potential terrorists.411 
Finally, the concept of the  'enemy's criminal law’ brought about yet another 
worrying consequence to countries like the United States and England, as Munoz 
emphasises: a very significant feeling of distrust between the various racial, religious or 
ethnic communities.412 Indeed, the antiterrorist reforms adopted by the United States 
and the United Kingdom (and already a few years ago by Israel) have created a major 
division between communities, with significant consequences to the cultural, social and 
economical-financial spheres. In a way, as Dershowitz pointed out, the 'enemy' scattered 
across societies, rooted itself in various communities and constitutes a new problem for 
democratic constitutional States, in terms of confidence and pluralism.413 
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e) The creation of new criminal offences & the development of the 
framework of a criminal policy to fight terrorism a nd organised 
crime 
 
There is another phenomenon impossible to ignore in the context of the 
legislative developments of the last decade414 that is closely related to the limitations 
imposed on the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms: the creation of a new set of crimes 
and criminal offenses directly or indirectly related to terrorism. This phenomenon seems 
to be cross-cutting to multiple accusatorial system.415  
The case of the new offence, approved by the London G vernment in the 
immediate aftermath of the 7 July 2005 bombings – the offence of glorification of 
terrorism – clearly reflects the climate of pressure, fear and “exceptional context” we 
mentioned earlier. According to this new antiterrorism legislation – passed by the 
British Parliament with 315 affirmative votes against 277 negative votes – people who 
publicly defend terrorist acts or support terrorist f gures or groups, even without any 
specific activity or form of incitement, can be charged with the offence of “glorification 
of terrorism. As Jakobs points out, with this law, the borderline between a criminal law 
of the fact and a criminal law of the perpetrator is extremely thin. 
The expression “glorification of terrorism” which relates to what Barendt has 
classified as “acts, at least where members of the public would reasonably infer that 
they should emulate them”,416 is of special concern as it raises serious questions 
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regarding restrictions of freedom of expression in light of the inaccuracy and the almost 
infinite ways it can take form. The criminalisation f such a vague conduct that can be 
open to multiple interpretations, (such as publishing a report considering a suicide 
bomber a role model, suggesting one responsible for a te rorist attack should receive a 
commendation, or sharing a video of terrorist propaganda on a social media webpage) 
seems to be contrary to the interpretation that has been made by the European 
Convention on Human Rights by the English courts and the European Court of 
Justice.417  
The criminalisation of vague conducts has been targe ed elsewhere by upholding 
that the adherence to the principle of legality requires criminal laws to be intelligible.418 
In the United States for instance the Void-for-Vagueness doctrine requires that “a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement”419 
                                                
417 The House of Lords has upheld that offences must be clearly defined in law (SW and CR v United 
Kingdom), and that no norm can be regarded as a law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to foresee, the consequences that his actions may incur in (Sunday Times v United 
Kingdom (1979); furthermore it has stated that “no one should be punished for any act which was not 
clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act ws done” in Clark, R v [2003] EWCA Crim 991 (04 
April 2003);  
418 As Francis Bacon exemplified: 'For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself 
to the battle? So if the law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore t  
warn before it strikes … Let there be no authority to shed blood; nor let sentence be pronounced in any 
court upon cases, except according to a known and certain law … Nor should a man be deprived of his 
life, who did not first know that he was risking it.' (Quoted in Coquillette, Francis Bacon pp 244 and248, 
from Aphorism 8 and Aphorism 39 - A Treatise on Universal Justice, Stanford University Press, 1992). 
419 The US Supreme Court argued, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), that “a statute may be 
so vague or so threatening to constitutionally-protected activity that it can be pronounced wholly 
unconstitutional, 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct 
is forbidden by the statute,' it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, it makes criminal 
activities that by modern standards are normally innocent, and it places almost unfettered discretion in the 
hands of the police” ( http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=405&invol=156, 
accessed July 2013); also, in Kolender v. Lawson (1983) the Supreme Court stated that “the law must 
provide explicit standards so that those who enforce and apply the law do not do so in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory fashion (…) the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage rbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”( 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=461&invol=352, accessed July 2013); 
finally in City of Chicago v. Morales (1997) “[t]he statute in effect is a catchall prohibition which would 
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In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights ha decided, in more than 
one occasion, on the illegal nature of the high degre  of indeterminacy of some of the 
crimes defined under British law, as well as the excessive powers given to police 
authorities (for example related to the use and destruction of suspects’ DNA), in regard 
to European Community norms,.420 
As Borowitz argues, the introduction of this new criminal category – 
glorification of terrorism – is open to multiple interpretations and understandings from 
the point of view of the evolution of English criminal law. In any case, it should be 
noted that it also represents a society dominated by fear, panic and, to some extent, by 
the inevitable excesses that have been committed in the fight against terrorism.421 
These excesses – and this climate of panic not only in civil society but also 
within the security forces themselves – are very clear in the examples of the application 
of antiterrorist laws presented to the ICJ Panel of Eminent Jurists on Terrorism, 
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, in April 2006.422  
In no other country has the concept of terrorism been so broadened and adapted to 
the Government’s criminal policies than in the United Kingdom.423 In fact, this concept 
had been opened up and broadened to such an extent that, in 2005, the British 
Parliament found it extremely difficult draw the line between common crime and 
terrorist crime in the global war on terrorism. 
                                                                                                                                    
allow the courts to say who could and could not be rightfully detained. An enactment may be attacked on 
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The 2000 Terrorism Act covers an extremely wide range of terrorism-related 
offences considered as “terrorist activity”:  
• Disclosure of information that may harm a terrorist investigation or interference with 
material that may be relevant to it (Section 39). 
• Receiving, providing or inviting others to training, inside or outside the UK, relating to 
firearms, explosives and radioactive materials or weapons (Section 54). 
• Directing an organisation which is concerned with the commission of acts of 
terrorism. (section 56). 
• Possession of an article for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism (Section 57). 
• Collecting or recording information of a kind likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or possessing a document or record 
containing information of that kind (Section 58). 
• Incitement of another to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the UK, 
where that act would constitute one of the following offences within the UK: murder, 
wounding with intent, poisoning, explosive offences, ndangering life by damaging 
property (Section 59).424 
• The failure to disclose information that may help prevent an act of terrorism or may 
assist in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a person involved in 
the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism (Section 38B, 
introduced by Article 117 of the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act). 
The 2000 Terrorism Act thus covers an extremely wide range of terrorism-
related offences considered as “terrorist activity”. The manner in which those threats are 
dealt with puts pressure upon traditional principles of judicial proceedings. So for 
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example, the protection of the right to privacy can been diminished through the 
widespread use of wiretapping, and the right to freedom restricted by the increased use 
of preventive detention.  
The following situations deserve special mention:425 
- more than 600 people, including an 82-year-old activist, were detained during the 
British Labour Party Conference; 
- a citizen was detained while walking on a bicycle path in Dundee; 
- an 11-year-old girl was detained and searched while protesting against the war in 
front of a Royal Air Force base; 
- in 2005, an 80-year-old Royal Air Force veteran was detained for wearing an anti-
Tony Blair T-shirt; 
- a 23-year-old student was detained, in 2005, while taking photographs of the M3 
motorway to complete his thesis on Web design. 
Israel has also created and approved new criminal offenses in relation to the terrorist 
threat. Indeed, while the United Kingdom created the specific offence of “glorification 
of terrorism”, Israel added two specific offences,426 one in the 1990s and the other in 
2005: the offence of “inciting religious hatred against Jews” and the offence of 
“supporting international terrorism”. It is this last point that causes much controversy: 
while the first offence had a residual application and was mainly addressed to radical 
Islamic activists, the second served to silence much of Israeli criticism and exert a 
strong legal pressure on the media. Israeli research r and journalist Yair Lapid called 
this law “antiterrorism censorship law”.427 
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3. The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on the 
Liberal and Democratic Nature of the Constitutional 
Rule of Law 
 
 After analysing the main trends of the antiterrorist reforms in systems of 
accusatorial nature, it becomes essential to sumarise some conclusions in relation to the 
impact of those changes in the structure of the democratic State based on the rule of law 
and its fundamental principles. Can we speak of a change in the structure of the rule of 
law in accusatorial systems? Is this, paraphrasing Leogomez, a paradigm shift from a 
liberal State to a semi-authoritarian State? Or should we, on the other hand, be speaking 
of a new balance between security and fundamental rights?428 
 Since the emergence of the first antiterrorism measures adopted in the United 
States after 9/11, the growing imbalance between th need for community safety and the 
guarantee of fundamental rights of citizens has becom  more and more apparent. 
Indeed, as soon as the Presidential Declaration No. 7463 of September 14, 2001 (which 
declared a state of emergency and removed a number of individual liberties to the 
detriment of the police authorities) and the USA Patriot Act were approved, the 
security-focused nature of these measures became evid nt. 
 In this sense, some important American scholars, including Cassel and 
Dworkin,429 as well as some international institutions like thUN, strongly appealed to 
not lose sight of the balance between the necessary measures to fight terrorism and 
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some of citizens’ fundamental guarantees. Likewise, it became apparent that the fight 
against international terrorism would entail major sacrifices and, as mentioned by 
Donohue significant costs, especially in terms of the nature of Constitutional States and 
of the Rule of Law as well as in terms of the fundamental rights of liberal modern 
States. 
The analysis of the impact of these measures in terms of the nature of democratic 
constitutional States must therefore be made according to three key topics: 
a) Measures to fight terrorism and fundamental rights: a difficult balance 
b) The crisis of the proportionality principle 
c) The concepts of security and freedom within emerging models of criminal justice 
As already made clear in the introduction to this chapter, criminal procedure laws 
were probably the elements that underwent most changes under the antiterrorism 
reforms adopted in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Torres said that 
perhaps at no time in history has the paradigm shift in criminal justice been so intense 
and clear due to a single event.430 As a result, in no other area was the restriction of 
citizens’ fundamental rights and guarantees vis-à-vis the power of the state to 
investigate and punish their crimes more apparent.  
 There is consensus among American and European scholars that the USA Patriot 
Act was a severe setback in the development of human rights protection in U.S. 
legislation and case law.431 The primary goal – expressly stated in the first section of the 
USA Patriot Act – was the improvement of internal security,432 which was to be 
achieved through a wide range of specific measures in the fields of communications, 
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finance and cooperation between institutions, especially the criminal police authorities, 
intelligence agencies and military services. 
The case of the United States seems to be the one that best represents the changes 
undergone by the criminal procedure law in the fight against terrorism. The legal 
instruments proposed by President George W. Bush and p ssed by the U.S. Congress – 
including the USA Patriot Act – clearly show to what extent criminal justice systems 
have acquired a new configuration.433 While drawing these conclusions, it is important 
to make a detailed analysis of the USA Patriot Act 2001, because it faithfully represents 
the new difficult balance between fundamental rights and security and the idea of the 
new security-focused State associated with the fight a ainst terrorism. 
The USA Patriot Act 2001 is an acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”. The 
Patriot Act434 is part of the U.S. Congress’ response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 
The Law referred to as “Patriot Act” is the result of the merger of two previous 
bills and similar laws, Senate Bill S.151079, passed on 11 October 2001, and the H.R. 
297580 bill, passed by the Bush Administration on 12 October, amending some 
expressions of the H. R. 310881 bill. 
After having informally resolved their differences, the Bush Administration issued 
the final version of the Law on 24 October, which was passed by the Senate on 25 
October and signed by the President on 26 October 2001. 
It could be stated that the Patriot Act is structured as a tree system, i.e. starting 
from a common root, which aims to increase national security, it spreads its branches in 
several directions, causing changes in almost all legal instruments governing strategic 
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areas of national security (homeland security) and some aspects of international 
security, but for the purpose of protecting the borders and territory of the United States. 
It reorganised the sensitive areas of civil liberties and, in particular, changed the 
surveillance system, expanding and admitting new techniques and/or application of 
devices to operate in this sector, implying greater uthority for the FBI (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation) and, at least temporarily, authorising it to gather and share information 
by intercepting wire and electronic communications in the name of national security. As 
a result, law enforcement and intelligence officers now have wide powers to detain 
“terror suspects” – without any legal definition ofthis concept – whether they are 
foreigners or U.S. citizens. 
The Patriot Act amends federal money laundering laws,435 particularly those 
involving overseas financial activities, creates new federal crimes,436 increases the 
penalties for existing federal crimes, and adjusts exi ting federal criminal procedures, 
particularly with respect to acts of terrorism. 
However, in terms of systematisation and because it is a necessarily broad 
overview, this analysis of the Patriot Act should develop under two key points of 
analysis: 
 
I – On the one hand, the study of rules and regulations under the Patriot Act, which, by 
their very nature, introduced profound changes in limine to the U.S. legal system after 
September 11, and also led to the amendment of several legal instruments regulating 
pressing issues that had to be collaterally and indirectly updated or adjusted in order to 
meet the goal of improving security, depending on the achievement of the central 
purpose of the Patriot Act: to strengthen America ag inst Terrorism. 
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II – On the other hand, the study of the meaning (i.e. the intensity of the effects 
produced) of the synaptic response caused by the tig tening and proliferation of security 
measures in the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens, the so-called “civil 
liberties”.437 In turn, the United Kingdom also saw a significant shift in the paradigm of 
its criminal justice system and human rights protection, as a direct effect of the 
September 11 attacks and the London bombings of 7 July 2005.438 
The phenomenon of terrorism in the United Kingdom is neither new nor uniform in its 
manifestations. On the contrary, the different threats that have been made have changed 
the type of antiterrorism measures adopted by the Government. As stated by Struye: 
 “A fundamental concept seems seriously reviving: the concept of opponent, the 
threat of a imminent danger to our free society. A permanent and powerful enemy. 
This notion is nowadays changing: who is the enemy? What is the most preeminent 
risk? The terrorism and the terrorists!”439 
 
It can be said that the fight against terrorism in the United Kingdom has gone 
through three different stages, which basically correspond to three types of causal 
impulses: 
- The first stage corresponds to the antiterrorism measures designed to combat internal 
or domestic terrorism, characterised primarily by the Northern Ireland conflict.440 
- The second stage was triggered by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, which 
forced the Government to find measures that, in addition to combating terrorism, would 
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prevent possible attacks, both on British soil and gainst British citizens around the 
world, and in which the perpetrator of the threat ws briefly identified as “al-Qaeda” 
and the Taliban. 
- The third stage corresponds to the 7 July 2005 bombings, which, by their unexpected 
and serious nature, laid bare many flaws in the security system of the British 
Government and, in addition, uncovered new unsuspected home-grown and suicidal 
foes. The 7 July (and 26 July 2005) bombings illustrated how the antiterrorism security 
measures acquire repressive role, but are inadequate for prevention, because they 
contribute to the development and radicalisation of potential young terrorists.441 
Since 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term strategy for countering 
international terrorism and extremists who support it, implementing a programme with 
short-term and long-term goals at local, national and international level, known within 
the Government as “CONTEST”, which is divided into four main pillars known as the 
“Four P’s”: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare: 
• Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals; 
• Pursuing terrorists and those who sponsor them; 
• Protecting the public, key national services, andUK interests overseas; and 
• Preparing for the consequences. 
The UK’s antiterrorist policies have been strongly criticized by international 
human rights organizations for their impact in humanitarian affairs but also for 
undermining the country’s democratic spirit. As Held observes, the effects of the past 
decade’s antiterrorist policies in the UK have had a strong negative impact which goes 
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beyond the restriction of fundamental rights, but also point to a weakening of the British 
parliamentary structure.442 
Román also says: 
“The legal battle for UK courts to admit evidence obtained under torture, whenever 
it had not been practiced by British agents, is the most eloquent demonstration of 
the hypocrisy and backward thinking to be imposed upon one of the oldest 
democracies in the world.  
In the heat of British and American antiterrorist policies and of circumstantial 
alliances, a new climate of permissiveness was created. Abusive governments 
worldwide enacted laws that further restrict citizen’s rights and which are used to 
persecute, silence or eliminate political dissidence or discordant minorities, as 
could be seen in Russia, China, India or Uzbekistan.”443 
 
Referring to the 7 July 2005 bombings, Prof. Gearty, despite being more restrained than 
Donohue, warns of the danger of a “short-circuit debat ”,444 i.e. the lack of debate on the 
counter-terrorism measures adopted. He suggests that:  
“The significance of the attacks in London on 7 July depends on what happens 
next. (...) It is devotedly to be hoped that the restrained and intelligent sense of 
critical distance shown by the Prime Minister in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombings is sustained in the months to come”. 445 
 
This could pose a serious risk as the Government would not discuss properly and 
thoroughly the contentious issues raised by those attacks, such as biometric identity 
cards and the new antiterrorism laws applicable to the events of 7 July. 
Although Gearty recognises that it is particularly difficult to reason 
dispassionately about these antiterrorism laws in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, he 
argues that: 
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“ It is exceptionally difficult to oppose such laws in an atmosphere that is so 
dominated by the politics both of the last atrocity and of the atrocity still to come, 
with past and future horror combining to drive out reasoned debate. However, in 
spite of all the propaganda surrounding them, terrorism laws in themselves do not 
prevent terrorism any better than the ordinary criminal law, properly enforced by 
diligent police action. What they do achieve is thecr ation of a climate of fear in 
which considerations of national security come to dominate and due process and 
political freedom move to the margins of our democrati  culture, eventually 
dragging democracy itself onto the sidelines with them. There is already evidence 
of the terrorism laws of recent years and in particular the prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 having an effect of this sort.446 
 
 It is imperative to note that the reforms undertaken in the last decade under the 
criminal procedure law have not only affected the form of the criminal justice system, 
but also the very structure of the democratic rule of law as we know it. 
Furthermore, in no other area is it so clear that tere is such a separation, a 
distinction between the various stages of the criminal justice process,447 which was 
initially characterised by an excessive and almost exclusive power of public authorities 
and, subsequently, by a balance (although unstable) between the state and those 
suspected of having committed the crimes in question. 
The principle of proportionality, one of the main pillars of modern criminal 
procedure, has been significantly rethought so as to allow the introduction of highly 
restrictive measures of the fundamental rights of citizens at a very early stage of the 
proceedings, even when there has been no charge or conviction. 
Another factor that should be taken into consideration is the crisis of the principle 
of proportionality, a fundamental value – inherited from the political liberalism of the 
late 18th and 19th centuries – of most criminal justice systems. Gauer s ggests that: 
“Proportionality aims to ensure that the system’s preventive or punitive measures 
are applied with the necessary dose and intensity, without undermining the 
fundamental rights of citizens. Basically, the principle of proportionality in 
criminal law advocates that criminal measures should be appropriate and 
                                                
446 Maria Portela, Irene, supra note 393 at 526-534 
447 This idea will be specifically analysed on the last chapter of this thesis.  
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proportionate to the objectives to be achieved, implying a balancing and weighting 
of interests.”448 
 
Even though it is historically undisputed that the principle of proportionality is 
one of the fundamental imprints of liberal systems with the clear objective of limiting 
the Executives’ actions, it should be noted that the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights has contributed to the reconstruction of its meaning. As McBride 
states, even though it is absent from the formal text of the European Convention, the 
principle of proportionality has been an essential element in the enforcement of human 
rights, namely when it relates to their restriction and to the enforcement of human rights 
in emergency or insatiability situations. The same author also notes that at the same 
time, the construction of the principle of proportinality has been carried out in an 
intelligent way by the European Court, giving a rational and consistent reading of the 
most threatened rights of our time, such as the right to freedom, to privacy, to property 
and to a defense in a court of law.449 
As Costa Pinto notes, the crisis of the principle of proportionality can only be 
understood in connection to the theoretical framework specifically assessed in chapter 
II.450 In truth, the crisis of the proportionality principle in the justice systems has had 
special repercussion in the early stages of criminal proceedings, as a direct result of the 
reinforcement of police powers and of investigation, surveillance and control methods. 
Costa Pinto develops this idea concluding that "the crisis of the main constitutional 
principles must be understood in the theoretical frmework of the differentiated 
                                                
448 Gauer, Ruth, Criminologia e sistemas jurídico-penais contemporâneos, EDIPUCRS (2008), p. 238 
449 McBride, Jeremy, “Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights” in The Principle 
of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe,  Hart Publishing (1999) pp. 23 and following. 
450 Costa Pinto, Frederico Lacerda, Direito Processual Penal, AAFDL, Lisboa (2010), p. 56 
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evolution of criminal justice systems after the terrorist attacks of 2001” [the 
‘bifurcation’ of criminal justice system]. 451 
How does this affect the liberal nature of the modern state? In order to understand 
the impact of such changes it should be questioned what characterises the liberal nature 
of the modern state? 
This question, posed by the likes of John Rawls or Stanley Benn (1982), has not 
received a straightforward answer, but all agree in highlighting two aspects of the rule 
of law: freedom as a primary and universal rule (both in the state-citizen relationship 
and in the horizontal relationship between citizens) and the organisation of the state’s 
power structure to protect citizens’ freedom.452 
However, the constitutional rules of most Western countries regarding the 
protection of citizens’ freedom have not changed in the last decade. Indeed, an idea 
prevailed in most countries that this is an “exceptional” context and that the Basic Law 
should not be amended in times of crisis. Therefore, from a strictly legal point of view, 
we cannot speak of a change in the constitutional structure of the state.453 We are 
probably dealing with a case of appearance versus reality, and while the new context 
and the new Executive functions within the fight against terrorism suggest otherwise, 
we cannot - at least not legally – be speaking of amutation in the nature and in the 
constitutional structure of the State. 
                                                
451 Ibid. at, p. 93 
452 Rawls, John, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority." In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, III  , University of Utah Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
(1982), pp. 1–87 
453 The main point in this argument is that we cannot speak of a shift in the structure or nature of 
constitutional state as a consequence of legal reforms directed against terrorism and oganized 
transnational crime. Rather than the fundamental values and principles inherent to the Rule of Law, what 
has effectively changed, as Jorge Miranda points ou, is the interpretation and enforcement of laws. See 
Miranda, Jorge, Escritos vários sobre direitos fundamentais, Principia ed., Lisboa (2006) p. 501 
 
 
 
 
199 
On the other hand, although criminal justice system have been changed and 
severe restrictions have been imposed on the fundament l rights of citizens in the pre-
trial investigation stage, such restrictions were, at least according to legislators, offset 
by adding and strengthening the rights in subsequent stage of the criminal proceedings. 
Once again it is possible to observe here the specific logic of the 'bifurcation' of 
the criminal justice system, explained in chapter II. In spite of the restrictions in the 
early stages of the proceedings, the reforms that were undertaken created several 
compensation mechanisms to those restrictions of fundamental rights and reinforcement 
of the executive powers. Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the 
theoretical framework of the 'bifurcation' of the criminal justice system, analysed in 
chapter II, is absolutely critical to understand the antiterrorist measures adopted by the 
States during the last decade. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a fundamental change, but a new balance between 
freedom and security, between citizens’ rights and the state’s duties to protect collective 
interests. 
Consequently, speaking of a mutation in the nature of the state over the last 
decade seems to be, in every sense, an excessively vague statement, with small 
scholastic support from an academic point of view. What really needs to be analysed is 
the influence of the legislative changes that have occurred in the interpretation and 
application of the law by the courts, a scenario that is familiar in civil law and common 
law systems.454  
It is for this reason that the impact of counter-ter orism measures on the liberal 
and democratic nature of the constitutional rule of law should be analysed. The clear 
restriction on fundamental rights and the growing extension of police and government 
                                                
454 United Nations, Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism, United Nations Publications 
(2010)  p. 9 
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powers in crime prevention, control and surveillance have led to a new interpretation 
and application of the fundamental rules in force in most Western constitutions. Indeed, 
the legal hermeneutics should seek a new balance between freedom and security,455 
between fundamental rights and state powers, in a context outside of the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime. This balance must be found, however, within the liberal 
rule of law and not outside of it. 
Behind the creation of temporary solutions to contain and prevent terrorist threats 
in the short term we have found dangerous and frail solutions. On the one hand those 
solutions have questioned the principles and values of constitutional states which are 
forced to respond using anti-crisis mechanism to stike a balance and maintain their 
identity. On the other hand such solutions come at he vy price as they infringe upon 
human rights and fundamental values without ensuring they are efective or even 
succesful. This lack of balance, beyond being potentially counterproductive when 
fighting terrorism, becomes harmful to the very essence of accusatorial systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
455 E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, The balance between freedom and 
security in the response by the European Union and its member states to the terrorist threats, Official 
Publications of the European Communities (2003), pp. 21 – 5 
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CHAPTER V  
Conclusion –  
The emerging ‘Bifurcation’ of Criminal 
Justice System and Convergence as between 
Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Systems 
 
 
 
The criminal justice system is not a structure which has been planned as a system456 
Andrew Ashworth 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
456 Asworth, Andrew, Setencing and Criminal Justice, Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 71 
 
 
202 
 
Summary and general overview 
 
Following on from this differential analysis of inquisitorial and accusatorial 
systems, it is time to draw some important conclusion  from the research undertaken. 
Before, however, it is important to look at what has been discussed so far in regards to 
the initial research questions. 
Three research questions were layed out in chapter I. The analysis that followed 
these sought to provide solid and scientifically grounded answers, namely in regard to a 
specific set of legal systems (Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and Israel): 
- whether  the antiterrorist reforms of the past deca  caused a division between the 
preliminary phases of criminal proceedings and the trial stages among systems of 
criminal justice (strongly restricting fundamental rights in the first stages and 
developing compensation measures in the second).  
- whether the evolution of the systems of criminal justice throughout the last decade 
came closer together and towards a greater convergence as a result of States’ responses 
to the new threats posed by global terrorism. 
- understand the true impact and the associated costs of these measures on the liberal 
nature of the rule of law in democratic states and define the extent of such changes in 
regard to the fundamental principles and the framework of constitutional values within 
these States. 
To answer such questions it was imperative to analyse and characterize this 
“new threat” that was set upon States and which they w re required to address in order 
to provide adequate protection to their citizens and to their legal and social order. In 
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chapter II the phenomenon of “global terrorism” was characterized and analysed as a 
form of terrorism built upon objectives of global destruction, using highly sophisticated 
methods, mobility and cooperation with common criminal networks. 
In chapters III and IV the antiterrorist measures adopted by the jurisdictions 
choosen for analysis were scrutinized in relation t the characteristics of the global 
terrorist threat as seen in chapter II. Both chapters analysed the most relevant 
antiterrorist measures of the past decade –regarding espectively common law and civil 
systems – with special attention to topics such as pre-trial detention and the right to 
freedom; new mechanisms of extra-judicial control of c mmunications and freedom of 
expression; the marginalization of certain communities and the criminal low of the 
enemy; and also the advent of new criminal offenses a sociated with the phenomenon of 
global terrorism. 
It is undeniable that we are facing a new global threat. As Prezelj refers it is the 
most complex, disseminated and concealed threat that the world has faced in the last 
two centuries.457 This new threat has, as mentioned in chapter II, features that are 
intrinsically linked to the phenomenon of globalisat on and to the internationalisation of 
criminal networks458, which forced nations to a response that would encompass not only 
their territories and interests, but the 'international space' of interests. 
In chapters III and IV, we went on to list the differentiated responses that some nations 
– Portugal , Spain, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States of America -  
designed and produced to specifically address the problem of global terrorism.  
                                                
457 Prezelj, Iztok, The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans, IOS 
Press, (2008), p. 17 
458 Andreopoulos, George, Policing Across Borders: Law Enforcement Networks and the Challenges of 
Crime Control, Springer (2012), pp. 56 - 80 
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The compared analysis of the States’ different respon es allow us to envisage an 
evolution in terms of convergence between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. It will 
be observed the manner and the scope of this convergence further along.  
Incidentally, the comparative analysis in chapters III and IV, demonstrates clearly that 
the legislative responses designed by nations have significant similar characteristics, 
despite the fundamental differences of the respectiv  riminal justice systems, such as:  
-increasing periods of pre-trial detention and the considerable surge in its use; 
-the increase of arrests and deprivation of liberty that are beyond judicial scrutiny; 
-the increased control of telecommunications and electronic communications, through 
highly intrusive and invasive techniques to the citizens’ right to privacy; 
-the significant increase of powers assigned to the bodies of criminal police in terms of 
policies for the prevention and repression of organised crime; 
-control and repression systems especially designed a d targeted at specific nationality 
or religious groups (the enemy’s criminal law as referred to by Gunther Jakobs). 
How do the previously studied measures have implications for the current 
criminal justice model? To what extent can we talk about a new characterisation of the 
criminal justice systems, as a result of the fight against international terrorism? 
This is a reflection that we necessarily have to make t this point in time. There is no 
doubt that in the last decade, criminal justice system  have suffered some of their 
biggest changes of the last century, as concluded by Prezelj.  
However with the detailed analysis of the main changes in the models of criminal 
justice systems459, some conclusions become immediately apparent: the hardening of 
criminal policies and the considerable reduction of the rights of suspects in the pre-trial 
stage. Indeed, as Sousa Santos pointed out, the restrictions to fundamental rights in 
                                                
459 Prezelj, Iztok, supra note 404 at 56 - 62  
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criminal proceedings that have been approved through t the last decade, are extremely 
significant460: the considerable increase of custodial measures pending the trial, the 
obtaining of evidence through measures that are highly nvasive to privacy, and in many 
instances offensive to human dignity itself (such as the use of torture techniques, 
including waterboarding).461 These legislative reforms are part of a design aimed at 
tempering the pre-trial procedural stage, through si nificant restrictions to the rights of 
suspects and a considerable increase in the powers legally assigned to police authorities 
and to the public prosecutors. As Loaves refers, the main concern for criminal justice 
systems is now the prevention of terrorism and organised crime, and not anymore the 
guarantee of the fundamental rights of suspects and victims. 462 
The legal system of the United Kingdom is, in this re pect, paradigmatic. The reforms 
regarding pre-trial detentions, the obtaining of evid nce and measures for the police and 
administrative control of suspects, were so significant that the country became much 
more similar to Spain, Portugal or Germany than to the other countries of the 
Commonwealth.463 
Under this perspective another evident aspect of the legislative reforms instigated by 
the terrorist phenomenon stands out: the clear approximation between two traditionally 
distinct criminal justice models (the so called models of accusatorial and inquisitorial 
nature).464 
This approach came about for two reasons: on the one ha d, in the case of accusatorial 
systems, the need to strengthen the prevention of terrorist acts and to ease the social 
                                                
460 Sousa Santos, Boaventura, supra note 56 at 51 
461 Sousa Santos, Boaventura, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, a d 
Emancipation, Cambridge University Press (2002), pp. 34 - 39 
462 Nacos, Brigitte L., Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion, University of 
Chicago Press, Jun 1, 2011 p. 43 
463 Figueiredo Dias, Jorge de, XXV anos de jurisprudência constitucional portuguesa:  
e discursos proferidos por suas Excelências o Presidente da República e o Presidente do Tribunal 
Constitucional, na sessão solene do XXV aniversário : C lóquio comemorativo do XXV aniversário do 
Tribunal Constitucional, (24 e 25 de Outubro de 2008), Coimbra Editora (2009), pp., 135 - 189 
464 Dammer, Harry,  Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, 5th ed., Cengage Learning, (2013) p. 149 
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panic which spread throughout all social sectors demanding measures typically used in 
other systems, such as the significant increase of pre-trial detentions or the creation of 
mechanisms for the administrative and police control of suspects that didn’t require any 
judicial authorisation. On the other hand, in the case of inquisitorial systems, the need to 
create mechanisms that could compensate the highly restrictive legislative measures to 
the freedom and privacy of citizens, forced some countries to adopt (as in the case of 
Portugal) measures belonging to the Anglo-Saxon system, in particular the 
reinforcement of judicial remedies and the Habeas Corpus principle.465  
However, the detailed analysis of counter-terrorism measures in chapters III and 
IV and the subsequent contextualization in the corresponding legal system, suggests an 
important modification of criminal justice systems with regard to their definition in the 
main legal literature. This idea is expressed in the visible unbalance within the justice 
systems themselves (between the pre-trial stage and the following stages) but also in the 
previously mentioned trend of rapprochement between inquisitorial and accusatorial 
systems. This idea of modification of the criminal justice system has gradually gained 
ground within the legal literature and must be analysed in detail.466  
What might be suggested is that criminal justice systems, whether inquisitorial or 
accusatorial, have a predisposition to lose their structural unity and are gradually 
becoming divided into two distinct blocks: a first tage in which the rights of the 
suspects are practically nullified (or extremely rest icted) on the basis of the powers and 
prerogatives of administrative and police authorities; and a second stage in which 
suspects are empowered and equipped with various instruments for the defence of their 
rights and the careful assessment of the evidences obtained by the prosecution, as well 
as a large set of diversified resources that allow them to correct any mistakes that were 
                                                
465 Beckam, James, upra note 366 at 122 - 123 
466 Kraska, Peter, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed 
Forces and the Police, UPNE (2001), pp. 120 and following 
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made in the first stage of the process (for example, th  system of judicial appeals). 
Beleza states that: 
 “ In a certain way, legislators have created a number of mechanisms to compensate 
for the reduced or annihilated rights during the first stage of the process, regarding 
the taking of evidence or even concerning the deprivation of liberty of suspects 
which clearly violates the principle of the presumption of innocence.” 467 
 
We have called this imbalance, the 'bifurcation of criminal justice models'. The 
idea of bifurcation embodies an emerging and notorius reality within the criminal 
justice systems after 9/11: an increasing separation, in legal terms, between the pre-trial 
stage and the subsequent stages, allowing for the division of the criminal process in two 
significantly distinct stages, in terms of the applicable standards and principles. 
 This bifurcation of criminal justice systems is a trend that became apparent in 
chapters III and IV, showing a stage I (pre-trial) tending to be restrictive when it comes 
to fundamental rights of suspects and evidencing large discretionary powers468 assigned 
to police forces; and a stage II in which the rights of the suspects are kept or even 
strengthened as a compensatory mechanism for the restrictions operated during the first 
stage. Similarly, this bifurcation appears to be common to inquisitorial and accusatorial 
systems, corroborating once more the existing approximation between these two 
systems as highlighted in chapters III and IV. 
 However we must question the scientific foundation underpinning this idea of 
bifurcation of criminal justice models and whether  this is a mere exceptional historical 
situation or a real trend or paradigm shift that will last for years to come? 
In chapters III and IV we analysed the main antiterrorist reforms approved by a 
considerable number of nations in response to the phenomenon of global terrorism and 
transnational organised crime. These measures, whenanalysed comparatively, identified 
                                                
467 Beleza, Teresa, Direito Penal, I Volume, AAFDL Lisboa (1984), p. 67 (translated by the author) 
468 Owens, John, The War on Terror and the Growth of Executive Power?: A Comparative Analysis, 
Routledge  p. 42 
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a particular pattern common to both types of criminal justice systems which consists, as 
mentioned above, of a growing invalidation of fundamental rights469 during the criminal 
investigation stage and, on the other hand, in the consolidation and strengthening of 
these rights during the trial and in the following stages. This situation brings with it 
another element of concern. In fact, a considerable number of detentions do not produce 
any formal charges or even to lead to a trial, so it is not enough to look only to the 
compensation mechanisms. On the contrary, as Soares d  Veiga notes, very often 
suspects see their rights strongly restricted with no additional compensation.470 This 
separation (or bifurcation) is common to both systems and, as pointed out by Rosenfeld 
reveals the need to maintain the constitutional ident ty of the currently existing justice 
systems471, as well as their liberal and democratic nature, to use the famous expression 
of John Rawls.  
Are we facing an exceptional historical moment, a solid trend for reform or even a 
paradigm shift within the criminal justice models? 
Saraiva da Fonseca refers to a paradigm shift as a set of structural changes that show a 
true mutation in terms of identity and nature.472  According to this author paradigmatic 
changes occur, when amendments to the core identity of a particular phenomenon, in 
this case, the criminal justice systems are made. Now, can we speak of a true change in 
the nature and identity of criminal justice systems?  
Shahidullah refers to the nature of criminal justice models as a combination of the 
following elements:  
• Liberal or authoritarian/totalitarian nature, as to the political nature of the system   
                                                
469 Doswald-Beck, Louise, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, Oxford University Press, p. 
255 
470 Soares da Veiga, Raul, “Acesso aos autos em process  penal” in Revista da Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade de Lisboa, AAFDL (2010), pp. 67 - 73 
471 Rosenfeld, Jean, Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves theory and political violence, 
Taylor & Francis (2010) pp. 239 and following. 
472 Fonseca, João Saraiva, Apostila de metodologia da pesquisa científica, Universidade Aberta Ed. 
(2009), p. 11 
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• Constitutional/democratic or authoritarian nature, as to the legitimacy of the system 
• Illuminist/rational or faith-motivated foundation, as to the grounding of the system 
• Humanist or totalitarian nature, as the to the fundamental rights of human beings.473 
It seems evident that the criminal procedural reforms analysed in chapters III 
and IV show a progressive and extensive annihilation of the fundamental rights of 
citizens in basic aspects of their lives such as the right to privacy, to freedom, to 
information and geographic mobility. Gunther Jakobs goes a bit further stating that the 
changes in criminal law represent, in terms of migrat on and foreign communities, a 
civilisational regression when compared to the darkest moments of 20th century 
European history.474  
Similarly, the changes in terms of custody, control and electronic surveillance of 
citizens and telephone interception may affect the lib ral and humanist nature of 
criminal justice systems. In fact, as the analysis of the case of the United Kingdom 
revealed, the priorities and the objectives of criminal policy changed significantly, 
placing the emphasis on the prevention and repression of terrorism and no longer on the 
defence of fundamental rights. These rights have actually been significantly reduced in 
the first stages of proceedings, at the expense of citizens’ freedoms and their confidence 
in the justice system. 
Also with regard to the constitutional nature of criminal justice systems, several 
principles have been explicitly undermined, as argued by Donohue475. The 'control 
orders ' in the United Kingdom and the wide powers conferred by the USA Patriot Act 
caused a severe crisis to the principle of separation of powers476, with an extraordinary 
reinforcement of competences and powers assigned to the Executive at the expense of 
                                                
473 Shahid M. Shahidullah, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, Jones & Bartlett Publishers (2012) pp. 
61 - 81 
474 Jakobs, Gunter, Derecho penal del enemigo, Thomson-Civitas ed., Madrid (2006) p. 45 
475 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at 56 
476 Walker, Clive, Terrorism and the law, Oxford University Press (2011) pp. 326 and following 
 
 
210 
the Judiciary. Some of the most meaningful and grounded principles in the Western 
legal tradition have been seriously challenged, in particular, the principle of guilt and 
the presumption of innocence, mentioned in chapters III and IV, two main corollaries of 
17th and 18th century. 
However, as examined in chapters III and IV, these structural changes seem to 
have been applied mainly to the first stage of the criminal process, which is the stage of 
prevention and criminal investigation. With regard to the next steps, it seems that a few 
compensatory mechanisms have been created, such as the generous system available to 
appeal to higher courts (Portugal) or the obligation of a trial fully open to the public, 
even in cases of terrorism (the Spanish penal reform). As Santos refers: 
"It seems that the major structural changes in contemporary criminal procedures 
take place especially in the early stages of the procedure, which is nothing less than 
perverse, inasmuch as it is precisely when citizens are more unprotected vis-à-
vis the State". 477 
 
Under this perspective criminal justice systems seem to have suffered, in the last 
decade, a two-speed evolution in two distinct directions: on the one hand the first 
procedural stages present an increasing restriction of fundamental rights and an 
exponential increase of public powers, whereas the trial and the final stages of the 
process insist in maintaining and even increasing the citizens' procedural guarantees, 
which can be seen as a mechanism for compensating or, according to Costa Pinto 
(2000), as "a reservation clause of their democratic and liberal identity". 478 
In chapter IV is described how the United States and the United Kingdom bent the 
need for judicial mandates to intercept conversations and to tap phones with a very 
negative impact in terms of the citizens’ right of privacy. In the case of the United 
                                                
478 Costa Pinto, Frederico da, Direito Processual Penal, Universidade de Lisboa (2000), p. 65 
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States, for example, at the time this phenomenon occurred, the jurisprudence of higher 
courts was very reluctant to accept any of these elem nts as evidence presented in 
trial479. Once again, there seems to be an underlying mechanism designed to balance 
and maintain identity, through which the criminal justice system appears to seek, within 
itself, a solid and lasting balance with regard to the destabilising threats caused by 
antiterrorist reforms. 
Following this preliminary framing it is now necessary to build upon each of the 
presented topics, in alignement with the three research questions that are the object of 
this study. Therefore, this chapter will be divided in three specific sections to mach 
those questions. 
In the first section the bifurcation of the criminal justice system will be analysed 
in light  of the antiterrorist measures seen in chapters III and IV. A greater 
understanding over the theroretical analysis - developed in chapter II - of the bifurcation 
of criminal justice systems will be pursued, as well as its legal and constitutional 
implications. 
The second section will analyse the convergence between common and civil 
systems as a result of antiterrorist reforms, and in regard to the legislative endevours 
undertaken as a part of the efforts to fight a commn threat. Through the comparison of 
antiterrorist laws drafted and approved in the different systems under analysis, it is 
possible to highlight the main points in common and the route towards a convergence 
that has been undertaken in the past decade. 
Finally, the third section draws conclusions regarding the impact of those 
measures in the constitutional framework of the rule of law and the liberal nature of 
                                                
479 Gardner, Thomas, Criminal evidence – principles and cases, 8th ed., Cengage Learning (2007) pp. 49 
and following 
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democratic States, seeking to examine wether or not we have before us a new, 
completely different criminal justice system paradigm. 
 
Section I 
 
1. Antiterrorist Legislation and the ‘Bifurcation’ of 
Criminal Justice System 
 
The bifurcation of the criminal justice systems is a result of the antiterrorist 
legislation in the states that have been the object of this study, namely the United 
Kingdom, United States, Spain, Portugal and Israel.  After the careful analysis carried 
out in chapters III and IV, it is important to draw the conclusions that support the idea 
of a bifurcation of the criminal justice systems. In what way has it materialised? In 
which legal grounds is sustained?  
The fundamental impact of terrorism has been especially onnected to the rights 
of freedom and privacy, as Walter refers,480 even though as we have seen it has many 
other consequences. It is also these fundamental rights that the idea of a bifurcation of 
the criminal justice systems is based upon. In other words, the restrictions to the rights 
of freedom and privacy are supportive of a bifurcated model of the criminal justice 
system, distinguishing development stages.  
                                                
480 Walter, Christian, Terrorism as a Challenger for National Ans International Law:  
Security Versus Liberty?, Springer ed., (2004), pp. 51 and following. 
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In chapters III and IV it was possible to observe how pre-trial detention ceased 
to be a precautionary and exceptional measure and became a routine and standard 
procedure with in the criminal justice system. Sousa Santos estimates an increase of 
over 30% in the use of pre-trial detention among European countries, regardless of 
which legal family they belonged to.481  
Here it is important to note that, on par with this considerable increase in pre-
trial detention, states created mechanisms of compensation for those restrictions of 
freedom in the early stages of criminal proceedings, in particular by reinforcing the 
publicity and transparency of trials (as is the case in the reform of article 86 of the 
Portuguese criminal procedure law) and the appeals systems available. 
In other words, if some systems, such as in the United Kingdom and in Portugal, 
consiberably increased the use and extension periods of pre-trial detentions for cases of 
terrorism and organised criminal activities, they simultaneously developing mechanisms 
that safeguarded and compensated for these restrictions in later stages of proceedings. 
This is the foundation for what is designated here as the bifurcation of criminal justice 
systems.  
This idea [bifurcation of criminal justice systems] i  strongly connected to 
circumstances that were seen in chapters III and IV: on the one hand, the new police 
powers regarding surveillance and detention; and on the other, restrictions to freedom of 
speech and freedom of press. 
In both inquisitorial and accusatorial systems it was possible to observe that 
police authorities strengthened their powers of control and surveillance towards citizens, 
translated in measures directed at physical control and also control of communications. 
The examples presented regarding the United Kingdom, the United States, and also 
                                                
481 Sousa Santos, Boaventura,” Direitos humanos: o desafio da interculturalidade”, Revista Direitos 
Humanos, 2, Lisboa (2009), pp. 10-18 
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Portugal and Spain leave no doubt that such measures were substantially strengthened 
after the 9/11 attacks, whilst simultaneously removing the need for judicial intervention 
in such cases.  
It was also demonstrated that in the United Kingdom and in Portugal, for 
example, many situations that had previously requird warrants became solely 
dependent on the decisions of police forces or the ex cutive, with significant 
consequences regarding citizens’ fundamental rights. 
However, several significant court decisions have restricted the use of certain 
electronic surveillance methods in court, namely control of communications or the use 
of remote control vehicles. In Portugal, decision nº 49-B June 6 of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, considered illegal the permanent control, over a period of more than six months, 
of the electronic communications based only on a suspicision that they were “financing 
terrorist activities”. It held that there was insufficient reason to arffect such a significant 
restriction in the fundamental right to intimacy of citizens. 
On the other hand, in the United States, in 2010, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v. Maynard, D.C. Cir. 2010, 
reversed the sentence of a citizen (Antoine Jones) that had been controlled by the police 
through the use of  GPS device planted in his vehicl , onsidering such a measure 
amounted to a search and had violated his rights to intimacy and property without 
reasonable cause. 482 
In this light the double perspective of the bifurcation of the criminal justice 
system becomes clear, as it runs two different paths. On the one hand it intensifies the 
restrictions of fundamental rights in the first stages of proceedings (as response to 
greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism). On the other, in the second stages, 
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stronger and more transparent procedures are required, especially during trial stages, as 
compensation mechanisms of the restrictions brought pon the first stages. This logic - 
close to the reality of countries such as Israel, which experience persistent historical 
problems of domestic and international terrorism – seems to be now influencing most 
western countries, taking into account the analysis undertaken herein. The “bifurcation” 
of the criminal justice system is evident in the vast majority of antiterrorist reforms 
analyzed in chapters III and IV. This can be seen a prevention mechanism by the system 
in itself, as it must co-exist with the previous constitutional framework and therefore 
grounded in the fundamental principles of liberal constitutionalism. As Masferrer refers: 
 “After 9/11 criminal justice systems faced a fundamental dilema: the resolution of 
fundamental and urgent problems in regard to a framework of values and 
fundamental principles that resulted from a world that was substantially different, 
namely from the cold war framework and the small natio list terrorist phenomena. 
So they had to adapt and create a logic of double survival of their own identity: 
respond to the challenges of terrorism with strength and efficiency and maintain the 
liberal identity of their criminal systems. This will continue to be the great 
challenge of the criminal procedure laws in the next decade and one which is 
especially noticeable – and relevant in the area of the protection of privacy and 
intimacy rights of citizens, evermore threatened by surveillance and cooperation 
programs developed by security forces and espionage services.” 483 
 
The new paradigm of involvement and cooperation by police forces when dealing 
with these matters with information and espionage services has been precisely – as was 
mentioned in chapters III and IV – one of the most controversial points of the 
antiterrorist reforms of the past decade. Besides the new powers acquired by 
intelligence services (especially regarding inquisitorial systems), computer programs 
developed for control and surveillance of communications generated further controversy 
and strong debates among civil society. In any case it is evident that individual 
freedoms are objectively threatened by the development of highly intrusive methods of 
personal data and information control. The fact thasuch tools are no longer exclusively 
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in the hands of intelligence services but also of police forces gives us the real dimension 
of the threat concerning the fundamental rights of citizens regarding their privacy and 
intimacy. 484 As for this specific point, the judicial power has been essential in limiting 
the powers of police forces and safeguarding citizens’ fundamental rights. Here, the 
logic inherent to the “bifurcation” has also been flt: while abuses in terrorism related 
cases by intelligence services and special forces have been tolerated in the investigation 
stages, the courts have been extremely demanding in the enforcement of procedural and 
constitutional rules regarding the admission of evid nce obtained in clear violation of 
fundamental rights of intimacy and privacy.485 
Another important point analysed in chapters III and IV was the development of 
marginal communities and new discriminatory criminal policies in the name of the 
antiterrorist struggle, which could be seen both in inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. 
Here, as presented by Gross, the idea of the bifurcation is also particularly relevant. On 
one hand, as we saw in the previous chapters, all of the jurisdictions analysed, 
developed systems of control of migration flows especially tailored towards certain 
communities. Citizens from Arabic countries, the Middle East and North and East 
Africa became the target of closer scrutiny when enteri g or leaving countries. 
Similarly, the change in policies concerning immigration allowed, in Portugal and Spain 
for example, the expulsion of a considerable number of citizens (allegedly involved in 
terrorist activities) from countries in those regions, without judicial appeal.486 
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the right to privacy of any citizen.” (translated by the author)  
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The discrimination between citizens from the same community – based on their 
ethnic or religious belonging – became a new element of reference in the new emerging 
criminal law of the enemy, as could be seen in the cases of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Spain and Israel. As Donohue refers “September 11 had been 
carried out by foreign nationals. It was to this community the [United Kingdom] 
government looked to ascertain the possible threat”.  
But at the same time, higher Courts of all these countries (in Portugal and Spain 
the Constitutional Courts) maintained a demanding jurisprudence built upon the 
principles of equality and non discrimination, as well as upholding the respect for the 
fundamental principles of international law. Soares da Veiga summarises this point in 
an interesting manner: 
“It is peculiar to observe that, despite the growing strength of the criminal law of 
the enemy, constitutional courts throughout Europe have forced the legislator and 
the Executive to significant concessions in the name of the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination. It is a political question to start with, but at the same time 
it is about the identity of criminal justice system: on one hand, the legislator 
considerably raises the repression level towards communities seen as marginal or 
hostil; and on the other, he creates a series of political and legal mechanisms to 
safeguard and protect those same communities.” 487 
 
Again this is a reference to the logic behind the bifurcation of the criminal justice 
system. On the same matter, two separate legal paths, which refer to distinct stages of 
the criminal procedure law. On one hand fundamental rights are considerably restricted 
at an early stage of criminal proceedings; on the other those rights are guaranteed, 
sometimes reinforced, in the later stages of the proceedings, seeking therefore to keep 
the identity of the liberal and constitutional system. 
Finally, it must be questioned if antiterrorist reforms are causing a shift in the 
constitutional paradigm or a change in the nature of a state under democratic rule of 
law? 
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This question has been answered in different ways by several investigators. 
Donohue seems to follow in the direction of a signif cant change regarding the legal and 
constitutional structure of States, namely in the cases of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America,488 as a consequence of antiterrorist reforms. On the o r 
hand, Bacelar Gouveia (and most Portuguese and Spanish uthors) has been extremely 
reluctant to go as far as admitting a “constitutional transition” or a profound change in 
the nature of the liberal state. This author refers that:  
 “If it is certain that the vast majority of antiterro ist legislation has caused a strong 
unbalance between fundamental rights and the security f nction of liberal States, it 
is not absolutely correct to say that we are facing a new constitutional identity or a 
subversion of the judicial nature of these States.” 489 
 
Despite the fact that many of the reforms analysed have a significant impact on 
the system of protection of rights and freedoms (and thus entail a significant change in 
the criminal policies followed by liberal states) there does not seem to be enough 
scientific data to ground the idea of a constitutional transition or of a deep shift in the 
liberal and democratic nature of states. 
On the contrary: the investigation carried out has demonstrated that during the 
past decade no substantial process of constitutional review was started in the countries 
reviewed, nor is any similar process being negotiated s far it is publicly known. 
This is a significant point which deserves our attention: the constitutional identity 
and the identity of legal systems have been kept despite of the significant impact caused 
by antiterrorist reforms. 
Once again, this idea represents a type of compensatio  nd balance within the 
system, safeguarding its principles and essential values. As Conde refers: 
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“ The preservation of the constitutional identity of western states has been a 
constant legal battle. The legislator seeks to restrict fundamental rights and expand 
the powers of public authorities to a limit where these equilibriums are still 
possible to fulfill within the same framework of constitutional values.”  490 
 
 
Section II 
 
1. The Convergence between Accusatorial and Inquisitorial 
Systems 
 
As already made clear in the introduction to this study, criminal procedure models 
were probably the legislative elements that underwent most changes under the 
antiterrorism legislation adopted in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
Indeed, in no other area was the restriction of citizens’ fundamental rights and 
guarantees vis-à-vis the power of the state to investigate and punish their crimes more 
apparent. Also, in no other area was it so clear tht there is a separation, a ‘bifurcation’ 
between the various stages of the criminal justice process, which was initially 
characterised by an excessive and almost exclusive power of public authorities and, 
subsequently, by a balance (although unstable) between the state and those suspected of 
having committed the crimes in question. 
The idea of a single, harmonised criminal justice process in terms of its values and 
principles was definitely in crisis over the last decade, within the framework of the fight 
against terrorism. As Marianne Wade argues, the vast majority of antiterrorism 
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measures focused on the criminal justice process and led to a definitive structural 
imbalance that had not been seen for many decades in most of the codes of criminal 
procedure of Western countries.491 
The bifurcation of criminal justice systems comes with another element, which is 
one of the key conclusions in the analysis of several countries: there is a convergence 
between systems of inquisitorial and accusatorial nature. A convergence with regard to 
the evolutionary trend of the last decade - observed and analysed in chapters III and IV 
of this work - that evidences well-known common aspects to the two types of justice 
systems. Pinto Albuquerque pointedly refers that "the last decade has produced an 
interesting phenomenon within the framework of the legislation on criminal procedure 
law: the classic differences between Continental and A glo-Saxons systems ceased to 
exist and the brotherhood of objectives became the hallmark of this new era of  'war on 
terrorism'. 492 
This phenomenon of convergence between the accusatorial and inquisitorial 
systems is an interesting trend, which can be analysed in different situations. On the one 
hand, situations presenting common trends in their leg slative development reveal also 
similar patterns in antiterrorist reforms. This is, a  presented in the previous chapters, 
the case of the changes made to the terms for telephon  tapping and interception of 
electronic communications. On the other hand, there are situations of rapprochement 
and convergence in which one of the systems approaches the fundamental principles 
that usually identify the other system. This applies to the evolution of pre-trial detention 
regimes in accusatorial systems, evidencing that the models of the United States clearly 
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492 Albuquerque, Pinto de, Direito processual penal: projectos legislativos, Vol. II, Almedina (2006), p. 
67 
 
 
221 
approach the continental models of countries such as Spain, Portugal, France and 
Germany.  
This approximation phenomenon of converging criminal justice systems is 
actually, as emphasised by Olásolo, one of the trends that has sparked great interest 
among the various scientific and academic research communities of this area. 493 
Furthermore, according to this author, although it is true that the evolution of the 
European Community legislation and the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights significantly contributed to the rapprochement between legislations, it was the 
paradigm of a common threat (fighting global terrorism and organised crime, as 
described in chapter II) that did the most to move the process forward of converging the 
different legal systems. Let’s focus again on the example of telephone interceptions and 
their regulatory legal regimes. As explained in chapter IV, before 2001 the British 
legislation required for most situations, a specific mandate for the interception of 
communications. This same regime was applicable in inquisitorial systems, namely 
Portugal and Spain that had quite similar criminal procedural law schemes. In 
accordance with articles 123 et seq. of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure, 
prior to 2006 telephone tapping could only be carried out, with the authorisation of a 
judge, if the following requirements were met: a) crimes with a maximum sentence of at 
least 5 years; b) indispensability of the medium, that is, there is no other mean available 
to obtain the desired information that is less restrictive and invasive of privacy; c) the 
investigating magistrate monitors and periodically reviews the procedure, at least  every 
three months.  
However after the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, both schemes 
suffered a similar evolution: in the United Kingdom and the United States the need for 
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mandates (liberalisation of warrants) has been made significantly pliable allowing for an 
increasing number of agencies and officers to have acc ss to the contents of telephone 
and electronic communications; In Portugal and Spain there was a real transfer from the 
Judiciary power to the Executive power494, putting an end to the interference of courts 
in a very large number of situations. Indeed the new article 127 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure no longer requires the intervention of Portuguese investigative judges as the 
decision-making body but only to review the actions f the Executive body. Basically, 
the real decision of authorising interceptions and telephone tapping went on to be in the 
hands of various criminal police bodies. As Boaventura Sousa Santos refers: 
“Bending the need for judicial mandates had, in contine tal systems, a more 
perverse feature capable of generating unbalance in the system: what happened 
here was a true transfer of power between the Judiciary and the Executive bodies, 
reversing the procedural regimes to times prior to 1975.” 495 
 
But it is perhaps in the area of financial counterterrorism that the convergence 
phenomenon is most noticeable. Before 9/11 the British legislation to fight the funding 
of terrorism was composed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 
and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision ) Act 1974: both contained 
clauses that gave the British Government important powers regarding the control of 
property in Northern Ireland. In addition, these legal instruments gave authorities a 
diverse set of skills, enabling them to seize and freeze any funds or property that were 
suspected of being used to commit acts of terrorism against the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, some of these powers demanded the interve ion of courts: for example, 
under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, it was the courts’ 
competence to freeze and seize goods of individuals formally convicted of belonging to 
or financing any of the following organisations declared illegal: Sinn Féin, the IRA, 
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Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hÉireann, Saor Éire and the UVF. In the following 
decades some legislative acts slowly increased the powers of the State in terms of 
financial control. This was the case of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1998 and the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 (which introduced and specifically defined crimes of 
financing terrorism and the use of goods with terrorist purposes). 
However, the antiterrorist reforms undertaken in 2001, in particular the 
Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, introduced, as Laura Donohue refers, 
important changes that had a significant impact on the rights of citizens, businesses and 
financial institutions. On the one hand, Governments were given wide authority to 
freeze any amount of money or goods suspected of having any relation to terrorist 
organisations, even without the existence of a judicial procedure.496  On the other hand, 
both citizens and financial institutions now had the specific legal obligation to provide 
information to financial authorities whenever a relation with terrorist activities was 
suspected, even without any specific criminal investigation or judicial intervention. The 
violation of these obligations could generate penalties of up to two years imprisonment.  
In addition, these powers-which initially were resticted to cases of terrorism or 
subversion – were expanded for common crimes, including complex tax or financial 
crimes, as foreseen by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2001. As Tim Parkman refers, the 
antiterrorism legislation provoked a real paradigmatic change in the control of financial 
flows, whereby the State now has the power to control all transactions occurring within 
the economy497, having also real power to intervene under the mere suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
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In terms of financial control, there was a fairly similar evolution in Portugal. 
Before 2002, the financial counter-terrorism scheme had virtually no application, to the 
extent that it had been specifically created to fight uerrillas (within the framework of 
the colonial war until 1974). According to the 1982 Penal Code, it was even considered 
as a common crime (not specifically related to terrorism). However, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure expressly required the need for judicial mandates to freeze or seize 
any goods or quantities of money, without distinguishing or creating any specific 
regime for cases of terrorism and organised crime. On the other hand, to permanently 
freeze goods or securities, some kind of judicial process had to be completed or 
underway in relation to the individuals or organisations formally facing the charges of 
crimes of terrorism, corruption, money laundering or illicit transfer of income abroad, 
However, after the attacks of 2001 - and especially fter the bombings of Madrid in 
2004 – the financial terrorism scheme changed radically. On the one hand, the decision 
of freezing goods or money is now solely dependent on he Judicial Police and Tax 
Authority, without any judicial intervention. On the other hand, the requirement to have 
some kind of judicial process or judicial condemnation underway ceased to exist. The 
freezing of goods is now entirely dependent on the "reasonable suspicion that certain 
goods or values may, directly or indirectly, be used to finance terrorist organisations or 
activities, regardless of the form of use or their effective implementation".498  
Similarly to what was witnessed in the United Kingdom, also in Portugal the 
intervention of courts was foregone, which the Executive power often sees as time-
consuming, inefficient and too concerned with citizens' rights. At the same time, the 
control of property and financial flows were channelled to the Executive power, by 
increasing its enforcement powers and, above all, by forcing financial institutions to a 
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set of increasingly comprehensive and detailed information. Article 15 B of the same 
law no. 65/2005 of 4 January determines, that financial institutions are obliged to 
inform the Government about all financial transfers xceeding EUR 500,000, as well as 
all suspicious movements involving terrorist organis tions or other similar to these. It 
furthermore determines that the duty to inform encompasses all requests made by the 
tax or police authorities for cases showing evidences that the financing of terrorist 
organisations or activities. 
There are therefore striking similarities between both presented schemes, which 
have the following defining features:  the expansio of the executive powers, the 
weakening of the judiciary power and the sharp increase of information duties (which 
came along with an equally sharp restriction to the right to privacy of citizens). This is a 
true convergence phenomenon between the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. 
As Júnior refers: 
 "The approximation between the common law and the civil law systems is visible 
in many reforms that have been approved over the past twenty years. However, the 
last decade and its structural reforms of most models of criminal procedure have 
generated a true phenomenon of identity merger".499  
 
However, although the idea of an approximation betwe n the identities of both 
systems might seem excessive, the phenomenon of legislative convergence within the 
context of the fight against terrorism is a reality that has been increasingly highlighted 
by researchers engaged with criminal justice system. 
 There is one remaining issue that must be raised: I  the bifurcation of the criminal 
justice system and the convergence between civil law and common law systems a mere 
historical coincidence or a trend of change that can be proven scientifically?   
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The question has to be examined with caution, taking into consideration the 
limitations of social sciences methodology. To talk bout a paradigm shift or, as per 
Osvaldo Jr., about an identity that is common to the different families of criminal justice 
systems500, seems to be excessive or, at least, without solid an  consistent scientific 
foundation. The bifurcation of criminal justice systems and the convergence between 
the different legal families has been a consistent evolution trend over the last decade. 
Chapters III and IV show strong evidences of this evolution, evinced by the antiterrorist 
reforms performed in several legal areas, such as te financial control and the pre-trial 
detention schemes. This trend, as highlighted by Faria Costa, will tend to increase in the 
foreseeable future, under the same guidelines that have existed since the 9/11 attacks.501 
Little by little, antiterrorist reforms significantly altered the structure of criminal 
justice models to which we were accustomed to, moving away from the fundamental 
principles of rationalistic liberalism and from the ideals based on humanist and 
Christian formation that inspired the tradition of Western constitutions502.  This was a 
common path, hence the phenomenon of approximation nd convergence between the 
different legal families. Nevertheless, to talk about a change or paradigmatic transition 
is to go further than the scientific data allows us to do, crossing the borders of scientific 
methodology. The proof that it would be eventually excessive to be speaking of a 
paradigm shift within the criminal legal system, is in fact already mentioned in chapter 
IV: despite legislative changes, the various Constitutions have remained largely 
unchanged, preserving their fundamental principles and guiding values. However, it is 
worth noting that the meaning of some of these principles and rights has suffered 
significant changes in spite of maintaining the same formal existence. This implies that 
even though several States decided to maintain their essential constitutional framework 
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of principles and values, they were given new meaning, by loosening their legal scope 
and restricting their protective effects, as a result of the antiterrorist reforms seen in 
chapters III and IV. Ashworth emphasizes this point when he talks of a ‘hollowing out 
of rights’.503 
 It should also be noted that, on this issue, none f the analysed countries is 
currently undergoing any constitutional review process, nor are they expected to do in 
the near future. Furthermore, as Bacelar Gouveia refers, the integrity and the protection 
of constitutional values in the West are still the most effective barrier against the 
profound cost of our antiterrorist regimes in terms criminal justice systems.504 
 
Section III 
 
1. The impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on the 
Liberal and Democratic Nature of the Constitutional 
Rule of Law 
 
As Jakobs points out, the constant fight against terrorism and organised crime in 
the last ten years has severely restricted, if not ignored, some of the most important 
modern constitutional postulates, such as the right to freedom, the principle of 
presumption of innocence, the right to a lawyer anddefence counsel at any stage of the 
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proceedings, the right to appeal to the higher courts, the principle of material truth, the 
right to non-discrimination on the basis of race or religion, etc. 
This new “criminal law of the enemy”505 has no doubt affected the fundamental 
structure of the democratic rule of law and its nature as inherited from the political 
liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the one hand, the humanist criminal law, as 
Figueiredo Dias called it, was definitively undermined.506 
The reflection to be developed should consider two different aspects. On the one 
hand, to know if we can speak of a Constitutional Rule of Law identity in the 
contemporary era, i.e. whether or not we can identify a set of principles and values that 
are common to this type of rule and that can be undermined by the counter-terrorism 
measures. On the other hand, it is important to ascertain to what extent the measures 
adopted to combat terrorism and transnational organised crime have caused a real 
mutation in the liberal nature of the constitutional rule of law or if this change has 
limited itself to configuring the criminal justice system and, therefore, just a part of that 
Constitutional Rule of Law. 
According to Murphy, the first step of this reflection should in any case be to 
recognise the changes in the legal system. The rule of law has inevitably adapted to new 
circumstances arising out of the September 11 attacks nd, over the last decades, this 
adaptation has brought about a real change in the ess ntial structure of the criminal 
justice systems of most Western countries.507  
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In this regard, research conducted in the various countries seems to show that the 
changes in the structure of the rule of law should be identified and grouped as follows: 
1. changes in the criminal procedure rules relating to criminal 
investigations, gathering evidence and coercive measur s; 
2. changes relating to the structure and overall purpose f the criminal 
justice system; 
3. changes in the constitutional nature of the state and its identity as a rule 
of law; 
 
With regard to the first point, as Roxin points out, there is consensus among all 
authors that the rules relating to the first stage of criminal proceedings (i.e. criminal 
investigation and preventive measures) have diametrically reversed the trend observed 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s in most Western countries. Most of these 
measures have already been identified and explained above, such as the facilitation of 
wiretapping and the increase of data relating to pre-trial detention in Portugal and Spain. 
As for the second point, it has to do with what some authors call the objectives of 
the criminal justice system, i.e. the goals that criminal procedure aims to achieve and 
secure with the measures it applies. This is basically where we find the classic 
differences related to the objectives of the global justice system: ensuring the 
application of criminal penalties, ensuring a set of insurmountable rights for suspects, or 
meeting the needs of crime victims as far as possible. According to George F. Cole, the 
fight against terrorism and organised crime has reformulated the objectives of the 
criminal justice system, which, on the one hand, now has as its main objective the 
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effective and expeditious investigation of terrorism and terrorism-related crimes, and, 
on the other hand, invests in crime prevention.508 
This seems to be a fact that cannot be ignored, according to the data obtained. 
During the 1990s, even criminal justice systems that were based on a predominantly 
protective approach (i.e. focused on fundamental rights) substantially changed their 
concerns, as was the case, for example, of Belgium and Luxembourg. Therefore, these 
systems went on to focus on two essential concerns: the prevention and investigation of 
crimes related to terrorist activities. As Valmonte argues: 
“During the last decade, the global concern about terrorism has essentially changed 
the public and well-known objectives of criminal justice systems, not only in 
Brazil, but virtually in all Western countries. We have provided these countries 
with effective tools for the investigation, control and prevention of terrorism and 
organised crime, rather than for the protection of rights, freedoms and guarantees. 
For this new dominant approach, the protection of fundamental rights is inherent in 
the war waged against terrorism.” 509  
 
The last point – changes in the liberal and democratic n ture of the rule of law – 
requires deeper reflection. On the one hand, as mention d above, it is inevitable to see 
that the principles of proportionality, equality and the right of defence (constitutionally 
enshrined rights, for example, in Portugal, Spain, France and Germany) are in crisis in 
the context of the fight against terrorism. A practical example is pointed out by Paulo 
Pinto de Albuquerque, analysing both common law and civil law systems: while before 
the reform of 2006 the application of pre-trial detention was an option (to be applied in 
exceptional cases and only under a specific set of circumstances), after this reform, the 
application of pre-trial detention became virtually inevitable in cases of terrorism or 
organised crime. This reality undermines a principle deeply rooted in existing criminal 
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justice systems, in both in common law and civil law countries: the principle of 
presumption of innocence of the suspect. 510  
It may therefore be concluded that there has been a substantial change in the 
identity and objectives of the criminal justice system. We may even agree that some of 
the principles traditionally accepted in the contemporary approach of criminal procedure 
and inherited from the political liberalism of the post-French Revolution have been 
definitely undermined in the context of the global war on terrorism. Another (more 
comprehensive) question is whether the dynamics and structure of the Constitutional 
Rule of Law is also undergoing a transition or paradigm shift? In a way, the question is 
whether the identified changes lie strictly and specifically within the field of criminal 
justice or whether they are already on a wider plane of political science and 
constitutional structure of the countries?511 
As already mentioned above, the costs of the war on terrorism and organised 
crime seem obvious today and assume various types: economic costs, legal costs and 
civilisational costs. The first are evident and well-identified in the reports prepared by 
the U.S. Senate and the European Union itself in 2010 and 2011. For example, a study 
conducted by researchers from Brown University’s Watson Institute for International 
Studies estimates that the economic costs related to the war on terrorism for the United 
States stand at four trillion dollars since 2001, considering only the costs directly linked 
to the wars fought in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and also the terrorist attacks 
perpetrated against U.S. interests. In addition to these, a whole set of indirect costs will 
also have to be taken into account.512 
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Finally, we have the civilisational costs related to the cultural and axiological 
heritage of the West, particularly the values inherited from the French Revolution. As 
Adhémar Eismein argues, the vast majority of values considered essential in the field of 
criminal procedure law derive from the imaginary advocated by the political liberalism 
of the 18th and 19th centuries, which was unreservedly asserted by the French 
Revolution of 1789. Now, it seems inevitable to conclude that many of these values 
were compromised, or at least required another type of interpretation,513 by the criminal 
reforms undertaken by most Western countries in the fig t against terrorism. 
The civilisational costs of the war on terrorism are represented not only by the 
number of human lives lost, but also by the undermining of values of freedom and 
property and, as Sakamoto points out, by the definitive abandonment of a perspective of 
multilateralism and diplomatic negotiation that had been gaining ground in the 1990s 
and disappearing altogether after the September 11 attacks.514 
However, regarding the question of a transition or a real mutation in the nature of 
the rule of law, a definitive answer seems to be exaggerated, if not premature. Although 
the changes identified above are varied and represent unavoidable costs of the war on 
terrorism and organised crime, they are not enough, alone, to cause a change in the 
nature of the Constitutional Rule of Law. As Poggi po nts out, we must not forget that 
the modern state, with all its functions, is an extraordinarily broad and complex entity 
that cannot be restricted to the specific area of criminal justice.515 Indeed, even if the 
changes brought about after September 11 cover such widespread areas as banking and 
financial regulation – or the use of the Internet and regulation of the right of asylum and 
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immigration – we must not forget that the liberal nture of the democratic rule of law is 
a much broader concept, both from a historical and philosophical point of view and 
from a legal and social point of view. 
 
2. Conclusion  
 
An extremely interesting fact should be noted from a comparative law 
perspective: while most Western states have adopted, as we have seen, specific counter-
terrorist legislation following 9/11 and 11/3 (Madrid) attacks, very few of them were 
willing to amend the Constitution in the troubled period of the war on terrorism. In 
reality, what could be observed was the suspension of certain legal protections and 
fundamental rights, as well as the derogation of a some articles of the ECHR. The 
United Kingdom for example derrogated article 5 of the ECHR as to apply, in its legal 
system, ‘control orders’ and indefinite detention of f reigners suspected of terrorist 
activities. As Donohue refers: 
“The 2001 Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) gave the British 
Secretary of State the authority to specially designate (“certify”) foreign 
individuals reasonably suspected of being a terrorist, and defined terrorist broadly, 
to include anyone with links to international terrorist organisations. Where either a 
point of law or practical considerations prevented deportations, the legislation 
provided for indefinite detention. To ensure that the State was in good standing 
with its international obligations, the United Kingdom formally derogated from 
Article 5 (I) of the ECHR.” 516 
 
This is a curious fact that should make us think carefully about the liberal nature 
and constitutional structure of the contemporary rule of law, which shows very few and 
insignificant changes in the context of constitutional law.  
                                                
516 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at 58 
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So what is the real meaning of this? On the one hand it shows that in spite of the 
profound changes in the respective systems of criminal justice, there hasn’t been a shift 
in the constitutional paradigm and that while inserted in different legal systems the 
models of criminal procedure remain anchored to a common set of fundamental 
principles. On the other hand, it also demonstrates, as Canotilho illustrates, that the 
modern liberal Constitutions, specially the written o es, were able to create protection 
and consolidation mechanisms, notably for crisis and emergency situations such as 
those we have lived in the past decade.517 In the words of this author, this is a 
constitutionalism with eyes set on the future and which requires anti-crisis 
mechanisms.518 
In any case, there is not enough data to prove the existence of a constitutional 
transition or a paradigm shift in the liberal and democratic nature of the rule of law. 
What there really is, no doubt, as Donohue points out, is the existence of a very high 
legal and civilisational cost for that same rule of law,519 which is forced to sacrifice 
some of the core values and postulates of its existence. In this regard, we have already 
mentioned the principle of presumption of innocence, proportionality and the right to 
defence of suspects. However, fundamental values such as the right to legal defence, the 
protection of fundamental rights, and the right to privacy have also been deeply affected 
by legislative counter-terrorism measures adopted in several countries. 
However, what seems evident, as Soares da Veiga points out, is that we can speak 
of a crisis of the fundamental values of the criminal justice system in place in the 
majority of western countries. Regardless of facing a constitutional transition or a shift 
in paradigm, what is at stake is a deep crisis of the values inherent to the systems of the 
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criminal justice of liberal nature. The costs of antiterrorist reforms are very diverse and 
relevant in relation to the fundamental freedoms, structure of State and citizens’ trust.  
These three elements, referred by Chang,520 reveal a profound crisis of the 
dominating model of criminal justice in most western countries. 
Whether we are or not before a shift in the paradigm of criminal justice, only the future 
– and perhaps a near future – will tell. The equilibrium that will be found between 
security needs and the protection of human rights – in areas so diverse such as 
electronic surveillance, control over financial trans ctions or the right to freedom and to 
privacy – will be indicators of the direction towards criminal justice systems are headed. 
As Seidl refers the structure behind this balance or behind those multiple equilibrium 
should provide us with a clear image of the emerging criminal justice system in the age 
of global terrorism.521 
We should however bear in mind, as Donohue points ou , that some of the 
measures included in the antiterrorist legislation approved by the West in the past 
decade may have immediate beneficial effects, but prove to be harmful in the long 
run.522  
In the short run they may contain the terrorist threat and give a false sense of 
strength and security. In the long run however, they are hugely restrictive of citizens’ 
freedoms and undermine the confidence – especially within minority communities – in 
democratic institutions, causing further radicalization which in the future may have a 
much deeper effect in regard to civil society. 
The costs of antiterrorist legislation are profoundly rooted in the societies we 
live in. Every day we are confronted and become more aware of the serious issues 
                                                
520 Chang, Nancy, Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Antiterrorism Measures Threaten 
Our Civil Liberties, Seven Stories Press (2011), pp.. 15 - 28 
521 Seidl, Florian, Terrorism and the Balance Between Freedom and Security, GRIN Verlag (2007) p. 67 
522 Donohue, Laura, supra note 33 at 89  
 
 
236 
surrounding control and surveillance mechanisms adopte  in all corners of the globe 
after 9/11. The scandals of electronic surveillance and espionage carried out by several 
North American and European intelligence agencies ar  just the tip of the iceberg of a 
long and much needed debate that the civil society must face in order to identify what 
our systems of criminal justice should look like. In the complex and unpredictable fight 
against global terrorism questions such as what rights are we willing to give up, and 
what freedoms will we uphold no matter what, cannot be ignored. And they are crucial 
to ensure the survival of the democratic rule of law among liberal states.523  
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APPENDIX 
Some events that shaped modern terrorism - A brief chronology 
 
In September 1972, the confirmation that innocents were to become targets of 
terrorist acts came when, during the Munich Olympics, a group of Palestinian 
extremists killed some of the Israeli athletes.524 
In December 1975, a radical group led by the Venezuelan terrorist Illich 
Ramirez Carlos, carried out the kidnapping of 11 ministers of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna.525 
In 1982, in Beirut, Lebanon, a terrorist attack with car bombs caused 200 deaths 
in the barracks of marines.526 
In 1988, terrorists stroke again, this time with a commercial airliner that crashed 
in Lockerbie, Scotland, leading to the death of 259 passengers and a few by-standing 
Scots. At the time this was considered the largest terrorist attack since World War II. 
The attack was attributed to two Libyan nationals, whom Libya refused to hand to the 
U.S. authorities.527 
In 1992, the Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was destroyed in an 
attack without antecedents for its magnitude: 30 people died. The attack was claimed by 
a command of Arabic origin. 
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Also in 1992 the Algerian president Mohammed Boudiaf w s assassinated. At 
this time Islamic fundamentalism triggers systematic terrorist actions with alarming 
proportions.528 
In 1993, in New York, one of the "most spectacular" terrorist episodes in U.S. 
history occurred: an armed van parked in the subterran an level of the World Trade 
Centre blew up, killing six people. The authorship was attributed to Bin Laden and his 
organisation.529 
In 1994, Argentina was again the stage for terrorists. The headquarters of the 
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AIMA) was targeted, causing more than 100 
deaths and many injuries. This was considered one of the deadliest attacks in the 
country’s history.530  
Japan started dealing with a new kind of terrorism in 1995, when the sect 
"Supreme Truth" triggered a series of attacks with neurotoxic gases.531 
In 1995, the U.S. federal building in Oklahoma exploded, causing 168 deaths. It 
was the biggest terrorist attack suffered in the country up to this date. The authorship 
was attributed to Timothy McVeigh, who had been a soldier in the Gulf War, and who 
was later arrested and sentenced to death.532 
In November 1997, in Egypt, new and bloody attacks occurred against foreign 
tourists. Islamic terrorists claimed these attacks.533 
In August 1998, two different attacks occurred on U.S. embassies in Africa 
within a few minutes. The first was in Nairobi (Kenya) with the explosion of a car 
bomb, killing 213 people. The second occurred in Tazania, partially destroying the 
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U.S. Embassy. Both attacks were attributed to the number one enemy of the U.S. at the 
time, Osama Bin Laden.534 
The largest terrorist attack in history occurred on September 11, 2001. Four 
commercial airliners were taken by terrorists in Boston, and subsequently diverted. Two 
hit the 100-floored Twin Towers of the World Trade C ntre in New York. The same 
that had been targeted by terrorists in 1993, now ceased to exist, dragging thousands of 
people to death. A few minutes later the third plane crashed against the U.S. military 
base, the Pentagon, which was partially destroyed. A fourth plane crashed in   
Pennsylvania.535 
On March 11, 2004, ten bombs went off virtually simultaneously in trains 
carrying commuters into Madrid. 190 people died in the attacks, with approximately 
2,000 people wounded. 
The terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005 tested the London Resilience Partnership plans to 
the limit, as four suicide bombers killed 52 passengers and injured nearly 800 on the 
city’s transport network. Three bombs went off at 8.50am on underground trains just 
outside Liverpool Street and Edgware Road stations, a d on another travelling between 
King's Cross and Russell Square. The final explosion was around an hour later on a 
double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, not far from King's Cross. 
 In November 2008, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (a group, whose name means "Army of 
the Pious"), a Pakistani based muslim extremist group,  lauched twelve coordinated 
shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, killing 166 people, including 28 
foreigners from 10 different countries, many of whom were separated and executed. 
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On the 21st September 2013, Al-Shabab’s jihadist fighters raided Nairobi’s 
Westgate shopping centre and made a stand-off with Quenian police forces which lasted 
for three days, killing 67 people and injuring nearly 200. Non-muslims were singled out 
for executions and a hostage situation gave the event global mediatic coverage. 
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